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A Self-Study Guide to Theory 
Preface 
The book is written for active learners – those keen on cutting their own 
path through the complex and at times hardly comprehensible world of 
THEORY in International Relations. Learning and studying is an active 
process that requires a great deal of self-organization. To aid this process as 
much as possible, this book employs the didactical and methodical concept 
of integrating teaching and self-study. It will do so by offering a structured 
concept for learning about theories of International Relations, the applica-
tion of which will be demonstrated in the book. The intention behind this 
concept is to enable students to subsequently apply the concept themselves 
when learning about theory and theories of International Relations. In an at-
tempt to be as learner-oriented as possible, the book will offer advice and 
guidance on studying IR theory by integrating self-study instructions 
throughout the text. The book also requires readiness to look at phenomena 
from different perspectives, to critically question teaching and learning 
contents and to actively engage in critical debates and share knowledge. In 
order to meet these learning challenges adequately, readers should expect to 
set aside at least twice as much time for self-study as they will spend read-
ing the book.  
The criteria for structured learning about IR theory will be derived from 
an extensive discussion of the questions and problems of philosophy of sci-
ence (Part 1 of the book). This is because the learning objective of the book is 
NOT to learn about particular theories of IR (such as Neo-Institutionalist or 
New Liberal Theory) as is the case in most of the textbooks on IR theories, 
but to learn about THEORY itself. Theory of IR refers to the scientific study 
of IR and covers all of the following subtopics: the role and status of theory 
in the academic discipline of IR; the understanding of IR as a science and 
what a “scientific” theory is; the different assumptions upon which theory 
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building in IR is based; the different types of theoretical constructions and 
models of explanations found at the heart of particular theories; and the dif-
ferent approaches taken on how theory and the practice of international rela-
tions are linked to each other.  
The criteria for the structured learning process will be applied in Part 2 of 
the book during the presentation of five selected theories of International Re-
lations. The concept is based on “learning through example” – that is, the five 
theories have been chosen because, when applying the criteria developed in 
Part 1 of the book, each single theory serves as an example for something 
deeply important to learn about THEORY of IR more generally. The presen-
tation of those five theories will be based on the concept of a reference au-
thor. Each will be presented using the coherent body of theoretical work done 
by a single accepted representative of the theoretical strand and structured ac-
cording the criteria derived from Part 1. The concept of a reference author 
has also been successfully applied in a textbook introducing eighteen theories 
of IR (Schieder/Spindler 2010 and Schieder/Spindler 2013, forthcoming). 
Readers interested in learning more about particular theories of IR might find 
it helpful to read not only this book on THEORY but to also combine it with 
the textbook by Schieder/Spindler (2013) and other works that provide more 
specific introductions to the large number of individual IR theories. You will 
find the titles in the reference section at the end of the book. 
In short, the focus of this book is not on the five theories themselves but 
rather on what they stand for in terms of philosophy of science. Most im-
portant are the insights that their analysis through the philosophical lenses 
can provide for our understanding of the role and function of theory more 
generally. 
By the end of the book, the learning method should have enabled students 
to apply the philosophy of science criteria – the guide to a structured learning 
process – to any specific theory of their interest as well as to their own theo-
retical work. They should also be able to engage in a critical discussion on 
the topic of International Relations as a science. 
The two parts of the book are divided into nine learning units altogether – 
four in Part 1 and five in Part 2. Each learning unit usually consists of three 
to seven learning steps, including a summary of key aspects, a range of re-
view questions and, in general, two to four self-study instructions integrated 
into the text. At the end of each unit are recommendations for required and 
supplementary reading.  
The book is written in a communicative style that aims to replicate “a 
conversation”. For the more auditory learners among you, an audio CD based 
on the book will be released soon. 
7 
In each unit, there will be several summaries in the text as well as key as-
pects listed at the end. However, when reading, please also be aware of and 
concentrate on the words and phrases in italic type and bold print that high-
light particularly relevant issues and terms. 
It is the very nature of the book to present “thought in progress”. In line 
with the learner-oriented concept introduced above, the book will not finish 
with a conclusion or any fixed “outcome”. As a result of the integrated self-
study parts, your learning progress will be geared to your own individual 
pace and will depend greatly on how you linked and applied what you have 
learned to additional readings. Instead of providing a conclusion, the book 
will finish by formulating a range of questions on IR as a science that are 
meant to stimulate and invite you to actively engage in further discussion. 
For this purpose, the book is linked to a course on iversity (iversity.org) 
where you will find additional information and useful links as well as oppor-
tunities to share your knowledge and to engage in discussions in a range of 
working groups on different aspects of IR theory. For admission to the 
course, please send an email with a short statement about your interests to 
SpindlerIRTheory-Book@yahoo.de.  
Last but not least, I would like to give thanks to a range of people for their 
support of the book project. My first and special thanks goes to Alexandra 
Skinner (alexandraskinner.edit@gmail.com) for making the text a much more 
readable book through her careful and thoughtful language editing. Beyond 
that, I am indebted to the students of my IR Theory and Philosophy of Sci-
ence classes at the University of Erfurt and the Brandt School of Public Poli-
cy as well as to the PhD candidates attending my courses on Macro-
Theoretical Approaches to International Relations at the Graduate School of 
Global Politics at the Free University of Berlin for their test-reading of se-
lected chapters of Part 2 of the book. Among the latter group, my special 
thanks goes to Jost Wübbeke for his detailed and helpful comments on Part 1 
and to Daniel Cardoso, Philani Mthembu and Miguel Verde for their com-
ments on Unit 9.  
Responsibility for mistakes and misrepresentations is mine alone and I am 
happy to receive any comments and advice that will help to make this a better 
book. 
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Systematic and methodical reflections about international relations and there-
fore “theory” and “methods” are core criteria to be applied when discussing 
the “birth” of an academic discipline. However, tracing the formation of the 
discipline “International Relations” back in history is not an easy undertak-
ing, as a great deal of controversy exists over the actual “birthday” of Interna-
tional Relations as an academic discipline. 
This controversy has much to do with the status of “theory” within the 
discipline. Does an academic discipline start once there is historical evidence 
of theoretical reflections on the core subject? Do we need additional criteria 
to think of a new discipline, such as the existence of departments or some 
sort of “infrastructure” where theoretical reflection, research and academic 
teaching take place?  
Academic discipline formation in the field of International Relations can-
not be meaningfully discussed without some deeper knowledge of the history 
of political thought on interstate relations. Step 1 of this unit will introduce 
readers to the history of International Relations theory. This will not merely 
take the form of a descriptive account of the history of thought on interstate 
relations. Rather, the process of tracing back the history of ideas on interna-
tional relations will be guided by the thesis that any theoretical reflections 
strongly depend on and are part of real-world (international) politics. The his-
tory of International Relations theory is closely tied to the history of the Eu-
ropean states system. It is crucial for our understanding of IR theory to know 
when and why theoretical reflections on interstate relations emerged in histo-
ry. Therefore, Step 1 will introduce a specific account of the history of IR 
theory. It will be complemented by a perspective on the discipline’s for-
mation after World War I, or in other words, a focus on its institutional de-
velopment with the first departments and chairs of International Relations 
and the new understanding of International Relations as a “science”, requir-
ing a scientific study of interstate relations. 
Step 2 will make a suggestion to students as to how to discuss the core 
subject of International Relations conceptually. Conclusions will be drawn 
for further discussions of the role and function of theory in International Re-
lations.  
These three aspects of the first learning unit – a basic understanding of the 
discipline’s development and its core subject, together with an initial under-
standing of how the core subject is studied – are essential preconditions for 
enlarging upon the scientific study of IR and scientific IR theory in the next 
step (Part 1, Unit 2). 
15 
Before we start to learn more about the academic discipline of International 
Relations, we have to reach a consensus on how to use the terminology at the 
core of our first learning unit (and throughout the book) in order to avoid any 
misunderstanding.   
The term International Relations (IR as the abbreviation, in capital let-
ters) refers to the academic discipline. Sometimes the discipline is called In-
ternational Politics, International Studies, World Politics or Global Politics.  
International relations or international politics (lower case) is the term 
used for the core subject of the academic discipline. That is, international re-
lations/international politics are the “real world-processes” and thus the sub-
ject to study by IR as an academic discipline (or international politics, world 
politics or global politics, if you prefer). For the scholarship that analyzes 
those “real-world-processes” you will sometimes also find the abbreviation 
SIR in textbooks, that is, scholarship or the study of international relations. 
Throughout the book, you will find the conventional term “International 
Relations” referring to the academic discipline. For the theory within this ac-
ademic discipline (International Relations theory), the abbreviation “IR theo-
ry” is used. 
Step 1:  
International Relations from an historical perspective: 
Interstate theory and discipline formation 
1.1 A social and political “need” for a theory of interstate 
relations   
The thesis of a strong linkage between real-world (international) political re-
lations and the systematic theoretical reflection on interstate relations will be 
at the heart of the specific account of the history of IR theory. It is derived 
from a central argument in the writings of Andreas Osiander (1994, 1996, 
2008), a German political scientist and historian. He provides a “needs-
oriented” view of International Relations theory that is worth discussing in 
more detail for the purpose of our first learning unit. 
At the core of Osiander’s writing about the history of thought in Interna-
tional Relations lies the basic argument that political thought is always “needs-
oriented”. It is the concerns that are of primary importance to society that 
cause a “need” for theoretical reflection (Osiander 1996: 43). Interstate rela-
tions (that is, relations between states, hence inter-state) became such a prima-
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ry concern to society and therefore only “caused” a need for theoretical reflec-
tion as a result of the advent of two conditions in history. The first condition 
consists of the existence of a more or less stable system of states in which 
states interact. Without states and a state system there would be no reflection 
about interstate relations. Second, the system of states has to be “integrated”. 
The more a system of states becomes “integrated”, the more likely it is that 
theoretical reflection takes place (Osiander 1996: 43). This is basically a 
statement about the social and political relevance of interstate relations: once 
inter-state relations become highly relevant for societies, systematic theoreti-
cal reflection about those interstate relations will occur. The social and politi-
cal relevance is the defining feature of what Osiander calls “interstate interde-
pendence”. Only when the mutual economic and military dependency of states 
becomes socially and politically relevant, or in other words, when it affects the 
functioning or even the survival of the societies, will those interstate relations 
become the object of theoretical inquiry on a larger scale. The higher the level 
of interdependence and the more a state system is “integrated”, the more theo-
retical reflection there will be on interstate relations.  
Theoretical reflection on interstate relations therefore took place histori-
cally on a larger scale once such an “integrated” system of states with the de-
fining feature of interstate interdependence came into being. This change did 
not occur before the industrial revolution, and Osiander convincingly devel-
ops a line of argument that traces the development of political thought on in-
terstate relations back in history up to that “threshold”, beyond which theory 
formation occurred on a larger scale. With the advent of industrialization, the 
mutual dependence of states became so significant to the state and to society 
as a whole that a real “need” developed for a theory of interstate relations. 
More precisely, the history of the European states system can be discussed as 
a history of rising levels of interdependence, with interstate relations becom-
ing more and more relevant to societies. It is this history that brought about 
theories of international relations. 
It is worthwhile to take the argument further by briefly discussing the his-
torical developments behind it in more detail, starting with antiquity (the 
states system of city-states in ancient Greece and of the large-scale Roman 
empire), and moving through the European Middle Ages with the feudal 
state, the Italian states system, eighteenth century Europe and the nineteenth 
century with its industrialization, nationalism and increasingly integrated 
world economy. The next sections will draw on Osiander 1996. Please note 
that the text written by Osiander will be part of the required reading. It will 
give you the chance to explore the line of argument in depth after reading the 
introductory text contained in this unit. 
17 
Greek Antiquity 
In antiquity, states were integrated into federations of city states or into large-
scale empires. 
The Greek states system of ancient Greece (500-100 BC) was a system of 
city states (such as Athens or Sparta; the city-state was also referred to as po-
lis). According to Osiander, this system was not stable enough, economic ex-
change between the states was not relevant enough, and wars – despite their 
destruction of city-states – did not threaten the existence of Greek society as 
a whole. Osiander argues that there was thus no need for a theory of interstate 
relations. For this reason, and in contrast to many textbooks, he denies that 
Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War, written around 431 BC) is 
the “father” of a theory of interstate relations (Osiander 1996: 46, on Thucyd-
ides and IR theory see Doyle 1990). Osiander reasons that he does not see 
any large scale theoretical writing on interstate relations of the Greek city 
states in that time and thus considers the single text to be a pragmatic text in 
the context of a particular historical moment (a similar argument is developed 
by Czempiel 1965). 
With regard to the Roman Empire (200 BC- AD 500), the large-scale em-
pire is seen as the dominant form of social organization of the states system 
at this time. In the context of imperial expansion in particular, no stable inter-
state relations existed. Here again, cross-border relations held only a limited 
significance for the Roman Empire. There was therefore no need to reflect 
upon interstate relations on a large scale.  
The European Middle Ages 
The empire remained the dominant pattern of political organization in Chris-
tian Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire, with the successor of the 
Roman Empire in Europe being the Medieval (Roman Catholic) empire, 
known as Christendom, based at Rome in Western Europe and, in Eastern 
Europe and the near East, the Byzantine (Orthodox) empire with Constanti-
nople at the center. These empires composed the two parts of the European 
medieval Christian world (500-1500). 
Within the empires, the medieval European state existed with its central 
feature, the feudal tenure system. This decentralized system had a high regard 
for power, was economically particular and locally organized, and had no 
central control of large territories. The emperor and the monarchs were polit-
ical decision makers who entrusted power to vassals. Power and authority 
were organized on both a religious and a political basis by the Pope and the 
Emperor respectively. The medieval state was organized through personal 
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ties. Through the medieval tenure system, power was distributed to a number 
of hierarchically organized actors. The authority and capacity to engage in 
wars was not monopolized by the state. Consequently, there could be no 
thoughts of autonomous independent politic units in the European Middle 
Ages, a prerequisite for a theory of interstate relations. With regard to exter-
nal relations, the Middle Ages were an era of empire with relations between 
those empires only at the margins (Osiander 1996: 47).  
The Modern Age 
In the early modern age came the first attempts to formulate a theory of inter-
state relations, based on the experience of the Italian system of states. The 
writings of Niccolò Machiavelli (Il Principe, 1513 and the Discorsi, about 
1518) discussed the internal and external dimension of the state’s ability to 
cope with threats, indicating a strong awareness of the importance of foreign 
relations of states for society. However, according to Osiander (1996: 48), 
this was still a theory of the state which only featured some reflections on 
foreign relations. 
Please note that you will read a short text, the “Recommendations for the 
Prince” by Machiavelli, as part of the required reading at the end of this in-
troductory unit. It will give you an impression of the quality and style of this 
early writing on interstate relations.  
The historical development in the modern age can be summarized as a 
general process towards the formation of the centralist territorial sovereign 
state. It is a process of centralizing and consolidating power within the state. 
This development makes the distinction between the domestic and the inter-
state sphere increasingly clear: there is “inside” and “outside” the state. A 
general agreement exists that this modern state is a “product” of the Thirty 
Years War (1618-48) and the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the war and 
established the principle of the sovereign state. From the middle of the 17th 
century onwards, the modern state was considered the only legitimate politi-
cal system in Europe, composed of a separate (state) territory, (state) gov-
ernments and (state) citizens. The centralist state’s monopoly on legitimate 
violence is thus the outcome of a historical process in early modern Europe, a 
process of the consolidation of sovereign territorial states with a monopoly 
on the means of warfare. 
From a theoretical perspective, this process has been reflected in attempts 
in political theory to politically legitimize the new central powers. Thomas 
Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) provided the starting point. In his writing, he drew 
an analogy of relations among “sovereigns” to relations among individuals 
prior to the establishment of society. He called this condition a “state of war” 
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and considered it to be the core problem of politics. The idea that the basic 
condition of the interstate system is a “state of war” became influential for 
International Relations theory at a later stage (Realism). Please note that a 
short text fragment of Hobbes’ Leviathan is part of the required reading, al-
lowing you to form an impression of those early thoughts on the nature of the 
interstate system. However, in addition to political theory, there have been 
other important contributions which have helped develop the idea of “sover-
eignty” as a concept of international law. Examples include Hugo Grotius’ 
Mare Liberum (1609), discussing the sea as “international waters”. 
From the mid-17th century through the 18th and 19th centuries, the history 
of the European states system is not only a history of the central sovereign 
state (inside) but also a history of intensifying interstate relations (outside the 
state). An increasing exchange of ideas and diplomatic contacts between the 
European states were preconditions for establishing the post-Napoleonic Eu-
ropean balance of power system at the Congress of Vienna (1815), agreed 
upon by the great powers (the Concert of Europe). The balance of power sys-
tem lasted more or less for most of the period 1815-1914.  
“Inside” the modern state, relationships between state and society ob-
tained a new quality in the 19th century with the advent of nationalism and the 
nation state. The rise of nationalism was part of the process of centralizing 
and consolidating the power of the state. Economic relations within societies 
became increasingly integrated (national economies), as did the external eco-
nomic relations. Economic theory of the 18th and 19th century, such as Adam 
Smith’s An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(1776) and David Ricardo’s On the Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation (1817), reflected theoretically on the gains in welfare through an in-
ternational division of labor and the integration of national markets. Increas-
ing integration of the national economies through an intensification of trade, 
transport and communication, along with interdependence in the sphere of 
national security, became central features of the European states system.  
A mutual dependence in issues of economic and security meant that ex-
ternal relations of the state also became increasingly relevant for societies. 
The danger of interstate war was perceived as a threat to the existence and 
well-being of national societies and thus became a central concern for those 
societies.  
It therefore comes as no surprise that the international peace movement is 
a product of the 19th century and emerged along with industrialization. Peace 
Societies appeared immediately after the Napoleonic Wars in England and 
the US (1815-1816). Members called themselves “friends of peace” (Cooper 
1984: 76). These early peace societies are the first examples of private citizen 
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groups formed in order to lobby and influence foreign policy. The American 
and the British Peace Societies were soon followed by the Parisian and the 
Genevan Peace Societies. The 1860s saw a significant increase in new peace 
societies in Europe (Cooper 1984: 91). Together these societies formed an in-
ternational peace movement, setting up a headquarters in Berne after 1891 
(the Bureau International de la Paix) to coordinate the movements in more 
than 20 nations until 1914. Peace movements are “associations of private cit-
izens, usually drawn from several social classes, who form societies that 
work to influence or protect against expansionist foreign and military poli-
cies” (Cooper 1984: 75). They proved to be influential not least through their 
support of the The Hague Peace Conferences 1899 and 1907, which pro-
duced the important Hague Conventions and the Geneva Protocol. Founda-
tions such as the US’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the 
World Peace Foundation, both founded in 1910, were powerful actors that 
contributed to the establishment of International Relations as an academic 
discipline after World War I (this will be discussed in the next part of this 
unit).  
In regard to theory, the concerns of society have been reflected in books 
such as Norman Angell’s The Great Illusion (1910). The core thesis of his 
writing is about the “illusion” of what can be reached by war. The integration 
of the European states’ economies instead increased to a level that made war 
between them entirely futile. 
In 1914 came the end of a century of “organized peace societies” with 
their hopes for rational European leaders who would recognize the need to 
regulate international anarchy through the creation of international institu-
tions for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The experience of World War I 
demonstrated the extreme significance of interstate relations for societies. 
The conclusion was reached that, from then on, war and peace should not be 
left to politicians and diplomats; rather, a systematic study of the causes of 
war and the conditions for peace was seen as a real “necessity” for helping 
politics to build peace. 
Summary 
The history of International Relations theory is part of a double process:  
(1) A historical process of centralization and consolidation of power. The 
transformation of political organization from the medieval to the modern 
state is based on centralization, the construction of the independent territorial 
state (inside the state) and an international states system of consolidated, uni-
fied and centralized sovereign territorial states (outside the state). The core 
function of the central, sovereign state is the provision of core values such as 
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security, welfare, freedom. In this historical process, the significance of ex-
ternal relations to society is growing. This gain in significance occurs be-
cause of increasingly integrated national economies and the resulting rise in 
mutual dependence between national economies.  
(2) The development of the states system in Europe, the process of intensify-
ing interstate relations, and the growth of worldwide communication, trade, 
and transportation go hand in hand with a systematic reflection in the fields 
of philosophy, political theory and international law. In terms of the history 
of thought, the historical process is at the same time a history of state theory 
(or Political theory) and interstate theory (later International Relations theo-
ry). In this process, state theory (or political theory) increasingly starts to re-
flect on interstate relations, theoretically “mirroring” the historical process of 
a rising significance of interstate relations. In fact, theoretical reflection – the 
historical evolution of inter-state, later inter-national theory – is part of these 
historical processes of the formation and development of the European state 
system. We will come back to this argument and discuss it in more detail in 
Unit 3. Before we do so, however, let us first take a look at the discipline’s 
formation. 
1.2. The “birth” of the discipline in 1919: Institutionalization and 
International Relations as “science” 
In the first part of Step 1, we discussed a perspective that suggests seeing the 
history of international relations theory as closely tied to the real-world pro-
cesses of the historical evolution of the European states system. In this read-
ing, the history of IR theory starts in the mid-17th century. Political thought 
on interstate relations before World War I made important contributions to 
theory building within International Relations as an academic discipline. 
Concepts such as the balance of power (an important concept in political the-
ory for a stable European system since the 18th century), the idea of the “an-
archy” of the international system (derived from Hobbes’s state of war), and 
Kant’s philosophical thinking and writing on the conditions for a foedus 
pacificum (league of peace) in his Perpetual Peace (1789) – which became 
influential in the political construction of the League of Nations in 1919 and, 
later, for that of the United Nations – proved to be building blocks for theory 
formation once IR had been established as an academic discipline. This es-
tablishment did not occur before 1919, and it is the objective of this part of 
the first chapter to discuss the “birth” of IR as an academic discipline. This 
discussion is a highly relevant for the purposes of the book, as the birth of IR 
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as an academic discipline is not only a consequence of World War I and 
hence an expression of its previously mentioned extreme existential signifi-
cance to societies, but also indicates a change in the “quality” and status of 
theory in International Relations.  
The birth of the discipline will be discussed with regard to two interrelat-
ed aspects: International Relations as science and its institutionalization. For 
didactical reasons, the next section will discuss the latter aspect, the institu-
tionalization of IR as an academic discipline, first.  
Institutionalization of IR as an academic discipline 
Many textbooks on International Relations provide the discipline with a 
“birthday”: May 30, 1919. They choose this date because International Rela-
tions as an academic discipline is understood as the “child” of the Paris 
Peace Conference of 1919. There the British and American delegations 
agreed upon the establishment of institutes and university departments for the 
scientific study of international relations. The agreement was born out of a 
desire to immediately work and reflect on the processes of the Paris Peace 
Conference, at which the international order after the Great War had been ne-
gotiated. The initiative was put into practice through the founding of the Brit-
ish Institute of International Affairs (July 1920, later Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs) and the American Institute of International Affairs (later 
merged with the Council on Foreign Relations). 
One result of World War I was the feeling of an urgent need for a scien-
tific inquiry to explain inter-state conflict and state rivalry. The first chair of 
International Politics was established in Great Britain (at the University Col-
lege of Wales, Aberystwyth) in 1919. There was support from the League of 
Nations and private organizations such as the Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace to establish additional chairs of International Relations, for 
example in 1925 in Paris and 1927 in Berlin. Enthusiasm in Great Britain, the 
US and France remained high over the following years and, by 1926, 40 
American universities and colleges were offering introductory courses to In-
ternational Relations (Czempiel 1965: 277, quoting Wright 1927: 396-397). 
However, early systematic work had already been done before. According to 
Czempiel (1965: 272), the first systematic political science book was pub-
lished in 1916 by A.J. Grant (An introduction to the study of international re-
lations, London), written at the request of the British Council for the Study of 
International Relations. In the US, courses on World Politics existed as early 
as 1913 and courses on International Relations by 1916, at the University of 
Indiana and Stanford University respectively (Osiander 1996, quoting Kirk 
1947: 2-5). 
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From this institutionalist perspective, International Relations as an academic 
discipline started with the first departments and chairs of International Rela-
tions. This development strongly emphasized the institutional aspects of “or-
ganizing” a discipline by providing the infrastructural underpinnings for re-
search and teaching.  
International Relations as science 
With regard to the “quality” of early theory, the information presented above 
has already indicated that political thought before the establishment of IR as 
an academic discipline had never consisted of more than political concepts 
developed to give advice for conducting politics against the background of 
short-term problems. The ideas have been pragmatic solutions in the histori-
cal context of their writing. What they lack, however, is the quality of a sys-
tematic and methodical approach to theory building (Czempiel 1965: 271).  
Now, coming out of the bitter experience of the Great War, the task of the 
newly established discipline was to systematically discover the causes of war 
and conditions for peace in inter-state relations. Peace and war among na-
tions were the fundamental problems to be studied in International Relations.  
After the Great War, the criterion of science as a systematic reflection us-
ing specific methods was applied to International Relations. This fact indicat-
ed a new quality of theoretical reflection. In this early understanding, system-
atic theory and method differentiate “science” from other paths to knowledge. 
Since that point, a systematic, generalized study of international relations has 
been considered an important criterion for thinking of the academic discipline 
of IR as science. In this regard, the birth of IR as an academic discipline 
marked the beginning of a qualitative change in approach: academics gradu-
ally began to concern itself with the systematic, methodical study of IR and 
hence with a new quality and status of theory. As you can easily imagine, the 
self-understanding of an academic discipline claiming to be scientific in-
volves the search for a shared, common understanding of “science”. We will 
learn that the understanding of IR as a science and of scientific theories draws 
on a European tradition of philosophical thought about science that extends 
back to ancient Greece. From around the end of the 19th and early 20th centu-
ries, such reflections became the core domain of what is now called “philoso-
phy of science” – an academic discipline that is part of philosophy. The devel-
opment of IR as an academic discipline after 1919, especially since the 1950s, 
is closely linked to the philosophy of science discussion.  
The history of IR theory and the academic discipline is thus not only bound 
to the historical evolution of the (European) state system (as discussed in Step 1 
of this unit) but also to the historical development of ideas about what scientific 
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study in general, and of international relations in particular, implies. We will 
elaborate on this connection in detail in the next learning unit.  
In addition, another consequence of the Great War was a strong connec-
tion between the early scientific inquiry into the nature of inter-state relations 
and the postwar practice of international politics. The League of Nations was 
the practical political attempt to build peaceful interstate relations based on 
an international organization. It went hand in hand with the new studies on 
war and peace in inter-state relations. Broadly speaking, war and peace were 
the first subjects of the newly established discipline to be studied in a sys-
tematic, methodical way. On a practical level, these studies aimed for the first 
time to reach general conclusions on the causes of war and on what must be 
done for politics to build a lasting peace in interstate relations. 
To “organize” an academic discipline therefore also means finding some 
agreement on the core subject studied by the newly created academic disci-
pline. We will discuss the core subject of the new scientific study of interna-
tional relations in the next step in more detail. Please note that for systematic 
and didactical reasons and in line with the purpose of the book, the aspect of 
“science” with its new quality and status of theory and method will be dis-
cussed in the second and third learning unit of part 1. 
Step 2: 
The core subject of International Relations and International 
Relations theory 
2.1. The modern sovereign state and international relations in the 
modern states system  
From what has been said in Chapter 1, we know that states and states systems 
are social/political organizations, tied to social/political practice and therefore 
subject to transformation and change over time. States and systems of states 
are historical.  
Any abstract statement about the state or the states system as the core sub-
ject of the academic discipline of IR therefore has to specify exactly which 
state and states system is at the core. 
Our historical analysis has shown that there is a history of international 
systems with different states systems at different times. These include the sys-
tem of city-states in ancient Greece, the Roman Empire, the Persian Empire, 
the Empire of Alexander the Great, the political order of the European Mid-
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dle Ages with the feudal state, and the European system of states during the 
17th century. Climbing the ladder of abstraction, we could think of “types” of 
states and states systems. The “type” of each states system depends on the 
“type” of state and the nature of interstate relations. 
Historically, it has been shown that the system of states, based on the sover-
eign territorial state, is a “product” of 17th century Europe. Many textbooks use 
the term Westphalian order because the basic principles of this European states 
system (central state power and state sovereignty) were the subject matter of 
the negotiations that led to the “Peace of Westphalia” (1648), ending the Thirty 
Year’s War in the Holy Roman Empire. The relations of European states be-
came subject to international law and diplomatic practices. Initially European, 
this system of states expanded globally in the centuries that followed. 
It is the Westphalian order of sovereign nation states (or the modern state 
and modern states system) that is at the core of the academic discipline of In-
ternational Relations. The origins of the Westphalian state and the Westpha-
lian states system date back to 1648. However, looking more closely at the 
“type” of state and states system, it can be determined that the sovereign state 
and the system of sovereign states are still being discussed as the core of IR 
as an academic discipline. More precisely, the dynamics and change of the 
sovereign state and the states system constitute the core of our discipline. 
You might already be familiar with the academic (and public!) discus-
sions about the “retreat of the state” in the face of the process of globalization 
and a diminishing role of the “welfare state”. Both public and academic de-
bates are being conducted on the treaty establishing a constitution for Europe 
and hence the EU as a state-like system, on the problems caused by “failed 
states” (such as Somalia or Sudan) for contemporary international politics, 
and on the tension between the principle of state sovereignty and the UN’s 
Responsibility to Protect through military or humanitarian interventions. You 
can easily see that in one way or another, the sovereign, centralized state 
(Westphalian type) is still the main point of reference in those discussions.  
With regard to the states system and given the perceived diminishing role 
of the state, we now find ourselves in the middle of debates as to whether the 
Westphalian model of the state and states system is still the adequate “type” 
of state and states system to be placed at the core of IR.  
Some scholars argue that the global system of states we live in can, for 
example, be better categorized as a networked world society. That is, ques-
tions and problems involving the dynamics and change of the system of sov-
ereign states are very much at the center of International Relations. This ar-
gument is certainly easy to follow against the background of the fundamental 
historicity and therefore transformability of “the state”. 
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Following the argument above, theorizing about the state thus also means 
theorizing about the “end” or better transformation of the (Westphalian) state, 
its transformative processes, the rise and growing importance of other “social 
organizations” such as private actors, NGOs or international organizations 
besides the state. Theorizing about the states system also includes asking the 
following questions: is it still the Westphalian “states system” that we live in; 
that is, are interstate relations among sovereign states still the most relevant 
relations that make up the system? Could the system be better characterized 
as a world society? Even in this context, these two main modes of theorizing 
(about the state and the state system) still remain at the core of IR theory. 
The modern state and the modern states system also still serve as the main 
point of reference for academic work in the field of IR as well as in practical 
international politics, for example in the UN. Theoretically, even theories try-
ing to go “beyond the state” usually take the state as a starting point or refer 
to it. We will learn about those different approaches in the particular theories 
of IR covered by Part 2 of the book. 
For the moment we can therefore conclude that, for more than three cen-
turies (!), the categories of the (Westphalian) state and the Westphalian states 
system have formed the core of inter-state theory. They also became the core 
of the newly established discipline of IR after the Great War. Even now, in 
the 21th century, a look at IR textbooks will demonstrate the strong persis-
tence of the (Westphalian) state and the state system as the core subject of the 
academic discipline of IR. Bringing to mind the time periods of the transi-
tions of earlier forms of state and state systems, this should not come as a 
surprise, even though we are not used to thinking in such lengthy periods of 
time.  
For our further discussions of the core subject in the next step, please re-
member the central functions of the modern state for society, which resulted 
from the historical process of centralizing power: to protect society against 
external and internal threats (security) and to ensure material welfare and 
freedom. These values are of high social and political relevance for the socie-
ties within the modern state. A threat to a state’s physical (territorial) exist-
ence, material welfare and/or independence/sovereignty is therefore a matter 
of major concern.  
State politics will provide a useful starting point for learning more about 
the state and the states system as the core subject of IR. 
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2.2.  Politics “inside” the modern state: the allocation of values for 
society as the core function of the state 
The state is usually perceived as the almost natural political organization of 
separate societal communities (inside the state). According to the American 
political scientist David Easton, “a political system can be designated as 
those interactions through which values are authoritatively allocated for a so-
ciety” (Easton 1965: 21). This is an old, albeit still influential definition of 
the function of a political system and the nature of “politics”: the authorita-
tive allocation of values for a society. Values are distributed by “interactions” 
and the fact that interactions allocate or reallocate values (or are directed to-
wards influencing value allocation) gives them a political nature. Easton 
summarizes this definition as follows: “My point is, in summary, that the 
property of a social act that informs it with a political aspect is the act’s rela-
tion to the authoritative allocation of values for a society.” (Easton 1965: 
134). Legitimate political authority plays a central role in this definition of 
politics: it refers to state authority, the monopoly of power in the hands of 
government and a hierarchical order with a central command over military 
and legal forces (army, police). Dominance and subordination are the defin-
ing features of social relations between the actors of a political system. 
This is the internal aspect of the state: a state as national government with 
state authority. 
Distributive or re-distributive policies based on welfare programs or taxa-
tion laws provide one example that demonstrates what we mean by an “authori-
tative allocation of values for a society” through a political system. Another is 
environmental legislation that “allocates” the value of, for instance, clean water 
to society and therefore decides on the degree of healthy living conditions. 
If this is the “nature” of politics, then “(t)he study of politics is the study 
of authoritative allocation of values for a society” by the academic discipline 
of Political Science (Easton 1953: 967). What, then, is the study of interna-
tional politics in the academic discipline of International Relations? 
2.3. Politics “outside” the modern state: the politics of 
international relations 
As you have learned, the political organization as independent states and the 
recognition of a state as sovereign by other states is the “external dimension” 
of the state. Interstate relations therefore belong to the external aspect of state 
politics.  
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Remember that we have defined politics as those “interactions through 
which values are authoritatively allocated for a society” (Easton 1965: 21). A 
transfer of this understanding of (national) politics to the context of interstate 
relations, however, is not a simple undertaking. This difficulty is due to the 
fact that, in contrast to state-society-relations (inside the state), international 
relations (outside the state) are not hierarchically organized. There is no cen-
tralization or monopoly of power in the international system. Additionally, no 
“world government” exists to authoritatively set the norms and rules for the 
conduct of international relations and enforce compliance or to sanction devi-
ant behavior. This “type” of social organization found at the level of the in-
ternational system is usually called “anarchy”: the politics of international re-
lations is understood as politics under the condition of “anarchy”.  
The anarchy in the international system has traditionally been presented 
as the first and foremost defining feature of international politics. The differ-
ence between “hierarchy” and “anarchy” as forms of social organization is 
what differentiates international politics from domestic politics. However, 
despite this fundamental difference, our definition of “politics” provides a 
useful starting point to better grasp the core subject of IR. If this definition is 
correct, there must be other sources of “authority” in international relations. 
These sources will be shown in the following paragraphs through a discus-
sion of the elements of our definition of national (state) politics as applied to 
international politics in more detail.  
First, international relations are interactions in the same sense as there are 
interactions within the state: international relations are simply social rela-
tions between social actors, comparable to social relations between social ac-
tors within the state. What differentiates them is that international relations 
are perceived as social relations crossing (state) borders.  
International relations as transborder relations exist between different 
types of social actors: state, non-state, individual and collective actors such 
as social groups or organizations. International relations are transborder in-
teractions between state and non-state actors. 
The defining feature of social actors is the purpose or intention of their 
action and interaction. Now remember the definition by David Easton “…that 
the property of a social act that informs it with a political aspect is the act’s 
relation to the authoritative allocation of values for a society”. That is, the al-
location or re-allocation of values is the political relevance or the political 
purpose of those social relations. 
More concisely, within the complex field of transborder relations, it is the 
“political” relevance that differentiates international relations from other “in-
ternational relations” such as tourism, correspondence, family relations or 
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private contacts. There have been attempts to introduce the term “internation-
al political relations” (Czempiel 1965: 282) but they have not succeeded. 
Politically relevant social interactions allocate or re-allocate basic values 
for society; human needs such as security and welfare, freedom, and order are 
core values for a (national) society. The same is true for international rela-
tions. Transborder relations are equally political relevant for society: conflict, 
war, cooperation, intergovernmental relations on a bilateral or multilateral 
basis, and economic relations such as trade relations or traditional diplomacy 
are all of concern to societies because they affect basic values. You are al-
ready familiar with this argument of the social and political relevance of in-
ter-state relations from the first chapter in this unit. 
War and military conflicts are international relations that in essence affect 
the value of security. Security is certainly the most fundamental value of in-
ternational relations: the protection of the physical existence of a political 
community of citizens against external threat. Basically, security involves all 
issue areas related to the use or threat of force.  
Cooperation in trade relations or other economic issue areas are interna-
tional relations that affect the basic value of welfare. Welfare refers to all is-
sues related to economic growth and material well-being. The production of 
goods and services and the coordination of economic relations, the welfare 
gains from market integration and political rules that govern a global or re-
gional market and the distribution of welfare gains from economic integration 
or poverty are all issues relevant to society. 
The international coordination of environmental protection is important 
for the value of clean air and water and therefore for society’s natural health 
and living conditions (environment). 
With regard to the value of freedom, society is concerned with the free-
dom and rights of the individual not only “inside the state” but also “outside” 
the state. Therefore, international rules for human rights influence the alloca-
tion of the value “freedom”. 
These are just a few examples of international relations affecting values 
important to society, given with the intention of demonstrating the applicabil-
ity of our definition of politics to international relations despite some funda-
mental differences. 
Finally, international relations, the politically purposeful actions and in-
teractions of state and non-state actors, constitute and create the structures of 
the international system over time. For the moment, the states system is still 
perceived as a system of sovereign territorial states with a central political au-
thority inside the states, but not outside them. 
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2.4. Summary and conclusion 
The study of international relations is the study of transborder interactions of 
different types of actors. The defining features of these interactions are their 
social and political relevance. Politically relevant interactions are those 
through which values are allocated or re-allocated or whose purpose is to in-
fluence value allocation through international politics. 
Scholars consider an authoritative allocation of values under conditions 
of anarchy impossible as long as “authority” is reserved for the state, with a 
central monopoly of power governing a hierarchically organized political 
community (inside the state).  
In contrast to the study of politics, the study of international relations (in-
ternational politics) asks questions and provides answers about politics “out-
side” the state. International politics, or politics “outside the state”, is usually 
understood as politics under conditions of anarchy. The question of “sources 
of authority” in an anarchical system forms one of the core problems of IR.  
While a great deal of agreement exists on what constitutes the core prob-
lem of international politics, there are different ways to theoretically and me-
thodically reflect on this core problem. Different theories of International Re-
lations will provide different perspectives on the core problem of politics un-
der the condition of anarchy or even question the concept of anarchy itself. 
We can briefly illustrate this fact by asking some questions derived from our 
definition of the core subject of International Relations as an academic disci-
pline: 
 
What is the “nature” of the international system? As an example, in neoreal-
ist theory, anarchy is the nature of the international system. Neoinstitutional-
ists agree, but point to interdependent relationships between states in the in-
ternational system that offer good opportunities to establish stable patterns of 
inter-state cooperation. That is, they see chances to “regulate” anarchy. In 
contrast, neorealism perceives only minimal chances for cooperation, while 
the condition of anarchy prevents any long lasting international collaboration.  
 
Who are the most relevant actors in international relations and what are the 
driving forces of their actions and interactions? We will learn that there are 
theories that consider states or, in some cases, simply the most powerful 
states as the only relevant actors, while other perspectives point to the influ-
ence of non-state actors on outcomes of international politics. These could be 
private actors such as transnational corporations, non-governmental organiza-
tions such as Greenpeace or human rights networks, or international organi-
zations such as the UN. What are these actors’ driving forces? Do they be-
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have rationally in terms of cost-benefit calculations? Are normative views 
such as “justice in our global order” their guide to action? Is their main moti-
vation to maximize national security or welfare gains?  
 
What are the most important values in international politics? Security? Wel-
fare? Human rights? Our natural living conditions? 
 
What are sources of authority in international relations? Is the power politics 
of the most powerful states in the states system one such authority? Is there 
authority in the transfer of competencies for the allocation of values from the 
state to an international organization? What about the voluntary agreements 
to set rules for behavior in international politics and to comply with these 
rules and norms, for example by building international regimes? Is the idea of 
authority that is derived from state politics applicable to international politics 
at all? 
 
What should the “ideal” international system look like? How does change in 
international politics occur? Is there “progress” in the development of the 
international system? What kind of international politics do we want? What 
kind of international politics do we oppose?  
 
Your perspective on such questions of international relations and your expla-
nations of the outcomes in international politics will depend on theory. Theo-
ries of International Relations reflect on the core subject: the state and the 
states system. However, they provide different ways to conceptualize or to 
understand the state and the states system, different ways to understand or 
explain outcomes in international politics, different lines of argumentation to 
predict the “future” of the state and the states system, and last but not least, 
different “instructions” and policy advice for real-world international politics. 
It is the objective of our book to become familiar with a range of different 
theories of International Relations in order to learn more about the role and 
status of theory in and for international politics more generally. However, be-
fore we discuss the different approaches to IR in part 2 of the book, we still 
will have to learn more about the nature of theory building and its status in 
science in the next learning unit. 
Before moving on to the next unit, recap what you have learned so far by 




Check your understanding: key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
• The history of International Relations theory is closely tied to the histori-
cal evolution of the European states system. The transformation of politi-
cal organization from the medieval to the modern state is based on cen-
tralization, the construction of the independent territorial state (inside the 
state) and therefore an international states system of consolidated, unified 
and centralized sovereign territorial states (outside the state).  
• The core subject of International Relations as an academic discipline and 
of International Relations theory is the modern sovereign state and the 
modern system of states whose legitimacy and independence is mutually 
recognized. Both concepts are of European origin and usually so is theo-
retical reflection upon them. 
• The politics of international relations is normally understood as politics un-
der conditions of “anarchy”. Constitutive for this view is the idea of a hier-
archically organized “inside the state” and an anarchically ordered “outside 
the state”. Anarchy is conceptualized as the absence of a higher authority 
that monitors compliance and sanctions non-compliant behavior. Such an 
authority would be comparable to the state and its power monopoly. 
• Based on the fundamental understanding of “inside” and “outside”, inter-
national relations are usually understood as transborder interactions be-
tween state and non-state actors. They thus cross the border between in-
side and outside. 
• It is the “political” relevance that differentiates international relations as 
the subject of the academic discipline IR from other “international rela-
tions” like tourism, correspondence, family relations or private contacts. 
• Politically relevant social interactions are those that allocate or re-allocate 
basic values for society. Human needs such as security and welfare, free-
dom, and order are core values which international politics can allocate. 
• The academic discipline of International Relations was “born” in 1919 as 
a “child” of the Paris Peace Conference after World War I. The new de-
partments and chairs of International Relations focused on the scientific 
study of interstate relations, based on systematic, generalizing theories 
and methods. 
• The history of IR theory and IR as an academic discipline is not only bound 
to the history of the European states system but also to the idea of science 
as it developed in European philosophy, starting with Greek antiquity. 
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• Different theories of International Relations provide different perspectives 
on the nature of international politics and on how to study it. As a result 
of their different perspectives they provide different answers to the core 
problem of politics in the realm of international politics. 
Review questions 
1. When and why did theoretical reflection on interstate relations first occur 
in history? 
2. What are the basic criteria for discussing the “birth” of a new academic 
discipline? 
3. What is the core subject of International Relations as an academic disci-
pline? 
4. Why is it so difficult to discuss international politics with reference to 
concepts derived from national politics, such as the “state”, “authority” or 
“politics”? 
Step 4: 
Self-study and consolidation 
Self-study (1) 
Read the required reading to deepen your knowledge of the history of IR 
theory. 
Self-study (2) 
What are the basic values that are subject to allocation/re-allocation 
through international politics? Choose two examples out of the issue areas 
of international relations (security, welfare, freedom or environment) and 
discuss recent real-world international politics, demonstrating how it af-
fects the allocation of values for societies.  
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M./Shafritz, Jay M. (eds.) 1994: Classical Readings of International Relations. Bel-
mont: Wadsworth Publ., 183-189. 
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Publ., 24-27. 
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tional Relations. Belmont: Wadsworth Publ., 28-30. 
 
(2) Osiander, Andreas 1996: The interdependence of states and the theory of interstate re-
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42-68. 
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Introduction 
As you have learned in Unit 1, the discipline of International Relations was 
born after the Great War out of the desire to systematically find the causes of 
war and the conditions for a lasting peace. Since then, IR’s contribution to 
the practice of international politics has been closely tied to the idea of (so-
cial) science. However, even though there was a general acceptance that IR 
could and should be a science, the exact meaning of the term “science” itself 
was not quite clear. According to Czempiel (1965: 280), a consensus already 
existed at the end of the 1930s that, in order to define International Relations 
as “science”, the methods of the natural sciences had to be applied: to collect 
facts, to arrange them in some sort of “order”, and to explain them. For ex-
ample, in the late 1930s, E.H. Carr argued that realism could provide a scien-
tific theory because of its emphasis on the acceptance of facts and on the 
analysis of their causes and consequences (Carr 1939). Czempiel’s assertion 
raised an interesting point that shows how the idea of IR as a science pro-
gressed towards a very specific understanding of science as closely bound to 
the idea of natural science. This signalized a departure from an earlier under-
standing of International Relations as an area of study that synthesizes 
knowledge from other disciplines, drawing on judicial, economic, historical 
and technical aspects (Czempiel 1965: 280-281). 
In the early years, the issue of science was not a core concern in the theo-
retical work being done on interstate relations. This situation stands in sharp 
contrast to later stages in the discipline’s development, when debates and 
controversy about the nature of a scientific study of IR became a permanent 
feature. This remains true for today’s International Relations. As will be 
shown, however, at the heart of the discipline exists a particular understand-
ing of science – positivism – which has come to dominate and shape the dis-
cipline since the 1950s. Positivism provides the philosophy of science back-
ground for those IR theories that count as the most influential today. In the 
time period before, the scientific, or broadly speaking the systematic and 
methodical study of IR, is often called “traditional” or “classical”. In con-
trast to the positivist understanding of science, the “traditional”/“classical” 
inquiry into international relations is not based on an understanding of the 
concept of science drawn from the natural sciences (Little 1980: 7; Wight 
2002: 28).  
38 
Self-study (1) 
Read the texts written by Bull (1966: International Theory. The case for a 
classical approach) and Kaplan (1969: The New Great Debate: Tradition-
alism vs. Science in International Relations) from the required reading list 
and then return to this unit. The texts, written in the 1960s, will give you a 
direct impression of the different understandings of science debated at this 
time. The readings will help you to better grasp the current debates on IR 
as a science. 
 
For the moment, let us preliminarily conceive the idea of a scientific ap-
proach to the study of International Relations as being simply and broadly 
associated with the idea of a systematic and methodical study of international 
relations. In this case, the goal is reaching general, valid knowledge about in-
terstate politics. Both the theoretical “system” and the methods of such a sys-
tematic exploration will vary according to the fundamental understanding of 
science underneath. 
Theory is key to such a systematic and methodical study, as it presents a 
“guide” to the process of gaining knowledge by formulating questions, con-
jectures or hypotheses about international politics. Theory provides the fun-
dament of the “order” of a systematic inquiry. Therefore, theory always re-
tains a central position in this process of generating “knowledge”. 
However, as will be shown, no agreement exists among scholars on the 
question of what exactly is the nature, function and position of a theory in 
scientific research. The nature and function of theory in the process of 
knowledge production itself is a highly debated issue.  
It is thus worthwhile to take a closer look at the notions of theory and sci-
ence because “scientific knowledge” is considered to hold a key position in 
our societies. In the following chapters we will therefore discuss in greater 
depth both International Relations as a (social) science and the status of theo-
ry within IR. The discussion will touch on the status of “theory” within an 
academic discipline more generally while focusing on IR in particular. The 
idea of what a theory is and of which role and functions it possesses within 
an academic discipline is closely bound to that discipline’s understanding of 
the term “science”. The understanding of science is a key issue for any social 
science and, as we will learn, a matter of much debate and controversy with 
no consensus in sight. 
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Step 1: 
Philosophy of science: the “theory behind theories” 
(meta-theory)  
1.1. Philosophy of science and the role of assumptions 
The legitimization of modern academic disciplines as “science” usually in-
volves a reference to a particular philosophy of science. For example, from 
your reading of the texts written by Bull and Kaplan, you already know that 
“traditional” IR refers to a different understanding of science than that of the 
“scientist” understanding that draws on the natural sciences. There are differ-
ent philosophies of science at the heart of both accounts of science. They take 
up different positions on such fundamental questions as the “nature” of the 
relevant subject to be studied by IR, how to gain knowledge about this sub-
ject, what counts as valid “knowledge” in IR and which methods should be 
used in the process of knowledge acquisition. 
As a recognizable field of study, the philosophy of science emerged in the 
1920s and 1930s with the work of the Vienna Circle and the writings of Karl 
Popper. The formation as an academic discipline can perhaps be traced back 
to the end of the 19th century, with the first chair of “History and Theory of 
Inductive Science” established 1895 in Vienna (the holder being the physicist 
Ernst Mach). Of course, philosophy of science as a form of philosophical 
thought about the nature of science and scientific study goes much further 
back in history and can be traced at least to ancient Greece. In Greek antiqui-
ty, this type of thought is associated above all with the work of Greek philos-
ophers such as Democritus, Aristotle or Plato – just to mention a few. In Unit 
3, we will come back to their ideas of science inherent in their philosophy in 
more detail. 
The underlying reason why philosophy of science has become so attrac-
tive to the social sciences since the early 20th century lies with the enormous 
success of modern natural science such as physics, mathematics, chemistry 
and biology and the prestige natural science has gained in modern societies 
(Wight 2002: 25; 41). You can easily see the prestigious status of science and 
its role in our modern world in your everyday life: imagine your life without 
the 20th century advances in industry and technology. Those advances – and 
your life as you currently live it – would be unthinkable without the progress 
of natural sciences.  
Within the philosophy of science discipline, the object studied is the na-
ture and practice of science itself. The discipline aims to find out what is dis-
tinctive about scientific explanations and theoretical constructions. What is 
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the nature of science in contrast to, say, speculation, intuition or religious 
systems of knowledge? 
Any philosophy of science consists of a range of assumptions. These are 
ontological assumptions (claims about existence and being), epistemological 
assumptions (claims about what constitutes valid knowledge and the grounds 
for such claims of valid knowledge), and methodological assumptions 
(claims about the practice of science and the specific methods of gaining 
knowledge) (Wight 2002: 41). In short, any philosophy of science is based on 
all three types of assumptions. Philosophy of science positions are also often 
referred to as “meta-theory”: the theory or philosophy that is “behind” or 
“above” a theory of International Relations and whose subject is theory itself. 
It is also important to carefully note the terminology. When talking about 
philosophy of science, we talk about “assumptions” or “claims”: propositions 
that are taken for granted and that are not subject to being proved as “true” or 
“false”. The idea and term of assumptions originates in ancient Greek philos-
ophy and logic. It is quite similar to an axiom, a premise or starting point of 
reasoning. In theory building, it serves as a starting point for deducing or in-
ferring theory, to derive a logical conclusion from this starting point. As-
sumptions are not demonstrable by proof because their very nature is to be 
“starting points”: there is nothing else from which they logically follow.  
Consequently, we are talking about intellectual constructs of reality that 
are not subject to be proved as “true” or “false”. It might come to you as a 
surprise that it is the very nature of science and theory to start with something 
that is not subject to being “proved”. In fact, this is true for all systems of 
knowledge and the idea of knowledge about the world more generally, and 
not specific to science. 
From what you have learned so far about the nature of assumptions, the 
logical result is that there is always more than one account of what consti-
tutes science and therefore different philosophies of science within the phi-
losophy of science as an overall discipline. For the purpose of better under-
standing the nature of a philosophy of science, Step 2 will demonstrate the 
core elements of a philosophy of science (ontological, epistemological and 
methodological assumptions) using a specific philosophy of science, positiv-
ism, as an example. However, before we begin exploring positivism, we will 
need a basic understanding of the core terms of a philosophy of science. 
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1.2. Ontology, epistemology, methodology  
Ontology is the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence, or reali-
ty in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations in 
particular. In short, ontology is the philosophy of being. The following are 
ontological questions: What is there? What is? What exists? What is reality 
made of? What are the most general features and relations of the things and 
entities? One example is the ontological claim that only material reality can 
be claimed to exist: the answer to the question “What is?” is “Matter only” 
(ontological materialism or materialism as an ontological claim). Another ex-
ample, concerning the relation of “things” to each other, is the classical onto-
logical problem of how a “universal” relates to a “particular”. This ontologi-
cal “problem” is certainly familiar to you as expressed by the question, “Is 
the whole more than the sum of its parts?” The query could be answered by 
an ontological individualist claim (the whole is always and only the sum of 
the single parts) or by an ontological holistic claim (the whole is more than 
the sum of its parts; it possesses a quality of its own that is not reducible to 
the properties of the single parts). 
So, in the philosophy of science, an ontological assumption refers to a set 
of things which have been claimed to exist. This is done by means of a par-
ticular theory or system of thought. We speak of the ontology of a theory. An 
example that already is familiar to you from the first unit is the assumption 
found in many IR theories as the starting point: that states are the basic 
“units” of the international system and that the international system is “made 
up” of sovereign states forming an anarchical structure. Remember what has 
been said above about the nature of assumptions: they serve as the starting 
points for the purpose of theory building. There are many influential theories 
of IR that begin at this starting point: the ontological claim about the interna-
tional system as made of the single states, perceived as the “units” or even 
unitary actors. However, as Unit 3 will demonstrate, even though assump-
tions are starting points that do not need to be proved as “true” or “false”, 
they are not “free” experiments of thought. Rather, assumptions are always 
embedded in and derived from broader, long-term persistent world views and 
thus reflect specific, culturally variable patterns of thought. As reflections of 
deeper “orders of thought”, assumptions are usually not subject to explicit 
explication in a theory of IR or even meta-theory. They instead fundamental-
ly shape our cognition and perception of the world. This truth pertains not on-
ly to gaining scientific knowledge but to gaining any knowledge. Hence as-
sumptions form part of any system of knowledge, not only science. We will 
come back to this principle later in more detail. 
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In sum, the term “ontology” deals with what-questions, or what there is to 
know.  
Different from ontology is epistemology, which stems from the Greek 
word episteme (knowledge). Epistemology is the branch of philosophy con-
cerned with the theory of knowledge. In short, epistemology is the philosophy 
of knowledge or of how to come to know and of how we can know. Episte-
mological problems are the definition of knowledge, accounting for the 
sources and criteria of knowledge, determining the kinds of knowledge pos-
sible, the relation between the one who knows and the objects known, and the 
grounds that we have for accepting or rejecting knowledge. In other words, 
epistemology concerns itself with the criteria for what we perceive to be le-
gitimate or valid knowledge. An example is an epistemological claim called 
empiricism: the belief that we can only know what we can observe/ex-
perience by our senses and that there must be an empirical basis for our 
knowledge in order for that knowledge to count as valid.  
Methodology, finally, is the part of the philosophy of science dealing with 
the specific ways – methods – of gaining knowledge. Differently put, meth-
odology is the practice of science. 
In short, any theoretical reasoning needs a starting point provided by on-
tological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. Together they 
form the core of a particular philosophy of science.  
These core elements of a philosophy of science (the ontological, episte-
mological and methodological assumptions) will now be discussed in more 
detail, using positivism as an example of a philosophy of science. Positivism 
provides the most relevant starting point, considering that this philosophy of 
science has so far been the most influential, not only in International Rela-
tions, but in all sciences – the natural as well as social science disciplines. 
Most academic work in IR – implicitly or explicitly – is based on a positivist 
philosophy of science. Step 2 therefore has a double function; first, positiv-
ism is used as an example to demonstrate the basics of a philosophy of sci-
ence. This should make what has been said so far about philosophy of science 
easier to understand. Second, at the same time, you will already be familiariz-
ing yourselves with the core assumptions found at the heart of many theoreti-
cal approaches to IR. This second aspect will make it easier to understand the 
single theories of IR presented in Part 2 of this book. At this stage, of course, 
this understanding will still be on the abstract level of philosophy-of-science-
discussions (meta-theory). Our discussions will take a more substantive form 
at a later stage when dealing with specific theoretical approaches to IR.  
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Step 2: 
Positivism as an example for a philosophy of science 
2.1. Positivism 
Positivism as a philosophy of science has a long history that draws on tradi-
tions of philosophical thought dating back to ancient Greece. The term “posi-
tivism” itself was only introduced in the early 19th century by the French phi-
losopher August Comte (Système de politique positive, 1824 and Cours de 
philosophie positive, 6 volumes by 1842). He claimed the only authentic 
knowledge was that which is based on experience obtained through the sens-
es; knowledge is based on positive evidence. “Positive” is used in the same 
way the term is used in the natural sciences: positive evidence in the case of 
an examination results in “proof”. Knowledge can only and has to be reduced 
to the interpretation of “positive results”: a positive result is the outcome of 
an experiment that provides the evidence for what has been expected/hy-
pothesized (as formulated in a theory). The opposite is when the experiment’s 
outcome has negative results which do not confirm the hypothesis – the sci-
entist does not find evidence of what he is looking for. This concept should 
be familiar to all of you from medical tests and examinations. Comte’s vision 
was to develop a science of society based on the methods of the natural sci-
ences, with observation and experiment at the core. He considered all scienc-
es, including those of society, as methodologically unified – an important 
view that shaped the development of the social sciences in the 19th and 20th 
century. Comte envisioned a project of positivism as a scientifically based 
world culture – the third stage in the development of mankind’s knowledge, 
following a theological and metaphysical stage (formulated in his théorie des 
troits états: theological, metaphysical and positive stage).  
The work of Comte is influential due to his epistemological positions. It 
was highly significant to the natural as well as the social sciences at the end 
of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century.  
Positivism as a philosophy of science will be now introduced in regard to 
its major ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. For 
didactical reasons, this introduction will take place through two “complexes” 
of positivist philosophy of science positions. The first complex will be related 
to questions of what can be known, what counts as knowledge and what ex-
ists. In the second complex, the focus will be more related to how to know 
and the methodology of knowing. 
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2.2. Epistemology, ontology and methodology in positivist science  
2.2.1. Complex 1 
Positivism is best understood by starting with its epistemological assump-
tions. This is not a didactical decision; rather, it is because, for a positivist 
account of science, epistemology matters more than ontology. Scientific pri-
ority is clearly given to epistemology. This is due to the privileged status of 
observation or, in other words, empirical experience. In positivism any 
statements about what exists depend on what we can know. What we can 
know in positivism is intimately linked to what we can observe/experience. 
As the latter question belongs to the domain of epistemology, the positivist 
account of science thus prioritizes epistemology over ontology. Epistemology 
is “philosophically prior” – it gives more importance to “what can be known 
by science” as compared to “what exists”. 
Empiricism 
The core epistemological position of positivism is empiricism. Empiricism in 
philosophy is a theory of knowledge (epistemology) which claims that there is 
(and must be) an empirical foundation for knowledge. Empirical experience is 
information perceived by the senses; knowledge ultimately results from sensual 
observation/experience. Hence, positivist science understands observation/  
empirical experience to be a representation of reality, not reality itself – as we 
can only perceive “reality” through our senses. Consequently, only statements 
about phenomena that can be observed or that can be experienced count as 
knowledge. This means that only “observables” are the objects of scientific in-
quiry in the positivist account of science and can be known by science. It thus 
follows that theories and hypotheses are only acceptable if they can be induc-
tively proved, that is, proved through experience/observation. 
As an epistemological position, empiricism was largely developed 
through British Empiricism and is associated with the works of Francis Ba-
con, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith. In Unit 3, 
you will find core elements of their ideas of science in more detail. However, 
as will also be demonstrated in Unit 3, empiricism draws on a long historical 
tradition of philosophical thought that goes back to ancient Greece. 
The central features of empiricism become clearer when compared to the 
opposite position, called rationalism. Rationalism (from ratio, reason) is the 
epistemological assumption that knowledge mainly derives from human rea-
son. It gives a privileged epistemological status to the human mind (and not 
to sensory, empirical experience). Rationalism as an epistemological position 
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also has a long tradition in European philosophy and is usually associated 
with the work of René Descartes, Baruch de Spinoza and Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz. In fact, like empiricism, rationalism actually dates back to ancient 
Greece and the ideas of Aristotle and Plato.  
In short: in positivist science, knowledge derives from experience. Expe-
rience is information received through the senses. Only statements about 
phenomena that can be directly experienced/observed can count as knowl-
edge, whereas any statements that do not refer to the world of observable ob-
jects cannot be granted the status of justified knowledge. Empiricism there-
fore results in a scientific method which requires that all hypotheses and theo-
ries must be tested against observations of the natural world. It is a belief that 
empirical validation or falsification is at the heart of real inquiry. Science is 
therefore considered to be methodologically empirical in nature. We will 
come back to the methodological aspects later in more detail. 
Materialism/physicalism/ontological naturalism 
The empiricist epistemological core position of positivism is easier to com-
prehend when linked to the fundamental materialist ontology of positivism; 
this philosophical position is called materialism or often physicalism. Materi-
alism/physicalism is the ontological assumption that reality ultimately con-
sists of “matter”. According to this assumption, the world is a material world 
and “governed” by the laws of matter (nature). The position is sometimes al-
so called ontological naturalism, in which everything is “nature” – with an 
understanding of “nature” as physical nature. Physical nature is material na-
ture, hence the position’s interchangeable names of materialism, physicalism 
and ontological naturalism.  
A material/physical/natural world can be “observed” by the senses and 
thus be known, if not directly, then with the help of technological facilities 
such as microscopes, telescopes, laboratories, etc. 
The ontological position of materialism/physicalism/naturalism usually 
implies not only that the world is ultimately made of “matter”, but also that 
the human mind and consciousness belong to the material world as a result of 
their ultimately material/physical nature. This nature consists of nerve cells, 
neurons and the material structure of the brain, the activity of which can be 
observed for example in computer-assisted tomography. From a materialist 
ontological perspective, everything – including ideas and human thought – 
are ultimately attributed to matter. 
Here again the argument about ontological materialism/physiccalism/ 
naturalism should be exemplified by pointing to the opposite position, onto-
logical idealism. From an idealist position, the world is ultimately made of 
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(immaterial) ideas, theories and mental constructs. The ontological idealist 
position goes back as far as Plato’s theory of forms (or theory of ideas), 
which states that reality consists of non-material, abstract forms or ideas and 
not the material world known to us through the senses. The forms or ideas are 
present “in” nature/matter (physis). These forms or ideas are understood to be 
distinct, singular extra-mental entities that are plurally represented “in” par-
ticular material objects. Forms and ideas are the “essence” of material ob-
jects: there is no being (ontology) of material objects without their intrinsic 
“idea” or form. For example, the idea or form of “circle” is represented by 
the many material things expressing the form of circles. The essence of all 
circles is the idea or form of “circle”. Forms and ideas are thus superordinate 
to matter. Ideas/forms are also transcendent to time and space; they are non-
local and non-physical, even though they are real. The ideas and forms are 
often called the “universals” that are represented in the many particular 
things that we can see: the form/idea (universal) ”appears” to be material ob-
jects (particulars). True knowledge is thus knowledge that the human mind 
gains about the world of ideas/forms. For Plato, evidence of the existence of 
abstract forms is by intuition. For example, a tool-maker’s blueprints provide 
evidence that forms/ideas are real and guide the practice of a manufacturer.  
Atomism/particularism/individualism 
The materialist ontology of positivism is an atomist one. Ontologically, atom-
ism is the assumption that the (material) world is made up of the smallest in-
divisible material particles or can ultimately be reduced to such elementary 
particles. Atomist materialism as an ontological position dates back to an-
cient Greece in the 5th century BC, especially to the work of Democritus and 
his idea of atoms (a-tomos meaning “indivisible). In Democritus’ cosmology, 
the universe is assumed to consist of indivisible atoms that move in an empty 
space. These particles are discrete, hard, unchangeable, and eternal. Epicurus 
developed this idea further in the 4th century AD. An opposing position also 
existed in ancient Greece which assumed the world to be a process of contin-
ual flux (Heraclitus), but it was not widely accepted. 
As you will learn in this unit, the perspective of atomism fundamentally 
shaped philosophical thought in European history and culture and forms a 
key part of classical, modern science, above all classical physics. What 
Democritus believed in ancient Greece later became part of the dominant 
world view of the modern natural sciences. With modern physics and chemis-
try, science finally provided atomism – that is, the idea of a universe made of 
elementary particles, with a natural foundation and proved though observa-
tion and experiments. Elementary particles have been shown to be the entities 
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that constitute the material world. Consequently, atomism as a materialist on-
tological position is mainly associated with modern particle physics (also 
called classical physics). The search for the ultimate elementary particles that 
comprise the material world has fundamentally shaped the development of 
classical physics. The ancient Greek belief in the indestructibility of atoms 
was disproved by nuclear fission in the 20th century: the atom has been 
demonstrated as consisting of other elementary particles, e.g.. neutrons and 
protons. With the progress of modern technology, experiments have now 
proven the existence of far more elementary particles such as quarks, gauge 
bosons, leptons, hadrons, and probably quite soon the Higgs-Boson. The idea 
of a world of matter consisting of material particles is familiar to all of us 
who have been educated in the findings of natural science, especially classi-
cal physics. In case you are not familiar with these topics, take some time and 
do your own research. For example, read about the search for the Higgs-
Boson (sometimes called the “God particle”) in the Large Hadron Collidor at 
CERN. 
The atomist perspective of the natural sciences about “matter” is im-
portant because it can lead to a better understanding of scientific thought in 
other sciences. In both the natural and social science disciplines, positivist 
science implicitly (and only rarely explicitly) shares a fundamental atomist 
material ontological position – sometimes also called particularism or indi-
vidualism – because all disciplines refer to the most basic, elementary 
“units”. We will come back to the notions of particularism and individualism 
in more detail in Complex 2 below. 
From what we have learned about the materialist/physicalist/ontological 
naturalist and at the same time atomist/particularist ontology of positivism, 
you can now better understand the notion of an empirical foundation of 
knowledge that exists at the heart of positivism.  
A material, particularist world is observable. Therefore knowledge about 
this material world of particulars is possible because it can be experienced 
by the senses/observed. 
It is important to emphasize that atomist materialism/physicalism as an 
ontological position is not exclusive to a positivist philosophy of science but 
is also shared by other philosophies. What is, however, exclusive for positiv-
ism is the linkage to the empiricist epistemological position as described 




As has been mentioned, positivism considers observation/empirical experi-
ence to be information perceived by the senses. As such, sensual experience 
is a representation of reality and not reality itself. Positivist science’s particu-
lar ontological view of the nature of existence, or being, is therefore also 
called phenomenalism. From this viewpoint, physical objects do not exist for 
the observer “as things in themselves”, but only as perceptual phenomena. 
The object of knowing is therefore not “the thing as such”, but rather how 
these things appear to us (= phenomenon). For this reason, positivism as a 
philosophy of science is called “anti-realist”: for the observer, there is no 
world, no reality “as such”, only a representation of that reality (that is, a rep-
resentation empirically “mediated” by sensual experience). The sensual expe-
rience represents the “thing”, the object. In positivist science, scientific theo-
ries therefore refer to the phenomena, not to “true” reality. This is the back-
ground for the positivist claim that any scientific theory and hypothesis has to 
be formulated in terms of “observables” – as expressed in variables.  
So the question arises: if the objects of knowing are perceptual phenome-
na and not reality itself, how can we achieve valid knowledge? 
Objectivism 
The epistemological positions of empiricism and phenomenalism are con-
nected to the view that there is a distinction between facts and values: in con-
trast to values, facts are “neutral”.  
On the one hand this position is easy to follow because of the materialist 
ontology in positivism: what can be experienced/observed is assumed to be a 
matter of fact. Facts are observable and hence different than values (values 
would belong to the world of ideas – they cannot be observed and thus are 
not objects of positivist science). Facts are therefore assumed to be independ-
ent of any theory and value-neutral. Facts also form the basis for “objective” 
knowledge, which can be provided by (positivist) science and its methods.  
In essence, science occupies such a central position in modern societies 
because of the conviction that it is the only means of “producing” objective 
knowledge. However, in order for facts to become “objective knowledge”, 
science requires the empirical experience to be made evident by experimental 
and logical “proof”. Only verified knowledge counts as “objective” knowl-
edge. Knowledge can be claimed to be “objective” in a scientific sense only 
under certain conditions. Firstly, the observation or empirical experience has 
to be verified. In other words, it must be intersubjectively proved by way of 
repeatable experiment – repeatable by different researchers, independently of 
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each other and given the same experimental conditions. For a theory, this im-
plies that all hypotheses and theories have to be tested by empirical experi-
ence. In effect, the business of (positivist) science is testing theories and hy-
potheses about the world of facts (observables). If the outcome is “positive”, 
the observation counts as valid knowledge. What has been proven can then 
legitimately be claimed to count as valid knowledge. 
Such an epistemological position is referred to as objectivism. Objective 
knowledge about the material world made of particulars is assumed to be 
fundamentally possible. Positivist science provides the scientific methods to 
produce such objective knowledge. However, knowledge counts as objective 
knowledge only until it can be proved false. All hypotheses and theories are 
therefore provisional in nature. 
2.2.2. Complex 2 
Given the position of positivist science on what can be known, what counts 
as valid knowledge and what exists, we may ask ourselves the following 
questions: How can we know about entities such as “the state”, “the interna-
tional system”, or “society”? How can we formulate theories and hypotheses 
about such entities that are not “observable”? These questions lead us to epis-
temological and methodological aspects of positivist science that address the 
fundamental issue of how to know and the methods applied in order to know. 
Operationalism and instrumentalism 
We will start with a central methodological position of positivist science re-
ferred to as operationalism. Operationalism is the position of positivism that 
requires theoretical terms to be “translated” into observational ones. Because 
the validity of a theory ultimately rests on the facts, all concepts must there-
fore be defined operationally. In other words, they must be made into observ-
ables. The concepts of science must be defined in terms of the “operations” 
by which they are measured or applied. A concept is made measurable in the 
form of variables, which consist of specific observations. Epistemologically 
speaking, through operationalism we “make” things observable and hence 
knowable. This position is related to an instrumentalist treatment of theoreti-
cal terms. In positivist science, the theoretical term or concept itself is seen as 
an analytical instrument: a device to “organize” our observations, an instru-
ment to gain knowledge. In line with the materialist atomist ontology of posi-
tivism, a theoretical term or a concept (such as “the state”), ontologically has 
no “being”. It exists only by way of the observables into which the term can 
be “translated”, or, operationalized. 
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Instrumentalism in the philosophy of science is also related to the view 
that theoretical concepts are to be judged by their effectiveness. A concept or 
theory should be evaluated by how effectively it explains or predicts phe-
nomena as opposed to how accurately it describes objective reality. 
The philosophical background of the methodological requirement of “op-
erationalization”, or in other words, the “translation” of theoretical terms into 
“observables”, deserves closer attention. Is any theoretical term operation-
alizeable? Due to its ontological materialist-atomist position (the assumption 
that the world ultimately is made of material indivisible particles), positivist 
science basically assumes that all theoretical terms are indeed operationalize-
able. However, the question also arises of how to make this operationaliza-
tion possible. This is a methodological question and subsequently also related 
to the positivist account of explanation. We will approach these aspects in the 
next step. Beforehand, however, we first need to discuss epistemological and 
methodological aspects of atomism/particularism in more detail. So far, at-
omism has been discussed in terms of its ontological aspects. However, at-
omism/particularism is also a feature of methodology and the model of ex-
planation in positivist science.  
To develop the argument about the methodological and explanatory as-
pects of atomism, we will first return to the general ontological question of 
how universals and particulars relate to each other, as discussed in Step 1 of 
this unit. You know from Section 1 that the question of how universals and 
particulars relate to each other (remember: is the whole more than the sum of 
its parts?) is one of the central ontological questions. As will be demonstrat-
ed, the question of how universals and particulars are assumed to relate to 
each other is highly relevant for how science is conducted – for the method-
ology as well as the epistemological aspect of explanation. 
To start, please remember that at the core of positivist science lies theory 
and the formulation of theoretical hypotheses that have to be tested by empir-
ical experience. That is, when we try to know about “society”, “the state”, 
“the states system”, “institutional structures”, or “foreign policy” in the social 
sciences, positivist research requires that we formulate theories and hypothe-
ses about these “objects” of inquiry in order to gain general, valid knowledge 
about them. However, from what you have learned so far in Step 1 and Step 
2, you can see that the empirical testing of hypotheses and theories about 
“society”, “the state”, or the “international system” is not actually that easy, 
as these objects are not “observable”. They are general theoretical terms. 
Linking the discussion back to the previously mentioned ontological problem 
of how “universals” and “particulars” are assumed to relate to each other, 
general theoretical terms like “the state”, “society”, “structure”, etc., refer to 
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what are also called “universals”. That is, in most cases in the social sciences, 
we operate with concepts and theories that do not directly refer to (observa-
ble) particulars. As has been said above, methodologically these concepts and 
theories have to be operationalized, or “translated” into statements about “ob-
servables” (by way of variables). From an ontological perspective, the gen-
eral theories and concepts themselves – as we have seen above – have no be-
ing (ontology) and are not assumed to be “real”. In positivist science they are 
analytical “instruments” only. 
A huge ontological controversy exists with regard to what extent theories 
and concepts can be claimed to exist, to be “real”. This argument is often 
called the “universals controversy” and, in the history of philosophical 
thought, goes as far back as ancient Greece. Because of its relevance to the 
status of theory in science, it is worthwhile to take a closer look at this con-
troversy by discussing the issue against the background of the broader philo-
sophical debate. 
Nominalism 
A core aspect of the “universals controversy” is the question of whether or not 
general theoretical terms and concepts (the “universals”) exist or are simply 
pure mental constructions. Remember what we discussed in Step 1: a universal 
is an abstract term such as “man” or “humankind” or mathematical entities 
such as “number”, “relation” or a “class” in biology. For example, does the 
class “living being” actually exist? Do theoretical terms exist? Are they? Or are 
they pure conceptualizations of the human mind and as such do not “exist”? 
The debate goes back as far as Plato and his theory of forms (theory of ideas). 
As you have learned above, for Plato, ideas and forms (the universals) exist, 
they are (real). This controversy reached its peak in scholasticism in the Mid-
dle Ages; however, it still continues as a philosophical controversy today. 
Positivist science usually takes an ontologically nominalist position in the 
controversy. Nominalism denies the existence of universals, stating that uni-
versals and abstract objects do not exist; they have no being. They are only 
general terms and concepts to which the objects correspond. No objective 
meaning exists for the abstract words and concepts we use. Features of a uni-
versal are thus as follows: pure mental conception, time independence, lack 
of observableness, no causal effects. An example already mentioned in Step 1 
is a universal such as “human” or “humankind” that needs a reference to a 
particular point in time and a concrete human. Only as a concrete person at a 
particular point in time can the “human” be “observed” and have a “causal ef-
fect”. Research on “Foreign Policy” provides another example: only by refer-
ence to a particular point in time and a particular policy (such as American 
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Foreign policy during the Cold War) does “Foreign Policy” have “existence”. 
It otherwise remains only a general theory or concept, serving as an “instru-
ment”, but ontologically without “being”.  
In other words, in positivist science only “particulars” are claimed to exist 
(materialism, atomism). Here, universals are terms that can only be exempli-
fied by many particular elements and by what these “elements”/particulars 
have in common: characteristics, qualities, properties, relations. Universals are 
abstract and particulars are concrete; humanity is a universal while a particular 
person/an individual is a particular. The general – universals – do not exist. In-
stead, they are products of the human mind. The mind generates universals in 
a process of abstraction, abstracting from time and space and other factors 
needed to reference particulars/individuals. It results in an abstract idea (a uni-
versal) based on the analysis of the commonalities of the particulars/indivi-
duals. The “universal” is only the “name” or the idea.Words and abstract ideas 
have no being. For example, nominalism considers “movement” to be only a 
word – for the sum of the single, particular physical movements of a body (a 
position which an artist, painter, or sculptor would certainly deny). 
In short, as products of the human mind, universals have no “being” in a 
positivist account of science. Only the particulars can be claimed to exist. 
Nominalism occupied the core of scientific thought in the 19th century, 
exemplified for instance in the influential works of John Stuart Mill. It fea-
tured prominently throughout the 20th century (above all in the works of the 
Vienna Circle) and still maintains that prominence today. 
With regard to universals, nominalism is anti-realist. Please note that an-
ti-realism in regard to universals is nothing specific or exclusive to positiv-
ism; it is shared by other philosophies of science as well. For example, for 
mathematical constructivism, mathematical “objects” such as “numbers” are 
not assumed to be ontological entities; they have no being but are simply 
constructions of the human mind. The “number” or “class” as such has no be-
ing. This is in contrast to the realist position that mathematical entities (the 
universals) have their own existence: they are “there” and have to be discov-
ered by natural science. 
In the social sciences, realism about universals can be found in the phi-
losophy of science known as scientific realism (for example in the works of 
Charles Peirce, Bertrand Russell , Edmund Husserl, or Roy Bhaskar). Scien-
tific realism assumes ontologically the existence, the “being” of abstract 
terms such as “structure”.  
This brief excursion to the philosophy of science’s realism/anti-realism 
debate, particularly with regard to the ontology of “universals”, demonstrates 
how fundamental the questions at the heart of philosophy of science are. 
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However, the debate about the ontological status of “universals” forms 
only one aspect of the “universals controversy”. In addition to this ontologi-
cal question as to whether universals “are”, there is a related “universals 
problem”: the general question of whether a phenomenon can be expressed 
by or reduced to individual, particular categories in order to be explained. Al-
ternatively, are there phenomena that cannot be expressed by reference to in-
dividuals/particulars and therefore require a different method to be known? 
For those wishing to conduct scientific experiments, these are questions of 
epistemology and methodology: do knowing and knowledge come about by 
knowing the whole (universal) or by accumulating the knowledge about the 
single, particular elements that comprise an entity? 
You know that in positivism, we can only know about the materi-
al/physical particulars (observables) because any knowledge rests on an em-
pirical foundation. It will be easy to follow that such an epistemological posi-
tion is associated with a specific method for how to obtain knowledge. Let us 
take a closer look.  
Methodological individualism 
Methodological individualism is the claim of positivist science that phenom-
ena (natural as well as social) must be explained by showing how these phe-
nomena result from their individual parts or elements. How can one explain 
the features of something as a result of the structure of its atoms or mole-
cules? How can the social behavior of a group result from individual actions? 
As you can see from these questions, methodological individualism differs 
from ontological individualism. Ontological individualism (atomism/particu-
larism) is about existence or being; it holds the view that, for example, socie-
ty consists of individuals and the whole (society) is nothing more than the 
sum of the parts (the individuals). In the social sciences we find ontological 
individualism in the claim that society exists because of its elements, the sin-
gle parts. In turn, those single parts are individuals that finally and ultimately 
exist through their elementary particles – the natural substance of human be-
ing, their brains, DNA etc.  
In contrast, methodological individualism is about giving an explanation. 
“Methodological” means to prescribe a certain method, rather than to make a 
substantive claim about reality. This view denies that social collectives such 
as states, associations, interest groups or business corporations can, for ex-
ample, be explained as autonomous decision makers or agents. A social sci-
ence that tries to explain social collectives should ground its theories in indi-
vidual action. Social collectives should be treated as the results of the organi-
zation of individuals’ particular acts. The basic unit of social life is the indi-
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vidual human action. Explanations of institutions and social change aim to 
show how these organizations arise as the result of the actions and interac-
tions of individuals. In short, explanations of macro-phenomena must be pro-
vided by micro-foundations. Methodological individualism methodically 
privileges an action-centered view of social scientific explanation. In the so-
cial sciences, this view was formulated by Max Weber (Economy and Socie-
ty, 1922); in economics, for example, by Friedrich Hayek (Individualism and 
Economic order, 1948). Individual actions are explained by references to the 
intentional states that motivate the individual actors. Methodological individ-
ualism forms an essential part of modern neoclassical economics. It analyzes 
collective action, or the structure and dynamics of economic institutions in 
terms of rational, utility-maximizing individuals (homo economicus). Meth-
odological individualism is therefore closely associated with rational choice 
theory (theory of rational choice or theory of rational action). Rational choice 
is not a substantive theory. It is an action theory, based on the assumption 
that individual actors are rational and seek to maximize utility. Individuals 
make decisions about how they should act by comparing the costs and bene-
fits of different courses of action. Social outcomes are results of those indi-
vidual choices.  
The opposite of methodological individualism is methodological holism 
(for example, as formulated in the work of Emile Durkheim: The rules of so-
ciological method, 1895), often also called structuralism. Explanations here 
are given in terms of social wholes or structures and not in terms of the par-
ticulars/individuals. For instance, methodological holism claims that the 
property of a social system cannot be explained by its component parts alone 
(because ontologically, the whole is more than the sum of its parts). The 
“system” (whole) determines how the parts behave. Structuralism therefore 
claims that understanding social practices requires a focus on the structures 
and organizing principles within which those social practices are framed (a 
decentering of individual subjectivity). Structuralism is an attempt to scientif-
ically describe the structural principles (or the “logic” of structures) under 
which an activity could be explained. You will find this view in many vari-
ants of structuralism, historicism or other explanatory models that, for exam-
ple, view the role of social class, gender roles, ethnicity or identities as de-
terminants of individual behavior.  
In Part II of this book, we will learn about theoretical approaches to IR 
whose models of explanation are based on methodological holism/struc-
turalism in more detail. It is important to understand the differences be-
tween these methodological positions because they result in different ex-
planations of phenomena of international politics. These different explana-
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tions in turn have far-reaching consequences for the practice of internation-
al politics.  
From what has been discussed so far, you can see that atomism/particular-
rism/individualism can be found in the ontology, epistemology and method-
ology of positivist science. This core argument will be now further exempli-
fied by a brief introduction to “logical” atomism” (or logical positivism). 
Logical atomism 
The term atomism as described above for the world of material particulars is 
also used for elementary theoretical terms and statements that cannot be ex-
plained or reduced any further. This position is called logical atomism (also 
called logical positivism or sometimes logical empiricism) – in contrast to 
material atomism. Logical atomism became an influential position within 
analytical philosophy in the 1920s and 1930s and throughout the 20th century 
(for example with Bertrand Russell’s works The Philosophy of Logical Atom-
ism, 1918 and Theory of Knowledge, first published in the Collected Papers 
1984). Logical atomism was highly influential to the Vienna Circle (especial-
ly for the work of Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap).  
For logical atomism, the smallest indivisible elementary “units” (the “at-
oms”) are elements of logic. This stands in contrast to ontological materialist 
atomism, where the “units” are physical particles. In logical atomism, all 
meaningful statements are functions of truth of elementary propositions. 
They can be finally represented by atomic propositions. Theoretical state-
ments are required to be reducible to elementary “protocol statements” or, in 
other words, statements whose validity can either be proved intersubjectively 
by sensual experience/observation or at the very least can be brought into a 
logical relation to protocol statements. Once this relation is established, they 
can finally be proven (verified) by accepted protocol statements. Accepted 
protocol statements are understood as conventions – based on intersubjective 
agreement. For logical positivists, science implied that the content of scien-
tific theories could be finally reduced to truths of logics and mathematics.  
Reductionism 
You will have noticed that the term “reduced” has been mentioned in the 
previous sections on atomism and methodological individualism several 
times. In positivist science, a system or a thing is not only assumed to be 
made of particulars (ontology) but can be (methodologically) reduced to and 
explained by its elements. This has been described above as methodological 
individualism and logical atomism. For example, in logical positivism, theo-
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ries are reducible to elementary protocol statements; in materialist atomism, 
things are reducible to smallest indivisible particles etc. Both theories and 
material entities can finally be explained in terms of the particulars. 
The term reductionism might be seen as the broader, more general term. 
We are discussing it here in a separate paragraph because of its more funda-
mental nature as a specific mode of thought found at the heart of positivist 
science. The ontological as well as methodological and epistemological as-
sumptions of positivist science all reflect reductionism. However, when we 
say “reducible to”, we are usually referring to explanation and method.  
The notion of emergence provides an example for the opposite of reduc-
tionism in explanation. Emergence describes a case in which a system or a 
thing possesses a property that is NOT reducible to the parts or single proper-
ties of its parts. It excludes the principle of reductionism. For example, in 
systems theory, hierarchically structured systems have properties on the mac-
ro-level that cannot be found on the micro-level. On the macro-level they oc-
cur, emerging from the interaction of their elements on the micro-level, but 
cannot be reduced to those elements or explained in terms of them. It requires 
a different methodology to reach an explanation of the system (the whole). 
This position has been referred to above as methodological holism. 
Reductionism in its broader meaning is also exemplified by the famous 
“Ockham’s razor”: the principle of parsimony/lex parsimoniae. It requires 
giving preference to the explanation based on the smallest number of hypoth-
eses and hence presents the most simple, parsimonious theory. The theory 
should include as few variables and hypotheses (standing in clear logical re-
lation to each other) as possible. In fact, the position of reductionism dates 
back to ancient Greece with Aristotle’s view that nature chooses the simplest 
way – which, incidentally, is an ontological claim. But with Ockham, parsi-
mony became an epistemological principle: the requirement that, when build-
ing theories, needless elements should be eliminated. Going further, in the 
case that different theories exist to explain the same phenomenon, Ockham’s 
position would give preference to the most parsimonious theory. This princi-
ple became influential in the 19th century and has been spread above all by 
John Stuart Mill. More recently, the principle has been called “economy of 
thought” (Denkökonomie, a term probably first used by Richard Avenarius). 
In short: In positivist science, the ontological claim of a material, atom-
ist/particularist/individualist world (that is, a world of observables) and an 
ontological nominalist position in regard to “universals” is complemented by 
an epistemological and methodological reductionism. For science this implies 
the following: in order to know about the “whole”, we have to study the parts 
which comprise it.  
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Unity of science 
Consequently, reductionism is also found in the positivist belief in the ideal 
of a unity of science. This belief holds that all phenomena of the world can, 
in the final analysis, be explained by the fundamental, elementary science: 
classical physics. This principle reduces all scientific disciplines to an “ele-
mentary science”, with the expectation of a unified perspective of reality. For 
example, a belief in the unity of science assumes that chemistry is reducible 
to physics (because a chemical element is reducible to the arrangement of at-
oms and molecules), that biology is reducible to chemistry (and chemistry 
then to physics), or psychology to biology or biochemistry (holding, for ex-
ample, that the explanation of depression is ultimately reducible to a lack of 
neurotransmitters, which in turn is “observable”/measurable).  
In its most radical form, the belief in the “unity of science” ultimately re-
sults in the conclusion that even social sciences are reducible to physics or 
that a theory of the social sciences should be in line with the major findings 
of the natural sciences. The idea of the unity of science has been spread since 
the 1950s. Examples include Oppenheim and Putnam (1958). For a more re-
cent discussion as related to IR see Wendt (2006, 2010).  
As an epistemological and methodological position, the assumption of a 
unity of science gives a privileged position to the natural sciences and their 
methodology. The idea emerges that any science, including the social scienc-
es, should be based on the methodology and model of explanation used in the 
natural sciences. Social science can therefore be studied in the same manner 
as natural sciences; there is a single scientific method which can analyze both 
the natural and the social world.  
Contrasting arguments can be found in the works of Max Weber, Emile 
Durkheim, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger and Georg Gadamer, among 
others. These works claim that the social world requires a different form of 
analysis than the natural world, such as hermeneutics- the science of text in-
terpretation and understanding. They take this position because, in the social 
world, all analysis is embedded in language, history and notions of truth; rea-
son are themselves historically constituted. Further, in the social sciences, 
there can be no truly objective knowledge because the subject who interprets 
and observes is part of the world he/she is analyzing.  
Reductionism can be seen as the most orthodox position both in the 20th 
century and today. It can be read as an absolutizing and prioritization of 
physics. The success of modern science unquestionably provides the back-
ground for the success of reductionism. However, a trend of antireductionism 
has been growing for about 30 years. This trend emerged mainly as a result 
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of findings in neurophilosophy or biophilosophy that demonstrate the prob-
lems of a reductionist explanation of phenomena such as human conscious-
ness. Phenomena of the social world or such as the human mind appear more 
generally not to be reducible to phenomena that can be explained by the clas-
sical approach of the natural sciences. In the social sciences, the spread of so-
cial constructivist theories, theorizing the existence of “immaterial factors” 
such as the role of norms, collective ideas and collective representations, and 
learning etc. also provides a good indicator for the growth of antireduction-
ism. In addition, the simple fact remains that a unifying of sciences did not 
take place in terms of methodology and epistemology. Rather, diversification 
occurred in terms of the ontological, epistemological and methodological po-
sitions that underlie theory building. For IR, this trend away from reduction-
ism became clear at the very latest in the so-called positivism-postpositivism 
debate, which has been taking place since the 1990s. This debate will be dis-
cussed in the next section (2.3.). 
Finally, let us conclude our discussion of positivism as an example for a 
philosophy of science by focusing on its notion of causality and the specific 
type of explanation. Reductionism goes hand in hand with a specific concep-
tion of causality and explanation: the idea that, ultimately, single causes ex-
ists for any phenomenon observed.  
Causal, law-like explanation and the belief in prediction 
Positivism is based on the assumption that the material world of particulars is 
governed by laws and that we can gain scientific knowledge about this mate-
rial world and its laws through (positivist) science. The term “law” refers to 
regularities or the “order” of the world. With regard to explanation, positiv-
ism derives its understanding of the term explanation from a fundamental be-
lief in the existence of regularities or laws in the natural as well as social 
world. At the heart of these regularities are cause-effect-relationships be-
tween the entities.  
In positivist science, explanations establish a causal relation, also called a 
cause-and-effect-relation. This account of cause was originally influenced by 
the Humean account of the term (David Hume 1748, An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding). Hume’s idea was based on the experience that par-
ticular objects temporally appear together: when A occurred, so did B. Estab-
lishing a causal relationship in the Humean account of cause means discov-
ering the temporal relationship between observed events.  
In positivist scientific inquiry, the cause is the independent variable. The 
effect is the dependent variable. Variables (consisting of specific observa-
tion) stand in interrelation: the value of the dependent variable depends on a 
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change in the value of the independent variable. If this occurs, we speak of 
correlation. Correlation indicates the strength and direction of a linear rela-
tionship between two variables. Certain phenomena in international politics 
provide examples of such a correlation, for example the outbreak of a war or 
a conflict which can be observed to be linked to a particular type of political 
system of the conflicting parties. The theoretical statement about the rela-
tionship usually takes the form of an if-then-hypothesis. When proved “posi-
tive”, an explanation indicates the law-like succession of empirical phenom-
ena. Taking up the example mentioned previously, such a “law” has been 
formulated in the theory of inter-democratic peace. This law is based on the 
hypothesis that democracies do not fight each other. It has been empirically 
proved (here by statistical observation with the Correlates of War project at 
the University of Michigan) and is now usually presented as the empirically 
best-proven theory of IR. If we were to formulate this theory as a causal re-
lation in terms of “if, then”, it would read as follows: if international rela-
tions take place between democracies, then there will be no war between 
them”.  
However, establishing a correlation between two variables is not a suffi-
cient condition to establish a causal relation. Causal analysis in science is 
more complex. However, for the purposes of this learning unit, the example 
of correlation should be enough to indicate the nature of the specific type of 
causal relation between independent and dependent variables found at the 
heart of positivism: there is a cause for each phenomenon. The effect of a 
phenomenon temporally follows its cause; ultimately, a single cause emerges 
for the effect observed or the explanation is reducible to a single cause. A 
positivist explanation is thus a statement about the interrelation of an (ob-
servable) cause and an (observable) effect. If the (theoretically) hypothesized 
interrelationship between cause and effect can be scientifically verified, the 
explanation counts as valid knowledge (law-like). 
There are two typical forms of law-like explanations in positivist science: 
the deductive-nomological and the inductive-statistical forms of explanation. 
The deductive-nomological model of scientific explanations developed by 
Carl Gustav Hempel and Paul Oppenheim at the end of the 1940s (Hempel 
and Oppenheim 1948: Studies in the Logic of Explanation) was an important 
stage in the development of positivism. Since the 1950s and 1960s, it has be-
come a standard model of scientific explanation. The deductive-nomological 
model is the formal structure of a scientific explanation which is derived by 
way of deduction: from the abstract (the general law as the explanans) to the 
particular (the statements to be explained, the explanandum). A scientific ex-
planation here is a deductive argument that shows that a particular event is 
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“covered” under a general law (nomos in Greek). The model is also known as 
the “covering law model” or “subsumption theory”. 
It has been complemented by the inductive-statistical model of explana-
tion. In this model, explanations for an event fall under a statistical law. Sta-
tistical or probabilistic laws are established inductively (that is, by inferring 
from single events to a general law, going from the concrete to the abstract) 
and are used to show how, given the established law, a specific event is high-
ly likely (Smith 1996: 15). 
From what has been said about the causal, law-like nature of a positivist 
explanation, it follows clearly that positivist science holds the fundamental 
belief that prediction is possible. An account of explanation as a temporally 
linked relation of cause and effect enables prediction: if A, then B.  
Given the existence of other epistemologies such as hermeneutics, which 
claim that the social world requires a different form of analysis than the natural 
world, it is easy to conclude that there will be other notions of explanation in 
the social sciences. For example, Max Weber argues along these lines against 
the positivists, stating that to explain human behavior, not only are its external 
manifestations required (observables), but also knowledge of the underlying 
motivation. From this argument stems Weber’s definition of sociology as a sci-
ence which aims to produce an interpretative understanding of social behavior 
in order to gain an explanation of that behavior’s causes and effects. For We-
ber, interpretative understanding is a preliminary step towards causal relation. 
However, Weber holds that, in order to be considered a scientific explanation, 
any interpretative explanation must first become causal. Understanding and 
causal explanation invariably belong together as methods in the social sciences 
(Weber 1949). The example of hermeneutics should briefly demonstrate that 
there are different stances as to what counts as a scientific explanation. You 
will learn about these different models of explanation in Part II of this book. 
Based on the example of positivism, you may now have the impression 
that philosophy of science is an incredibly abstract and complex field. How-
ever, if you think about it, philosophy of science in fact forms an intrinsic 
part of our everyday life. The problems which this field reflects for science 
are more or less the same problems that exist in human thought in general. Of 
course, we do not often reflect on this in our day-to-day lives. 
The same argument holds true for IR theorists who formulate theories 
about international politics. Only rarely do they explicitly reflect upon the 
underlying philosophical positions that shape their theoretical ideas about 
world politics. Instead, these positions are often taken for granted.  
When reading about the theories of IR presented in Part 2 of this book, 
you will recognize how important it can be to take the time to look more 
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closely at the meta-theoretical foundations of our thinking about international 
politics. Ontological and epistemological claims both have consequences for 
scientific research and subsequently – and most importantly – for the practice 
of international politics. 
In sum 
Philosophies of science are integrated philosophical complexes. For example, 
the epistemology and methodology of positivism would be meaningless when 
combined with an ontological holist position because, in ontological holism, 
a whole is not reducible to its parts. The whole thus cannot be explained by 
studying its single parts.  
Because of their integration of ontological, epistemological and methodo-
logical aspects, I suggest we refer to philosophies of science more generally 
as “orders of thought”. This has been demonstrated, for example, by the dis-
cussion of atomism/particularism/individualism and reductionism as inte-
grated complexes of philosophy of science positions with ontological as well 
as epistemological and methodological aspects. The notion of “orders of 
thought” will be revived in more detail in Unit 3 of the book.   
Before we move on to Unit 3, let us briefly reflect on why discussing phi-
losophies of science is relevant for the academic discipline of IR. 
2.3. Competing philosophies of science in IR 
In the academic discipline of International Relations, systematic references to 
the philosophy of science on a larger scale started in the 1950s with the be-
havioral revolution in political science (a good reflection on that is the vol-
ume of Knorr/Rosenau 1969). In the early years there was a lack of legitimi-
zation in terms of the philosophy of science, partly due to the underdeveloped 
state of the field at this time. Since the 1950s, legitimization in terms of the 
philosophy of science has become a typical feature of IR theory. A large part 
of the historical development of IR as an academic discipline after World 
War II thus revolved around establishing a more scientific basis for the disci-
pline. From that point onwards, references to the philosophy of science (in 
the literature you will usually come across references to the work of Thomas 
Kuhn (1962), Karl Popper (1959), Paul Feyerabend or Imre Lakatos (1970)) 
has been a common feature of IR theories. 
The result has been a subsequent embedding of the positivist philosophy 
of science within the academic discipline of IR to such an extent that the 
terms “science” and “positivism” have been used and are still used synony-
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mously. Science became positivist science. The “scientific” study of IR thus 
came to mean a scientific approach based on positivism. There has been a 
continuing attempt to see the discipline’s development up this point in terms 
of increasing claims of “scientific” knowledge. From what we have learned 
earlier in this chapter, it becomes clear why IR scholars claim “cumulative” 
knowledge in the progression of IR as a science. IR derives from the method-
ologically refined study of the separate objects of international politics, split 
into such diverse fields as “foreign policy analysis”, conflict studies, security 
studies, international political economy, international organization, develop-
ment studies, environmental studies, area studies etc.  
On the other hand, there have always been deep debates over the very 
idea of science and the extent to which International Relations can be and 
should be a science. This became clear as early as the 1960s, with the wide-
spread controversy between “traditionalists” and “scientists” (positivists) 
over the appropriate methods for studying IR (remember the arguments in the 
texts written by Bull 1969 and Kaplan 1969 from your self-study in Step 1). 
The “classical approach” (Bull 1969) criticized positivism for leaving a large 
and important part of international politics unexamined because of a strict 
epistemological view. 
The latest controversy in IR between positivism and post-positivism has 
been taking place since the 1990s and once again involves the issue of sci-
ence and meta-theory. The debate has become more intense and the positions 
increasingly more diverse. At its core lies the role of positivism in IR, which 
has now become a controversial issue. Since these debates started, conten-
tious discussions about which ontology, epistemology and methodology is 
appropriate for the study of IR have been at the core of the discipline. How-
ever, the commonly used label of “post-positivism” to classify all non-
positivist approaches is misleading, since no such thing as a “post-positivist” 
philosophy of science exists. Rather, the controversy brought to the forefront 
the existence of a wide range of different understandings of science within 
the discipline of IR. All of these understandings critique positivist science. 
However, they draw on different philosophy of science positions such as con-
structivism, realism (such as scientific and critical realism), pragmatism, or 
historicism. From what you know about philosophies of science, it is easy to 
follow that those who reject positivist IR theory do not necessarily oppose 
systematic inquiry or the general idea of science. Rather, the specific under-
standing behind the term “science” differentiates those views. Only very few 
theories of IR are “anti-science”, rejecting the very idea that scientific 
knowledge is possible. What unites most different approaches to IR is an un-
derstanding of science as a systematic inquiry that employs method for the 
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purpose of gaining knowledge about international politics. They provide, 
however, different ontological perspectives on the core subject and how it 
can be studied by IR. In other words, the very idea of science as a system of 
knowledge lies at the core of debate. 
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of the book to present the different 
philosophies of science found in contemporary IR theories in as detailed as a 
manner as that used for the example of positivism. Different epistemological 
as well as ontological and methodological claims found in contemporary IR 
theory will feature at a later stage in our book, when we come to dealing with 
the single theoretical approaches to IR in detail. While discussing these theo-
ries, you will therefore also be learning about other philosophies of science.  
Step 3: 
Check your understanding: Key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
• Academic disciplines legitimize themselves as science through reference 
to a philosophy of science. There can be different philosophies of science 
dominant within a discipline at different points in time. 
• The object of investigation in the philosophy of science is the nature and 
practice of science itself. Any philosophy of science is based on ontologi-
cal and epistemological assumptions, as well as methodological ones. 
• In the academic discipline of International Relations, systematic reference 
to the philosophy of science at a larger scale started in the 1950s with the 
behavioral revolution in political science. 
• Most of IR theory is based on a positivist understanding of social science. 
For a long time, the positivist philosophy of science dominated the aca-
demic discipline to such an extent that the terms “science” and “positiv-
ism” have been used synonymously.  
• Discussing theories in terms of their underlying philosophy of science is 
highly relevant because of the ontological effects as well as its conse-
quences for the practice of international politics. 
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Review questions 
1. What is a philosophy of science?  
2. Which criteria allow International Relations to be counted as a science? 
 What does a “scientific study” of international relations mean? 
3. What are the implications of positivism for the study of International Re- 
lations? 
4. What is the relevance of discussing theories of International Relations in 
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Introduction 
The core argument developed in Unit 1 of this book holds that the history of 
IR theory is part of a two-fold process: the historical process of centralization 
and consolidation of power by which the modern state and the modern states 
system have been historically formed in Europe and which is simultaneously 
a process of increasing systematic reflection on inter-state relations in the 
fields of philosophy, political theory and international law. This process of 
reflection was driven by the rising social and political significance of inter-
state relations for societies. Put differently: in terms of the history of thought, 
state theory (or political theory) and interstate theory (later International Re-
lations theory) comprise part of these historical processes of the formation 
and development of the modern state and the modern states system since the 
17th century. Scholars have demonstrated that both the state/states system and 
theoretical reflection about this state and the states system are historically of 
European origin. 
In this unit, the arguments developed in Unit 1 on the core subject of IR 
(the modern state and international relations in the modern states system) will 
now be linked to the arguments about the scientific study of this core subject 
in the academic discipline of IR (as developed in step 1.2. of unit 1 and in 
unit 2). This will be done through historical reflection on the idea of science 
in European history – the same way we reflected before on the core subject of 
the discipline (the modern state and the modern states system) and on the 
theory of interstate relations. In short, we will take up the arguments on the 
European origin of IR’s core subject and on the theory of interstate relations 
by embedding them in a broader discussion of the historical emergence of the 
(European) idea of science in (European) philosophy. What we in the aca-
demic disciplines consider to be the “object” of our scientific study, our ideas 
of how to study this object, and which methods we should apply to that study 
are all culturally and historically embedded in overarching orders of thought. 
A deeper understanding of theory building in IR therefore requires an 
awareness of the interconnectedness of these processes. Consequently, it al-
so requires readers to risk separating the discussions on the core subject of 
the discipline from the theories about the core subject and the general idea 
of science underlying those theories. In brief, any study of “IR theories” as a 
separate subject is incomplete when divided from its underlying history and 
philosophy of science. This broader discussion will finally help us to under-
stand where we derive the assumptions as the “starting points” of theory 
building and the specific theoretical constructions found at the heart of IR 
theories.  
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The overarching cultural and historical embeddedness of the idea of sci-
ence will be discussed by using the notion of a “world view”. 
 
Self-study (1) 
In case you feel the need to refresh your knowledge about the historical 
processes of state formation and inter-state theory, it is recommended that 
you now take some time to go back to the summary at the end of Unit 1, 
Step 1.1. before you start reading about world views.  
Step 1: World views 
What is a world view? This question is admittedly a difficult one, as we are 
talking about a term that is used in many ways – usually as related to the dif-
ferent “world views” of religious systems or ideologies. For example, there is 
a philosophical core of Buddhism made of assumptions from which Buddhist 
thought and practice are logically derived. The same can be said about Islam-
ic philosophy and other religious systems of knowledge. At a first glance, to 
apply the term “world view” to ideas of science could be confusing, as we 
usually don’t assume that science depends on a “view” or perspective. Ra-
ther, we tend to see science as relating to a system that produces “objective” 
knowledge that does not depend on a view or specific perspective of the 
world. Let me therefore introduce the idea of world views as it will be used in 
this chapter. I will do so by way of an example that will be familiar to you 
and for which the notion of “world view” is a widely used and accepted term: 
the existence of the geocentric (Ptolemaic) world view as developed in Greek 
antiquity was universally accepted until it was replaced by the heliocentric 
(Copernican) world view in the 16th century. In case you need to refresh your 
knowledge of geocentrism and heliocentrism, please take some time and do 
your own research on the terms.  
To give a brief summary here, the geocentric world view was developed 
in Greek antiquity and is basically associated with the work of Ptolemy. Ptol-
emy was a mathematician, astronomer and geographer who likely lived 
around 90 AD to 168 AD. Ptolemy presented a geometrical model for calcu-
lating celestial motions based on astronomical observation and for the pur-
pose of calculating astronomical phenomena like the future and past positions 
of planets. The model was a geo-centric one, meaning that Earth occupied the 
center of the universe, with the sun, the moon and the planets moving around 
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the world on geometric curves. The geocentric model – which was also used 
by Aristotle – served as the universally accepted model for more than 1400 
years. The work of Ptolemy remained the authoritative text on astronomy 
throughout the Middle Ages. The geocentric world view lasted until the end 
of the Middle Ages in the 16th century. It was accepted to be “scientifically 
true” until it was “replaced” by the heliocentric world view.  
The heliocentric world view is mainly associated with the works of Nico-
laus Copernicus (1473-1543) and is therefore often called the Copernican 
world view. With his major work De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium in 
1543, Copernicus formulated a new world view of the universe. In his model, 
the sun (not the earth) occupies the center of the universe, with the earth and 
the planets moving around the sun and the earth rotating on its own axis. He 
was inspired by the work of the ancient Greek Aristarchos of Samos, the first 
person reported to have promoted such a heliocentric model of the solar sys-
tem. Aristarchos created his model sometime around the 3rd century, but gained 
little acceptance for his work at that time. With his own heliocentric model, 
Copernicus was able to solve the inconsistencies of the geocentric Ptolemaic 
model by introducing new hypotheses. Copernicus’s model was mainly used 
for the mathematical calculus of astronomical phenomena until around 1610, 
when Galileo “proved” the model’s physical reality based on observations 
made with his famous telescope. The works of Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), a 
philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, optician and theologist, further con-
solidated the heliocentric world view. Kepler formulated the exact mathemati-
cal model for heliocentrism, known as Kepler’s laws of planetary motion.  
The works of Isaac Newton, particularly Newton’s law of gravity (1687), 
finally proved the heliocentric world view to be correct in its physicalist ex-
planation. Just to give you an idea of the time span involved in the transition 
process, Newton came up with the law of gravity more than 240 years after 
the publication of Copernicus’s major work. After Newton, the heliocentric 
world view gave rise to the dominance of what is called Cartesian-
Newtonian science in a process well-known to all of us as the scientific revo-
lution. The rise of Cartesian-Newtonian science will feature in our discussion 
at a later stage (Step 2.3.). Heliocentrism lasted until it was replaced by the 
world view that our sun system is not the center but only a tiny part of the 
universe – a view finally accepted in the 18th century. For an excellent over-
view of the geocentric and heliocentric world views, see Bedenig 2011: 
Chapters 1 and 2, 19-53.  
From this brief introduction to the geocentric and heliocentric world 
views, you can draw several conclusions. First (1), these world views present 
attempts of astronomers, mathematicians, and philosophers (in Greek antiqui-
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ty usually all embodied in one person) to describe the “order” of the universe 
based on models derived from observation and mathematical calculus. The 
intention of these models was not only to describe and explain but also to 
predict – for example, anticipating the future positions of planets. Second (2), 
the world views were accepted as “scientifically true” for long periods of 
time that encompassed anywhere from hundreds up to more than thousand 
years. However, world views are (3) not eternal but subject to transition and 
change, driven by the progress of science. Finally (4), usually different, com-
peting world views exist simultaneously, but only one of them becomes his-
torically accepted.  
In short, world views comprise perspectives and persistent, long-term pat-
terns of thought on the “being” of the world, its laws and relation to the cos-
mos. A world view can be described as the dominant interpretation of an his-
torical age’s state of knowledge regarding the most basic questions of hu-
mankind; questions about how the world came into being, which position 
humans occupy in the cosmos, and what and how we can know about the 
world (Bedenig 201: 16). As such, world views comprise something very 
comprehensive that goes far beyond what a theory or a philosophy of science 
can express: world views are fundamental orders of thought. Quite often 
these world views are also referred to as “world systems” (see Harrison 2000: 
2), as they present “systematic” models or “systems” of thought. We usually 
find the “elements” of a particular historical age’s world view in the sciences 
as well as in literature, arts, architecture, music and many other areas. We 
will develop this argument of the comprehensive, all-encompassing nature of 
world views later in more detail. 
The world views presented above with the examples of geo- and heliocen-
trism are both world views associated with ideas of cosmology. Cosmology is 
the theory or philosophy of the world as it relates to the origin, development 
and structure of the universe. As a serious scientific area of study and an aca-
demic discipline, cosmology began in 1917 with the works of Albert Ein-
stein, especially those on the “static universe”. Since then, cosmology has 
developed from a mathematical and philosophical area of study into a main-
stream branch of physics and of science more generally (for an excellent 
overview see Harrison 2000 and Ellis/Maartens/MacCallum 2012). In this re-
gard, cosmology today forms an integral part of physics, chemistry, astrono-
my as well as philosophy. It also provides the background of these single dis-
ciplines. Cosmology’s object of study is the universe as a whole. As a core 
subject, this is indeed unique compared to other sciences.  
To help you to best achieve the learning objective of this unit, the follow-
ing discussion will draw on those aspects of world views that relate to the 
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systematical and methodological study of the order of the universe. There-
fore, hereafter the term “scientific world view” will be used because the fo-
cus will be on the ideas of science inherent in the world views. As has been 
mentioned above, world views are not eternal but rather subject to transfor-
mation and change driven by the progress of science. This argument points to 
an intrinsic link between philosophical thought about “the world” and the 
idea of science. The argumentation in this unit will be guided by the thesis 
that a mutual dependency of philosophy and science forms a central feature 
of the history of thought in Europe. Learning about this interdependency will 
enhance our understanding of theory building in the social sciences and of the 
particular theoretical constructions found at the heart of all theories. In other 
words, this unit will present world views by means of the historical under-
standings of science they incorporate.  
As mentioned above, scientific world views are perceived as long-time 
persistent patterns of thought about the existence of the world, how to learn 
about the world, what counts as valid knowledge about the world, and the 
methods used to obtain this knowledge. In other words, the focus will be on 
ontological, epistemological and methodological “elements” found in scien-
tific world views. These “elements” are already familiar to you from your 
reading in Unit 2, which introduced ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological assumptions as the core of philosophies of science. 
Our discussion of scientific world views proceeds along the same lines of 
the “elements” of a philosophy of science. However, now the discussion will 
be extended to the realm of philosophical reflections that go far beyond par-
ticular philosophies of science (such as positivism). The focus will be on the 
idea of science as formed and reflected in the history of European/Western 
thought more generally. You will learn how important the early scientific 
world views of Greek antiquity proved to be for the development of Europe-
an science and to what extent our contemporary study of theory in the diverse 
disciplines of the natural and social sciences have been shaped by scientific 
world views that emerged in this historical process. The discussion will also 
improve your understanding of where philosophies of science (such as posi-
tivism) are derived from and which theories they are embedded in. In addi-
tion, this unit will provide a framework to discuss other philosophies of sci-
ence. Finally, this approach will help us to better understand contemporary 
theory building in IR, especially against the background of the diversity of 
theoretical approaches that the so-called positivism-postpositivism debate has 
brought about. 
Please note that, as was the case in Unit 1, the term “scientific” here re-
fers to the general idea of a systematical, methodological study of the world, 
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based on theory and for the purpose of generating human knowledge. In other 
words, the term science itself is not attributed to a particular philosophy of 
science (such as positivism). 
This unit is not intended to provide a comprehensive presentation of the 
European history of philosophical thought. In line with the learning objec-
tives of this book, the discussion will instead draw on selected aspects that 
are necessary for learning about the historical emergence of the idea of sci-
ence. The unit aims to provide you, the readers, with the ability to identify 
the basic lines of philosophical and scientific thought that underlie particular 
theories of IR. This unit will help you to better understand the following: the 
nature of assumptions as starting points for theory building; the specific theo-
retical constructions offered by theories of IR; and the role and status of theo-
ry in IR and the practice of international politics. For those keen on learning 
more deeply about scientific world views in European philosophy, there will 
be a list of recommended supplementary reading at the end of this unit. 
Highly relevant to our learning purposes is a discussion of the idea of 
science as it emerged in the European history of thought. As you learned in 
the previous unit on positivism, during the modern age (positivist) science 
has gained the status of a superior system of providing objective knowledge, 
considered superior to any other systems of knowledge such as religions or 
myths. It also claims superiority over any other understanding of science and 
thus enjoys a very prestigious status in Western societies. However, the 
question of whether or not it is possible to provide “objective” knowledge, 
as well as positivist science’s claim of being able to causally explain and 
predict phenomena, are both highly debated issues. This holds particularly 
true given the complexities of our social, political, economic, technological 
and cultural world. The current economic, financial, environmental, political 
and legitimation crises our world is experiencing, their causes, and the strat-
egies used to “solve” these crises all raise serious doubts about the scientific 
claims of mainstream economic and political science. These and other sci-
ences have driven political, economic and technological processes for long 
periods of time, in fact since the scientific revolution in the 17th century. A 
critical reflection and debate on scientific claims has always been part of the 
theoretical controversies in the diverse disciplines but never has so much 
been at stake as in the present moment. The crises are serving as indicators 
that our economy, politics and natural living conditions have been shaken to 
their foundations. Consequently, a general discourse on the role and status 
of science and theory in our society is absolutely inevitable. This applies not 
only to the academic discipline of IR but to international politics as well. At 
the end of this book, we will take up this issue of the current relevance of a 
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discussion of science and you will be invited to actively take part in the de-
bate. 
Last but not least, the lines of argument in the discussion below are, out 
of necessity, based on my personal reading, interpretation and understanding 
of the history of scientific world views. They stem from my subjective selec-
tion of aspects that I have come to perceive as relevant for a better under-
standing of IR theory building. It should therefore be read as an interpretative 
approach, an offer of ideas that intend to provide “food for thought” and to 
invite and encourage critical discussion of IR as a science. The history of Eu-
ropean philosophical thought on science is a complex one and is a real chal-
lenge for students and teachers alike to study. I therefore take responsibility 
for all mistakes and misrepresentations and am happy to receive comments 
and advice on improving the book (see my contact details in the preface).   
Step 2: 
Scientific world views 
2.1. Greek Antiquity  
Based on the human mind’s ability to create language and to reflect on the 
world, it can be assumed that humans have historically always developed ideas 
about nature, the human being, the seasons, the order of the cosmos and other 
fundamental questions. For example, Bedenig (2011: 19-32) points to early 
creation myths that describe and explain how the world came into being and 
how death and the periodical cycles of season evolved. Other myths reflect on 
the dualisms of dark and light, heaven and earth, or matter and mind. Evidence 
for such mythological perceptions of the universe has been found all over the 
world: myths of the world and of divine creation exist in Chinese, Japanese, In-
donesian, Indian, African and many other cultures. The first “scientific ele-
ments” have been ascribed to the physical world view of the peasant societies 
of the Neolithic Age in Europe (around 7000 BC). These societies had ideas 
and models of a flat earth embedded in the sea with a dome-shaped heaven car-
rying the sun, the moon and the stars, all created by gods (Bedenig 2011: 31).  
In a more narrow sense, however, European history generally attributes 
the emergence of the idea of science to philosophical thought in Greek antiq-
uity. Greek philosophy is still appreciated today for having invented the sci-
entific method of interpreting observations by a theory, for the idea of using 
theory to make predictions for unknown phenomena, for the principle of veri-
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fying a theory, and for the idea of a clear separation of science and religion 
(an excellent overview is provided by Bedenig 2011: 33-48). As has been in-
dicated above by the example of the geocentric world view, it was by using 
scientific methods of systematic observation and mathematical calculation 
that the Greeks came to know that the earth was a sphere and assumed that it 
must be the center of the universe. Ptolemy and his followers formulated 
these findings in their geocentric geometric model. The world views as de-
scribed above are “scientific” in that they formulate assumptions, theories 
and hypotheses about the world/the universe in a systematic way and invent 
methods to come to know about the world. They reject traditional mythologi-
cal explanations of the phenomena in favor of “rational” explanations. 
This adoption of rational explanations occurred as early as the so-called 
Pre-Socratics, who asked fundamental questions about the “essence” of 
“things”. These questions included: what is and from where does everything 
come (ontological questions about being); how do we explain the things and 
objects we see (epistemological questions about knowing). They also tried to 
describe nature mathematically. The questions, problems and paradoxes at 
the core of pre-Socratic thought became the basis for modern mathematics, 
philosophy and science in general. In the history of Greek philosophy and in 
subsequent periods, there have been different answers to those fundamental 
questions. However, the core questions and problems of what is, how to 
know something, and which methods are needed to obtain that knowledge 
have remained throughout history, right through to the present. In fact, the 
very idea of systematic thought in terms of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology – the core of the idea of science – goes back to the philosophy 
of Greek antiquity! This period fundamentally shaped the core questions and 
hence the core subject of what is now called philosophy of science, as de-
fined as a sub-discipline of philosophy (see our discussion in Unit 2).  
In short, Greek philosophy heavily influenced our modern idea of science, 
which was developed in an historical process of European philosophy now 
encompassing more than 2500 years. To understand our idea of science and 
the prestigious status science has gained in our societies today, it is worth 
taking a closer look at some ancient Greek positions in regard to ontological, 
epistemological and methodological questions. Particularly interesting are 
those questions and problems for which there have been competing positions 
and arguments. 
For example, the early belief existed that true knowledge could only be 
gained by applying strict rationality – meaning both logical reasoning and 
empirical observation (see Bedenig 2011: 44). However, for Aristotle and 
Plato, whose works shaped European philosophy, only logical reasoning was 
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assumed to result in knowledge, not empirical observation. Remember our 
discussion on the epistemological positions of empiricism and rationalism as 
two different ways of coming to know something (in Unit 2). Plato and Aris-
totle’s emphasis on logical reasoning (and their disregard of empirical obser-
vation) is important because it explains why the idea of science associated 
with Aristotle – and with Greek philosophy more generally – is theoretical 
science and not empirical. Aristotle is well known for his systematic presen-
tation of the knowledge of his time, ranging from mathematics to political 
science. He differentiated between two types of knowledge based on different 
origins and goals of knowledge: practical knowledge (techne) and theoretical 
knowledge (episteme). For him, theoretical knowledge derived from rational 
reasoning was most important. He considered empirical methods always de-
fective, so the only reliable basis of gaining knowledge was rationality 
through logical reasoning. Thus, in Aristotelian philosophy, logical thought 
formed the most important starting point for gaining knowledge. European 
classical philosophy has been fundamentally shaped by the idea of knowledge 
derived from logical reasoning, while the rise of the natural sciences since 
the 17th century results from a new emphasis on an empiricist epistemologi-
cal position. These initial remarks will help you to better understand the 
rise of the empirical (natural) sciences during the scientific revolution, their 
focus on the empirical testing of theoretical hypotheses (as will be dis-
cussed in Step 2.3.), and the split between (natural) science and the arts still 
common today. 
In short, with Aristotle and Plato, the idea of science first became theoret-
ical. Greek science “produced” philosophy instead of industries and technol-
ogies. This development was in line with a Greek society in which only 
slaves had direct contact with “nature”, while the aristocracy focused on con-
templation and philosophical reflection. With regard to sciences, in Greek an-
tiquity originally everything was philosophy; only later did new subjects such 
as geometry and rhetoric emerge. However, the separation between (natural) 
science and philosophy did not exist in antiquity. Therefore, in ancient 
Greece, scientists were philosophers. In fact, one single person was often 
simultaneously a philosopher, an astronomer, a mathematician, etc., a cir-
cumstance which differs considerably from the later stages of the develop-
ment of the idea of science. In the 19th century, the epistemological prioritiza-
tion of empirical observation brought about a split between the natural sci-
ences and philosophy, leading to a huge diversity of highly specialized aca-
demic disciplines and sub-disciplines.  
Ancient Greek thought on science was reflected in the geocentric world 
view of the universe as the all-encompassing cosmological world view in 
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Greek antiquity. The basic models and assumptions can be summarized as 
follows (see Bedenig 2011: 33-48; Harrison 2000: 28-34):  
First, the general (ontological) view existed that there is “order” in the 
cosmos and that the cosmic order is similar to the order of human mind. This 
view resulted in the belief that, if the cosmic order is akin to the order of hu-
man mind, then the cosmic order can be known by the human mind and by 
human rationality (an epistemological position). Behind the cosmic order a 
“methodical intelligence” (god) was supposed to exist, bringing to the uni-
verse a spirituality and purpose that can be conceived by the human mind. 
Second, because of its divine origin, the ideas and forms in the cosmos are 
perfect, as expressed by models such as those of planets and stars with ideal 
circular orbits. You know about ideal forms and ideas from our discussion of 
Plato’s theory of ideas (or theory of forms) in Unit 2. The geocentric model 
draws on Euclidean geometry, where such ideas of ideal geometrical forms 
are modeled, deduced from a small set of axioms and then provided with 
mathematical proof (Euclid’s Elements). Third, the world view is atomistic: it 
draws on atomism, the idea systematically developed by Democritus and Ep-
icurus that everything in the universe consists of tiny, indivisible atoms (re-
member the discussion of atomism in Unit 2). The atomized world is made of 
“matter” – a materialist ontological position. As you know, there have been 
different ontological positions regarding the make-up of the world; for exam-
ple, Heraclitus assumed all things in nature to be in a state of perpetual flux, 
connected by logical structures. Such a position stands in contrast to atom-
ism. However, atomism ultimately became the dominant perspective and has 
shaped the idea of science throughout European history. We will later return 
to this argument in more detail. Finally, in the geocentric world view, the be-
lief existed that each movement in the universe has a cause (with the first 
movement caused by god as the prime mover). Causes of natural phenomena 
are seen as physical in origin and explanation thus implies the expression of a 
relation between cause and effect. Cause and effect are linked by natural 
laws. 
From what you know about the “elements” of a philosophy of science, 
you can easily see that the ideas mentioned above refer to ontological as well 
as epistemological and methodological assumptions and models of explana-
tion. All these principles and assumptions will sound familiar to you. Many 
of them have been introduced in more detail in Unit 2 because they are 
shared by positivism as a philosophy of science. Indeed, European philoso-
phy, culture and science have been fundamentally shaped by the philosophy 
of Greek antiquity. The work of Greek philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, 
or Aristotle is reflected in our philosophical and literary terminology, in our 
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political and economic ideas of liberalism and pluralism, in our political 
analysis, in our idea of freedom, in the way we perform and perceive science. 
Al-Jabri raises an interesting point with his argument that, in fact, the idea of 
science itself can be seen as the key impetus and driving force for Greek phi-
losophy and thus of European philosophy more generally. Science is consid-
ered the “incentive element” for the advancement of philosophy (Al-Jabri 
2011: 421). 
In the next step we will therefore investigate what happened to the idea of 
science and to philosophy in the time following late antiquity, which was the 
last period of the ancient world.  
2.2. The European Middle Ages and Renaissance 
After late antiquity in Europe, the progress of science stagnated for a long 
time. Providing a world view based on religion – the triumph of Christendom 
– has usually been perceived as a stumbling block to the further development 
of science. From the early Middle Ages onwards, belief and religious convic-
tion – instead of observation and analysis – came to dominate the idea of 
knowledge. The Church and the Holy Scripture held absolute authority, for-
mulating the ultimate “truth”. Philosophy now was the “servant” of theology, 
not the “provider” of scientific thought. 
Finally, this situation changed in the 13th century when Thomas Aquinas 
made one of the greatest contributions to the transformation from medieval 
thought to early modern thought: he revived the idea of science as derived 
from Greek antiquity by attempting to combine Christian theology and Aris-
totelian thought in a kind of synthesis. Thomas Aquinas was one of the main 
representatives of scholasticism, a method of thought based on dialectical 
reasoning. Scholasticism aimed to extend knowledge by way of logical infer-
ence and with the intention of dissolving contradictions. It was taught at Me-
dieval European universities mainly for the purpose of defending orthodoxy 
in an increasingly pluralist context. In addition to Thomas Aquinas, well-
known representatives of scholasticism include Albertus Magnus, Wilhelm of 
Ockham and, later, several Lutheran and Reformed thinkers. In short, scho-
lasticism can be seen as an attempt to reconcile Christian theology with clas-
sical and late antiquity philosophy. The latter basically comprised Aristoteli-
an and Neoplatonic thought – both of which, as you have learned, consider 
logical reasoning as the fundamental means and method of knowing.  
The historical background of the revival of Aristotelian philosophy and 
Neoplatonism is a particularly interesting one. Knowledge and ideas of an-
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tiquity had largely been “forgotten” in the early and High Middle Ages but 
had nonetheless been preserved in monastic libraries, in Arab culture and in 
Byzantium. The Greek philosophical writings had been translated into Ara-
bic, allowing Arab scholars to preserve and annotate the intellectual heritage 
of the Greeks. During Reconquista on the Iberian Peninsula (which ended in 
1492), the Christian conquerors captured the writings of these Greek and Ar-
ab scholars. In addition, the demise of the Byzantine Empire was followed by 
the migration of Greek scholars to Italy. They brought with them previously 
lost knowledge of Greek antiquity. Greek philosophy thus subsequently 
found its way back to Christian Europe in a roundabout manner, though Ara-
bic, Spanish and Latin texts. During the Renaissance in the 15th and 16th cen-
tury, a revival of ancient Greek thought took place. This revival is expressed 
in term Renaissance itself, which originated in the 19th century and means 
“rebirth”. It embodies the idea that, after the Middle Ages, European culture 
experienced a reorientation towards Greek and Roman antiquity: a “rebirth” 
of the spirit of antiquity.  
This “rebirth” of antique ideas manifested itself in a multifaceted and all-
encompassing way, reflected in sculpture, architecture, writing and philo-
sophical thought. Above all, arts and sciences were held in high esteem in 
the Italian city states, in a manner comparable to that of ancient Greece. For 
example, in the arts, a new tendency to mathematical-scientific clear-cut 
forms appeared which placed the human body at the center (as shown in Le-
onardo da Vinci’s studies of proportions). The Renaissance also marked the 
beginning of a new, anthropocentric world view. The idea of the individual 
as a creative person emerged as well, as expressed by humanism, often 
called the “spirit” of the Renaissance. Humanism was fundamentally shaped 
by Greek antiquity, with the Greek idea of education and intellectual devel-
opment serving as its model of orientation. At the core of humanism lay the 
interests, dignity, creativeness and value of the single human being, the in-
dividual, and the ability to educate and improve oneself. Typical questions 
posed by humanists included “What is the human?” and ”What is ‘true’ hu-
man nature?” Humanism provided a tremendous stimulus to the study of 
language, literature, and philosophy, this time for their own sake, separate 
from religion.  
In this long-term process, a more anthropocentric view incrementally re-
placed the theocentric world view of the Middle Ages. This process oc-
curred last but not least because of Martin Luther (Luther 1520: De liberate 
christiana/On the freedom of a Christian) and the Reformation, which called 
into question the “natural” authority of the Catholic church and strengthened 
the attempts to seek a truth free of tradition and dogma. As we will learn in 
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the next step, with the end of the Middle Ages, religion lost its prerogative 
for sole interpretation to modern science and technology. The transition 
from the geocentric world view to the heliocentric world view proved key to 
this process, since it was this change that gave birth to the scientific revolu-
tion. 
2.3. Scientific revolution and the rise of Cartesian-Newtonian 
science 
The “scientific revolution” was not a sudden event but rather a process that 
covered a long period of time; it lasted from the Early Modern Age at the end 
of the 15th century until the end of the 18th century. The scientific revolution 
is associated with the works of Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543), Johannes 
Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), René Descartes (1596-1650), and 
Isaac Newton (1642-1727) – all of them astronomers, mathematicians, phi-
losophers, and physicists. The scientific revolution resulted in a development 
towards Cartesian-Newtonian science or a Cartesian-Newtonian world view. 
This process was crucial for the rise of the natural, empirical sciences and 
technology, and for their role and current status in the modern world.  
Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler: the rise of experimental science 
The transition of the geocentric (Ptolemaic) world view to the heliocentric 
model as formulated by Copernicus (in 1543) and proved by Kepler’s laws 
and Galileo’s observations, is essential to the process of the scientific revolu-
tion because it gave birth to a new understanding of science. You can imag-
ine – and certainly know from history – that the Copernican world view was 
perceived as a threat to Christian cosmology, theology and Catholics morals. 
The trial against Galileo (1633) marked the height of the confrontation be-
tween religion and science but could not stop the spread of the heliocentric 
world view.  
This transition from the geocentric to the heliocentric world view forms 
an important part of our discussion on the history of the idea of science be-
cause it brought about a new ideal of science, one based on new ontological, 
epistemological and methodological perspectives. Let me illustrate this in a 
few steps (drawing on Schupp 2003: 85-100; and Bedenig 2011: 75-82). 
First, it was through systematic observation with a telescope that Galileo dis-
covered the truth of Copernicus’s claims. This observation led Galileo to 
write his famous Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi (1632): a dialogue 
about the two main world systems, the Ptolemaic and the Copernican. Gali-
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leo’s work was guided by his belief in a law-like character of physical pro-
cesses. The search for these general laws has since been seen as the main 
goal of physics. Galileo claimed it was possible to obtain knowledge about 
these general laws through observation and measurement and the subsequent 
formulation of the laws in mathematical language. This continues to be the 
current objective of physics. For Galileo, there was a central position of the 
experiment as a scientific method: that a theory can be accepted only when 
experimentally “proved”. In fact, the natural sciences still apply Galileo’s ex-
perimental methodology today.  
Out of fear of the church, Galileo’s work was first cautiously considered a 
“hypothetical model”. However, Kepler’s work subsequently demonstrated 
that the heliocentric model of Copernicus was not only a hypothetical model 
for the purpose of simplifying the calculations of planetary positions. Instead, 
Kepler “proved” the heliocentric model as a physical fact. Kepler’s work 
Epitome Astronomiae Copernicae was thus perhaps the first textbook on the 
heliocentric world view.  
In short, starting with Galileo, experimental science now formed the core 
of inquiries about the world. Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler all employed 
scientific methods. The methods of the natural sciences, based on empirical 
observation and its theoretical description and interpretation, had now taken 
their places at the heart of scientific inquiry. It is important to emphasize that 
this empirical orientation was a new focus in scientific thought. It was not 
based on Aristotelian and Platonic theoretical epistemology, but rather on ex-
perimental proof.  
In sum, with the works of Galileo and Kepler, a process towards the rise 
of natural sciences as empirical science was put in motion in Europe, based 
on experience/experiment. This process also provided the foundation for new 
experiments because of new industrial tools. Thus, science and technology 
entered a new, mutually advantageous relationship at this time. 
Once experimental science emerged with Galileo, European philosophy 
also entered a new stage with the work of René Descartes. Descartes re-
established philosophy as a science, as part of physics and mathematics. 
From then on, the progress of European philosophical thought was closely 
linked to the progress of the empirical sciences, with physics and mathemat-
ics at the core (Lefèvre 2001: viii-x). This might sound strange at first, given 
that our traditional understanding of philosophy is not usually associated with 
these disciplines. Let us therefore take a closer look at the role mathematics 
and physics played for philosophy at this time. 
82 
Descartes and Newton 
René Descartes is well-known for his idea of the universe as a machine that 
operates according to strict mathematical laws (an excellent overview is pro-
vided by Schupp 2003: 110-133; see also Bedenig 2011: 83-86). His works 
can be seen as representative for the rise of the mechanical world view, which 
was developed further by Isaac Newton, the father of classical mechanics. 
Descartes formulated many of his major ideas in his Discours de la méthode 
pur bien conduire sa raison et chercher la vérité dans les science (1637), 
which discussed the “right method” of applying human reason to science. 
Descartes assumed the existence of rules responsible for the movements of 
things (with the world itself being of divine origin). Descartes’ aim was to 
come to know those rules; the question was, how? 
While trying to fulfill this aim, Descartes systematically transferred atom-
ism to the Copernican world view. He drew on the atomistic world view of 
Democritus and Epicurus, whose ideas had been revived in Renaissance. In 
an Epicurean-like way, Descartes assumed an atomistic world of matter and 
motion that operates under natural laws (see Harrison 2000: 2). Please re-
member that, in its ontological aspect, atomism refers to the view that the 
universe consists of tiny indivisible atoms, moving in infinite neutral empti-
ness, and the idea that all phenomena result from the collisions and the com-
binations of these atoms. Scholars such as Giordano Bruno already saw an 
analogy between the Greek idea of atomism and the Copernican system: at-
omism corresponds to the Copernican system in that the earth is not the cen-
ter of the universe but is itself a part (atom) of a neutral, infinite space with 
other celestial bodies (atoms). However, it was Descartes who finally ex-
pressed this idea in a systematic manner. The atoms/particles were referred to 
as “corpuscles” during Descartes’ time and it was by name of “corpuscle the-
ory” that Descartes spread the idea of atomism in his work. Corpuscle theory 
is similar to atomism in that all matter is seen as being composed of minute 
particles; however, Descartes did not believe in the indivisibility of these 
“corpuscles”. Corpuscle theory became an influential perspective at this time 
and remained so for many decades afterwards. For example, Thomas Hobbes 
drew on it when formulating his political theory in the Leviathan (1651) and 
Isaac Newton used it in his “corpuscular theory of light”, which will be dis-
cussed below.  
In the Cartesian, mechanical, machine-like view of the world, it was as-
sumed that each corpuscle remains in a neutral state until it is given a “push” 
from the outside. After this initial contact, the corpuscle starts to move and 
continues to move constantly in a straight line until it collides again with an-
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other “corpuscle” (Bedenig 2011: 84). Descartes transferred this idea to the 
movement of celestial bodies. Its application to the solar system results in the 
conclusion that there must be a mechanism responsible for the earth moving 
around the sun: a “force” which compels the planets to move towards the sun 
and not “fly away” in straight lines (Bedenig 2011: 84). This “force” is in 
fact gravity, later discovered by Isaac Newton. The “mechanism” involved 
was mathematically formulated in Newton’s law of gravity.  
Newton’s work thus “completed” the new mechanical world view. Isaac 
Newton is well-known as the father of classical mechanics and is hence a 
major contributor to what is known as classical physics. This term applies to 
physics until the end of the 19th century; that is, before Einstein (for an over-
view see Bedenig 2001: 86-88). Newton formulated many of his major ideas 
in his Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (1687). Please note the 
term; physics at this time was considered to be a “natural philosophy”. 
In the year 1666, Newton made groundbreaking insights in a diverse range 
of fields: infinitesimal calculus (mathematics), optics and the theory of gravity. 
Of all his achievements, he is best-known for this last contribution, the discov-
ery of the gravitational pull as the physical law according to which each body 
in the universe exerts gravitational force towards other bodies. Newton’s laws 
of motion and of universal gravitation transformed astronomy (Bedenig 2001: 
87-88). Starting with Kepler’s Laws and continuing with Newton’s work, as-
trophysics developed as the “new astronomy”, merging physics and astronomy 
(with a basic understanding of physics as “natural philosophy”). 
As has been mentioned above, Newton’s work on the nature of light 
draws on corpuscle theory. Newton understood light as “corpuscle (particle) 
radiation”, the idea that light consists of tiny particles that are emitted from a 
light source in a linear manner. As you will learn in more detail in Step 2.4., 
this search for the nature of light belongs to the most important objectives in 
physics and cosmology.  
From the introduction in Unit 2, you know that atomism is a specific posi-
tion on the philosophical problem of how particulars relate to the whole. You 
are also familiar with the argument that, in addition to ontological aspects of 
atomism, epistemological and methodological implications exist as well. 
These result in methodological individualism and reductionism. It will there-
fore be easy for you to see that the mechanical world view and corpuscle the-
ory are closely linked to methodology. For Descartes, to understand a system 
we have to divide the system into sub-systems. These sub-systems have to be 
analyzed separately, allowing the single effects of each sub-system to be ex-
amined more easily. Complex systems thus have to be “reduced” to simpler 
ones until causes of phenomena can be analyzed separately, undisturbed by 
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interfering effects. Following this method, the direction of scientific thought 
should progress from the “simple” to the more complex (Bedenig 2001: 84-
85). This principle is referred to as reductionism or methodological individu-
alism, a major feature of positivist science with which you are already famil-
iar from your reading in Unit 2. Reductionism and methodological individu-
alism continue to be central positions in the sciences today. As we will see, 
they also play a crucial role in IR theory building.  
Both Descartes and Newton have proven to be highly influential, as their 
concepts of atomism/reductionism/methodological individualism became 
widespread in European scientific thought. This prevalence is reflected in 
many ways, ranging from the general ontological assumption of an atomized 
material world to the specific types of explanation and methodology found in 
the sciences. For example, in the natural sciences atomism is prototypically 
embodied in classical, that is, particle physics (Harrison 2000: 2). In the so-
cial sciences, the perspective is prototypically reflected in (neo)classical eco-
nomics and liberal theory. Both these areas perceive the individual as a sepa-
rate entity, the basic unit of society and its institutions. In IR, the interpreta-
tion of the state building processes in Europe as progressing towards “units” 
(the sovereign states) and models of a states system comprised of these sepa-
rate entities (states) also embodies the fundamental atomist order of thought 
as developed by Newton and Descartes in European philosophy.  
In short, since the 17th century, atomism/reductionism/individualism has 
come to shape the ontology, epistemology and methodology of the idea of sci-
ence to such an extent that it is now in fact taken for granted and remains to a 
great extent unquestioned. For a critical engagement with the atomism of Des-
cartes from a sociological perspective, see for example Norbert Elias 1987: 
The society of individuals. Other titles in the recommended reading section at 
the end of this unit also provide a more critical view of the perspective. 
In addition to atomism, the work of Descartes resulted in a consolidation 
of dualist thought on body and mind (Bedenig 2001: 85). Descartes assumed 
body and mind to be separate entities, as expressed by his well-known Ego 
cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The scientific, philosophical and 
theological repercussions were far-reaching: with the work of Descartes, the 
body-mind duality became a “sharp” divide (Harrison 2000: 2). Dualism on 
the classical body-mind/body-soul/matter-mind problem – the claim that nei-
ther mind nor matter can be reduced to each other – became typical for Euro-
pean/Western philosophy and is deeply embedded in the European idea of sci-
ence as well. The body-mind/matter-mind problem is not only an abstract 
philosophical puzzle, but also has implications for how we assume the ontolo-
gy of a core subject in an academic discipline, how we perceive the human 
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mind and thus mental constructs and theory, how we ascribe ontological status 
to social phenomena, how we perceive the position of the scientist in regard to 
the “object” of scientific inquiry, etc. We will come back to these questions in 
more detail in the final section of this unit and at the end of the book. 
The Cartesian-Newtonian perspective is further associated with utilitari-
anism, a concept which goes back to the influential works of Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626). According to this view, the purpose of natural science was to 
control and dominate nature and to utilize nature to improve human culture 
(Schupp 2003: 60-62). Knowledge was given value through its utility for 
technology and the progress of civilization. The ideas of Francis Bacon had 
their heyday with the industrial revolution and with the rise of positivism as 
the dominant philosophy of science in the 19th century. In addition, you can 
easily see that the natural laws inherent in Cartesian-Newtonian science can 
evoke a strong belief in determinism. This belief is exemplified in the works 
of Pierre Simon Laplace, a French astronomer and mathematician. His fa-
mous Laplace’s Demon (1814) incorporates determinism, depicting a strict 
deterministic world governed by laws, with the task of natural philosophy 
(mechanics/physics) being to formulate these laws through mathematics (for 
Laplace, this takes place in terms of differential equations). 
Summary  
The rise of Cartesian-Newtonian science was a process of transition towards 
a new scientific world view. Transition occurred in the form of a new status 
for the natural sciences. Natural science became empirical science. 
During this 17th century process, the Cartesian and Newtonian systems 
“mathematized and mechanized” the scientific view of the world (Harrison 
2000: 2). The Cartesian-Newtonian world view imagined the universe as a 
complex mechanical system of divine origin. This universe consisted of in-
numerous material particles moving in infinite space according to a range 
of physical laws that were mathematically presentable (for example, ac-
cording to the law of gravity). In this world view, light consists of the 
smallest mechanical particles. The earth moves around the sun on an ellip-
tic path, as do all the other planets, with the sun being only one star among 
many (an atomistic model of the universe). This model is linked to the idea 
of an infinitely expanding universe. From this perspective, there are clearly 
defined natural laws that govern life on earth and in the entire universe. The 
relations are causal; that is, a cause exists for each single event on earth or 
in the universe. The role of the human is to come to know the laws of the 
cosmos and to make use of them. Theory and experiment form equal parts 
of scientific methodology, but theories cannot be accepted until they have 
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been verified by experimental proof. However, this verification also implies 
the need and willingness to question “old” knowledge and, if necessary, re-
place it with new knowledge as soon as the new knowledge has been 
proved correct.  
Through this process, philosophy (of science) became naturalized, math-
ematized and mechanized. This transformation can be regarded as almost 
natural, as the philosophy of the early modern age cannot be separated from 
what was happening in the sciences and vice versa (Lefèvre 2001: viii, viii-
x). The single scholars (exemplified by Descartes and Newton) contributed to 
the development of more than one field of knowledge (e.g. mathematics, 
physics, astronomy, philosophy, optics) or, in some cases, to all of them. For 
example, Descartes’ mathematics strongly affected his philosophy and vice 
versa. These are “processes of co-evolution” among different fields of 
knowledge, with the linkage between mathematics, mechanics and philoso-
phy at the core (Lefèvre 2001: viii). Philosophy, mathematics and the scienc-
es thus formed a “unity of parts” (Lefèvre 2001: ix) in terms of overarching 
patterns/orders of thought. This unity can be seen, for example, in the philos-
ophy of Immanuel Kant. Kant drew on Newtonian physics and its theoretical 
concepts, especially with regard to the concepts of absolute time and absolute 
space. The same holds true for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, whose “monadol-
ogy” (1714) drew on both the biological concepts of microorganisms current 
at this time and the hypotheses of the mathematical calculus of infinite re-
gression/infinitely smaller entities (derivative and differential calculus). The 
interrelation of science, mathematics, philosophy and methodology thus ob-
tained a new quality in the 17th century, with those fields of knowledge be-
coming intimately interdependent (Lefèvre 2001: viii).  
Furthermore, the scientific revolution was important not only for the idea 
of science, but also for political, cultural, industrial and technological devel-
opment in Europe. These developments ultimately led to Europe’s worldwide 
predominance, while the Enlightenment and the French revolution further 
strengthened both the rights and position of the individual in Europe and the 
strict separation of church and state. These changes worked to further stimu-
late the development of the natural sciences. For example, Charles Darwin’s 
work in biology (1859: On the origins of species by means of natural selec-
tion, or the preservation of favored races in the struggle for life) enhanced 
the strict separation of natural science and religion. At the core of Darwin’s 
theory was the principle of evolution, the idea that the universe and life de-
velop incrementally by adapting to the demands of their surroundings. The 
structure and development of nature are not results of a divine plan, but rather 
consequences of an existential fight to survive. In that world, “survival of the 
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fittest” determines outcomes; the characteristics that helped animals to be 
“fit” – to reproduce as much as possible – became dominant in a population. 
The human mind suddenly was no longer of divine construction but rather a 
biological instrument resulting from evolution. However, it should be noted 
that Darwin also introduced “accident” to the natural sciences: in his work, 
accident was a mechanism of mutation – the spontaneous, inadvertent change 
of genotype that played such a crucial role in evolution. Pure accident in the 
form of mutation had now become part of a scientific theory. This develop-
ment is significant because it violates the argument of strong causality: if ac-
cident has such an important role in evolution, then determining a prognosis 
is difficult if not almost impossible. This conclusion holds true not only for 
biology; in fact, we will come back to this issue in the final section of this 
unit when learning about “new physics”. 
The 19th century was therefore particularly important for the continued 
development of the new scientific world view. With the industrial revolution 
in England and particularly after the publication of Darwin’s theory of evolu-
tion, the significance of the natural sciences and technology was rising tre-
mendously in Europe. In philosophy of science, positivism became the domi-
nant scientific perspective; positivism as a philosophy of science in fact em-
bodies the close linkage between philosophy and the idea of natural (empiri-
cal) science as described above. Al-Jabris’ argument of science as the “incen-
tive element” for the advancement of philosophy (Al-Jabri 2011: 421) again 
turns out to be plausible. Natural science based on physics and mathematics 
became the driving force of philosophy of science and shaped the idea of phi-
losophy itself. This new understanding of science is a philosophy of the world 
view of mechanics/physics, and holds philosophy to be a natural/empirical 
science.  
This mutual dependency of philosophy and science has far reaching im-
plications, as scientific world views are not only reflected in the conduct of 
the sciences, but as broader orders of thought that pervade society. They ap-
pear in economics, political thought, sociology, linguistics, arts, literature, 
culture, etc.  
Therefore, in regard to the discipline of IR, it will be easy to see how the 
Cartesian-Newtonian world view is embodied in most of our theoretical de-
scriptions and explanations of the rise of the European state and the state sys-
tem. This world view also appears in our theories on inter-state relations, lat-
er inter-national relations. Inter-state theory as formulated by Hobbes, Locke 
and Kant all fundamentally reflect the idea of science as developed at their 
time – the 17th and 18th century (described above). So, in fact, does the huge 
body of IR theory that draws on the understanding that IR’s core subject is 
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the modern state and the modern states system. In a nutshell: a co-evolution 
has taken place with regard to the processes of the rise of the modern state 
and state system (the core subject of the discipline), of inter-state theory as a 
systematic reflection on the state and state system, and of the rise of the Car-
tesian-Newtonian scientific world view being incorporated in the application 
of “science” to the study of international relations. I believe that being aware 
of this interconnectedness will help us to better understand the complex 
world of IR theory, an argument which we will return to again at a later stage 
of this book. At that point, we will take a closer look at the ways a selected 
range of IR theories theoretically and conceptually perceives the state, the state 
system, politics, international politics, their actors and structures (in Part 2). 
  
Self-study (2)  
Please read Capra 2010: Chapter 1 (The way of physics) and (for German 
readers) Brodbeck 2011: Chapters 2 (Social Physics) and 5 (Rationality) 
from the required reading list.  
In addition, choose one or two of the recommended titles from the section 
on “Philosophy/science, physics – Classical world view” from the sup-
plementary reading list. 
Then please take some time and reflect on: 
1) the general argument that our (European) view of the world is funda-
mentally shaped by the Cartesian-Newtonian idea of science (the role of 
science in and for society/politics/economics/culture/arts/literature etc.), 
and  
2) the argument that the natural sciences (with physics and mathematics at 
the core) are key to our scientific world view (science as physics?).  
You are invited to exchange your views in our course on iversity in the 
working group “Physics and politics”. For the iversity contact details and 
enrollment requirements, please see the information in the preface. 
2.4. Cartesian-Newtonian science in transition? “New physics” and 
the rise of a new scientific world view? 
In recent years, a huge debate has been taking place on whether or not a pro-
cess of replacing the Cartesian-Newtonian world view with a new world view 
based on “new physics” (for example, Dürr 2012: 16; Capra 2012: 51) has 
been set in motion. “new physics” is a term that refers to physics since the 
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beginning of the 20th century, with the focus on the works of Einstein and the 
atomic and quantum physicists. The development of new physics began with 
early 20th century physics experiments which led to the discovery of phe-
nomena that could not be described in the language of classical physics and 
predicted by its (classical) mathematical laws (Capra 2012: 66). These find-
ings resulted in the development of new models and theories that tried to de-
scribe and predict those phenomena more accurately. Physicists accepted that 
new physics had transformed and replaced many of the central laws of classi-
cal Newtonian physics. Consequently, it shook the Cartesian-Newtonian sci-
entific world view to its very foundations. In fact, Einstein’s theories of rela-
tivity, the discovery through atomic physics of the structures of the sub-
atomic world and the findings of quantum theory completely destroyed the 
fundamentals of the classical mechanical Cartesian-Newtonian world view. 
The idea of space and time as absolute, the idea of elementary particles as the 
fundamental components of matter, the idea of a causal, deterministic nature 
of physical phenomena and the idea of an objective description of nature 
were no longer valid (Capra 2012: 59). 
However, while the laws of new physics have been proven experimentally 
since the 1920s and have since been driving technological developments for 
decades, only since the turn of the millennium have the implications of new 
physics for our understanding of the world and of science more generally 
been discussed in a broader spectrum of sciences as well as in the public dis-
course on science (see, for example, the contributions in the volume of 
Hüther/Spannbauer 2012. There are additional titles in the supplementary 
reading list). More than 80 years have gone by since physicists proved the 
laws of atomic and quantum physics and since Einstein revolutionized the 
discipline. However, from what you know about the time spans of such tran-
sition processes, this should not come as a surprise to you. 
What has happened? Are we witnessing another historical transition pro-
cess towards a “new scientific world view”? Assuming the argument about 
the principles and laws of natural sciences (with physics and mathematics at 
the core) strongly determining our scientific world view holds true: what will 
the implications be in the case that our world view of physics is changing? 
Will this change be relevant for the study of IR and for the way IR theories 
are constructed? Will it matter for the assumptions on which theory building 
is based and for the explanatory models and methodological principles used 
to study international relations? Or does physics and mathematics have no 
relevance for the study of IR at all? 
In order to explore these questions, let us take a closer look at “new phys-
ics” in the next steps. 
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2.4.1. Einstein and atomic physics 
The dual nature of light 
While Newton believed that light is made of corpuscles – which was the ac-
cepted perspective on the nature of light for 200 years – Einstein’s revolu-
tionary work on light (1905) demonstrated a dual nature of light as both a 
particle and a wave (see the overview in Bedenig 2011: 129-134). There are 
phenomena that can only be explained by the particle-nature of light and oth-
er phenomena that can only be explained by the wave-nature of light. Thom-
as Young, Michael Faraday and James C. Maxwell paved the way for these 
ground-breaking insights, starting with the double-slit-experiment by Thomas 
Young in 1804 in which he first demonstrated the wave-nature of light 
through interference patterns. The wave-nature of light could explain phe-
nomena that were not compatible with the corpuscle theory of light as formu-
lated by Newton. Young’s experiment later played an important role in the 
development of quantum mechanics. Faraday, with his work on light as a 
wave-movement in an electromagnetic field (1846) and Maxwell with his 
famous Maxwell equations (1861-1864) were additional forerunners of dis-
coveries to come. The Maxwell equations provided the mathematical descrip-
tion for Faraday’s electromagnetic field and thus the proof that light is a phe-
nomenon of electromagnetic waves. In 1900, Max Planck then demonstrated 
that light is not disseminated in continual waves but rather in “energy pack-
ages” called “quanta” (later “photons”). Max Planck is therefore seen today 
as the father of quantum theory. In 1919, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in 
physics for his discovery of Planck’s constant. 
In addition to his demonstration of the dual nature of light, Einstein is fa-
mous for showing that the speed of light is a universally valid constant, inde-
pendent of the state of movement of the observer: nothing can move faster 
than light. 
Time, space, matter and energy 
However, Einstein is above all well-known for his revolutionary ideas about 
time and space. Before Einstein, classical physics/classical mechanics ac-
cepted time and space as absolute – they existed everywhere in the universe 
and independently of the observer. For example, this belief was reflected in 
Kant’s philosophical thought about space and time as absolute categories of 
human thought that are “a priori” given, not to be questioned and with no 
need to be explained; they are axioms. With his special theory of relativity, 
Einstein was able to show that space and time are not absolute, but flexible 
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and relative. Beyond that, space and time are inextricably linked with each 
other, forming spacetime. The new physical laws formulated by Einstein in 
his special theory of relativity thus replaced the ideas held by Newton and 
classical mechanics that an absolute time and an absolute space exist in 
which all physical phenomena happen (Bedenig 2011: 137-148). 
The incompatibility of Einstein’s special theory of relativity with New-
ton’s law of gravitation provided a driving force for additional insights in the 
field (see the overview in Bedenig 2011: 150-157). Einstein tried to extend 
the framework of his special theory of relativity to include gravitation. This 
forms the core of his general theory of relativity (1915): the idea that the 
same linkage as exists between space and time also holds true for matter and 
spacetime. The two are inextricably linked to each other and this interde-
pendency is called gravitational force. Einstein demonstrated that gravita-
tional force causes the curvature of spacetime. Curved spacetime is due to the 
distribution of matter within spacetime. The idea of curved spacetime was 
important in that it replaced the old ideas of geometry that dated back to Eu-
clid’s Elements and which had been formulated for a homogenous, not 
curved space. As proven by Einstein, Euclid’s geometry was no longer valid 
for curved space. However, it had been accepted as the truth for 2500 years!  
Consequently, Einstein replaced Newton’s s laws of gravitation with his 
general theory of relativity. This theory is now used by astrophysics and 
cosmology to describe the universe (Capra 2012: 62). The terms “absolute 
space” and “absolute time” are no longer valid. With the demonstration that 
the structure of the space-time-continuum depends on the distribution of mat-
ter in the universe, the idea of “empty space” lost its meaning (Capra 2012: 
63). However, Newton’s laws are still accepted as valid for all terrestrial cas-
es of gravitation – that is, for our life on Earth – while Einstein’s laws of the 
general theory of relativity are laws for outer space (under conditions of great 
masses). The same holds true for the relativistic effects observed by Ein-
stein’s special theory of relativity: they apply under conditions of speed close 
to speed of light. In short, the theories of relativity are for the “big picture” 
(for high speed and great masses that can be found only in space) or, alterna-
tively, for the “small picture” (the micro-cosmos/sub-atomic world of ele-
mentary particles and of photons that move at the speed of light). In contrast 
to these two areas is life on Earth, where Newton’s laws still apply (Capra 
2012: 63).  
From his special theory of relativity, Einstein derived his famous formula 
on the transformation of mass (m) into energy (E): E = mc2. In other words, 
Einstein could demonstrate that mass and energy are two manifestations of 
the “same”. They can be transformed into each other (with the atomic bomb 
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being a shocking example for the transformation of mass, released in nuclear 
fission, into energy). Einstein was able to show that mass is not a material 
substance (made of particles), but a form of energy. Energy is a dynamic, ac-
tive, physical quantity, related to processes (not substance) (Capra 2012: 61, 
76).  
Elementary particles 
Atomic physics in the early 20th century discovered phenomena that could 
not be explained by classical physics – as based on the idea of atoms as solid, 
indivisible material particles. With the discovery of X-rays and, later, radio-
activity, it became clear that atoms did have a structure. In 1919 Ernest 
Rutherford discovered that atoms were not solids but rather spaces where 
electrons move around the atomic nucleus – as epitomized by the planetary 
model of atoms (Capra 2012: 65). By the 1930s, physicists had proved that 
the structure of all atoms consists of protons, neutrons, and electrons. With 
the advent of nuclear fission, it was finally accepted that atoms are not the 
smallest, indivisible particles that make up the universe. Thus began the 
search for the ultimate elementary particle which is still at the core of particle 
physics today. At first, physicists found only three elementary particles; by 
1935, the number had increased to six and by 1955 to 18. Today, more than 
two hundred have been recognized (Capra 2012: 75). You likely know about 
the search for the Higgs-Boson (also called the “God-particle”) from the re-
cent news. If not, please take some time now and research this topic. 
However, even though Einstein’s new theories and the new findings of 
atomic physics did not change our day-to-day experience of the world, they 
did change our ideas about light, space, time and matter and thus the funda-
ments of the classical Cartesian-Newtonian mechanical world view. This in-
fluence holds even truer for quantum physics. 
2.4.2. Quantum physics 
Classical physics/mechanics draws on a distinction between particles (matter) 
and energy. It holds that only the latter possesses a wave-nature, while matter 
is particularistic (atomism). The properties of a material particle are “given” 
and the particle can be observed or measured through experiment. Objective 
knowledge about the particle is then possible due to the “objective”, given 
properties of the physical object (observable) and the “objective” position of 
the researcher in the process of measurement. The properties being measured 
are thus independent of the observer and the measurement process. This is a 
position that was still shared by Einstein as well, based on classical phys-
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ics/mechanics’ belief in fundamental, deterministic laws of nature that can be 
known by science. In this respect, however, Einstein was wrong. 
The new findings of quantum mechanics are based on the experimental 
observation that the sub-atomic particles that make up both matter and atoms 
have a double nature: sometimes appearing as particles, sometimes as 
waves. That is, matter has characteristics of both a wave and a particle (as 
demonstrated above by the nature of light, which can be made of particles or 
be an electromagnetic wave). So far, this will sound familiar to you and 
there might be no need to question classical physics in this regard. However, 
quantum physicists have come to recognize that phenomena that in classical 
physics can only be alternatives (wave or particle), can actually be con-
sistent, complementary aspects of reality: wave and particle. This property, 
the dual nature of matter and light, was difficult to understand; how can 
something be both particle and wave at the same time? (Capra 2012: 66). 
Ultimately, quantum theory and the formulation of the new laws of quantum 
mechanics solved this perceived contradiction (Capra 2012: 66). These laws 
will be briefly described in the next step. Nevertheless, please be aware that 
it might be difficult to follow this description if you are not familiar with the 
paradigms on which contemporary physics is built. There will therefore be 
recommended reading at the end of the unit that – depending on your famili-
arity with physics – you might already begin to consult while reading this 
text. 
As mentioned above, it was Max Planck who paved the way in quantum 
physics with his findings that thermal energy is not emitted continuously but 
rather in “energy packages” called quanta (Capra 2012: 66). Based on ex-
tended versions of Young’s double slit experiment, in 1926 and 1927 Erwin 
Schroedinger, Max Born, Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg formulated the 
basic laws of quantum theory. They can be briefly summarized as follows 
(drawing on Bedenig 2011: 161-178): 
In his famous Schroedinger equation, Erwin Schroedinger, an Austrian 
physicist and Nobel laureate for physics in 1933, described the development 
of the quantum state of a physical system (that is for example, atoms, mole-
cules, sub-atomic particles) over time when there is no measurement and no 
experiment. The Schroedinger equation is equal to Newton’s second law for 
the motion of a mechanical system in classical mechanics. However, in quan-
tum mechanics, it is a linear partial differential equation that describes a 
wave function of the physical systems (that is of atoms, molecules and sub-
atomic particles as well as of macroscopic systems/the universe).  
This quantum mechanical wave function was formulated by Max Born, a 
German mathematician and physicist and a 1954 Nobel laureate, as a statisti-
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cal interpretation. It is known as the Born rule or Probabilistic Interpreta-
tion. This function is a law of quantum mechanics and describes the proba-
bility with which the measurement of a quantum system will bring about a 
specific result. In other words, the descriptions of nature, of physical objects, 
and of the laws of nature are interpreted as essentially probabilistic (and not 
deterministic, as in classical mechanics). 
Then Niels Bohr, a Danish physicist and a 1922 Nobel laureate, formulat-
ed his famous Complementarity Principle. Another law of quantum mechan-
ics, it demonstrated the principle of fundamental complementary aspects of 
physical phenomena. One example is the previously mentioned “particle and 
wave” aspect of physical objects, emissions and matter: “particle” and 
“wave” are two complementary phenomena (and not alternatives). However, 
experimental measurement can only demonstrate either one or the other as-
pect, but never both phenomena in the same measurement process. The 
demonstration of one aspect necessarily precludes the other. They cannot be 
simultaneously measured, even though there are always two aspects of phe-
nomena in one and the same process. As complementary aspects, they belong 
together and form a “whole”. Nevertheless, which aspect will be measured 
depends on the observational practices of the experiment.  
With the principle of complementarity, paradoxes have thus been shown 
to be a feature of reality. Each phenomenon has an “other side”, an aspect 
contrary to the one being currently observed. Observation thus never results 
in “facts”, but only in aspects of perception, aspects of reality. 
In addition, Niels Bohr demonstrated that the measured properties of a 
physical object are affected by the measurement process, by the process of 
experimental observation. That is, objects governed by quantum mechanics 
do not have intrinsic properties that are independent of the process of meas-
urement. There are no “given” properties of objects independent of the ob-
server or the observation. The measurement process itself has an impact on 
what is measured. This effect was discovered through extended double-slit-
experiments, which were constructed to find out what happens when a wave 
passes the double slit. Normally, it would result in the classical interference 
patterns due to the nature of waves, for example of light. However, the ex-
tended Young experiments proved that when observed, the wave appeared as 
a particle when passing the double slit. In other words, under observation, 
there were no interference patterns. Without observation, however, the classi-
cal interference pattern of the wave-nature appeared. This might sound 
“spooky” to you. I therefore recommend that you do your own search on the 
extended double slit experiment and its interpretation. Knapp (2011: 65-79) 
provides a good and readable overview. 
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Werner Heisenberg, a German physicist and 1932 Nobel laureate, found 
out that uncertainty always exists when measuring quantum systems. This 
uncertainty is a fundamental limit to the precision with which pairs of physi-
cal properties of particles (such as position and momentum) can be known 
simultaneously. Heisenberg’s discovery is well-known as the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle. For example, the more precisely the position of a par-
ticle can be determined in an experiment, the less precisely the particle’s 
momentum can be known and vice versa. This observation applies to other 
pairs of physical properties, too. Hence, uncertainty is an important aspect of 
the property of matter, due to the wave-nature of physical objects. “Uncer-
tainty” is therefore a statement about a fundamental property of a quantum 
system (not a statement about defective measurement devices), a principle not 
compatible with the deterministic view of classical physics.  
The laws of quantum mechanics briefly described above form the basis of 
the famous Copenhagen interpretation of 1927 – an attempt to explain the 
mathematical formulations of quantum mechanics and the experimental re-
sults (see Heisenberg 1977: 28-40).  
All laws of quantum physics have been experimentally proved. Among 
these experimental proofs, the 1981 experiments of John Bell deserve closer 
attention, as they highlight another aspect of quantum phenomena that is im-
portant for our discussion of the transition of the Cartesian-Newtonian world 
view. Bell provided the experimental proof of quantum entanglement (a term 
from the German physicist Schoedinger; in German, Verschränkung). He 
demonstrated that a fundamental connectedness of interacting particles such 
as photons, protons, or molecules exists even when those particles are subse-
quently separated. The two or more particles in question stay entangled; they 
cannot be described as single particles with clearly defined properties, but on-
ly as a whole system. One object cannot therefore be fully described without 
considering the other. For instance, this entanglement occurs in atomic decay, 
where pairs of particles can be generated in one and the same process. Addi-
tionally, physicists have proved that the measurement of the properties of one 
particle, resulting in a definite physical value, will simultaneously cause the 
other particle to take the correlate value. This correlation has even been ob-
served when the entangled parts are located far away from each other.  
Recently, experiments on quantum teleportation have demonstrated this 
correlation for a distance of 143 km (see FAZ from 23 August 2012 – Rekord-
jagd beim Beamen – for a German language explanation or ScienceDaily 
from 05 September 2012: Quantum Physics at a distance for more detail in 
English). The findings of these experiments were also published in the jour-
nal Nature (vol. 11472, 2012).  
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Quantum teleportation is an application of quantum entanglement that has 
found its way into quantum technology. In this case, quantum information is 
“transmitted” without the information “crossing space”. This seeming impos-
sibility can occur because of entanglement; once the properties of the first 
particle have been fixed, the “other” particle takes correlate properties. Be-
cause of entanglement, there is “nothing” to be transmitted. This experi-
mental evidence of quantum entanglement disprove Einstein’s classical view 
of physical particles, which had defined properties independent of each other 
and independent of the measurement process. Interconnectedness between 
physical properties is fundamentally incompatible with the atomist view of 
single, separated entities at the heart of classical physics. Einstein fundamen-
tally disbelieved in the findings of quantum physics, expressed in his famous 
comment that entanglement was a “spooky action at a distance” and, as relat-
ed to the probabilistic interpretation of the wave function, his oft-quoted 
“God does not play dice”.  
Quantum entanglement has now been experimentally proved and recog-
nized as a valid feature of quantum mechanics. The focus now lies instead on 
technological research that will enable us to utilize the knowledge for com-
munication and computing. 
In fact, a great deal of today’s technology and industry is already based 
on the findings of quantum physics. Above all, quantum technology is used 
in communication technology and information processing. Quantum technol-
ogy has advanced to such an extent that it has been split into subfields such 
as quantum mechanics, quantum information technology, quantum optics, 
quantum computing, and quantum cryptography. For example, quantum im-
aging as a subfield of quantum optics is used to take images of objects with a 
resolution far beyond what classical optics can achieve. Other subfields in-
clude quantum lithography, quantum electronics and quantum nanomechani-
cal devices, quantum mathematics, and quantum chemistry. It has also been 
predicted that the quantum internet will be the next generation of the infor-
mation-processing platform (see Ma/Herbst et al 2012). Therefore, it will 
likely not surprise you that, starting in 1918 with Max Planck, and later 
Schroedinger, Bohr and Heisenberg, many quantum physicists have received 
the Nobel prize for physics for their contributions to this field. In the most re-
cent example of this trend, the 2012 prize went to Haroche and Wineland for 
their work with quantum systems. For readers interested in expanding their 
knowledge of this area, Milburn (1997) wrote one of the first books on the 
technological applications of quantum physics and provides an excellent 
overview of quantum technology. 
97 
Summary 
In classical physics (and as still believed by Einstein), all particles have de-
fined properties that are independent of measurement. The properties are 
“fixed”; that is, they are given before the measurement process. We can use 
measurement to know about the properties of the particles in an objective 
manner.  
In quantum physics, particles do not have defined properties. The state of 
any sub-atomic particle can be described by a wavefunction. The wavefunc-
tion is a mathematical expression which calculates the probability that a par-
ticle, when measured, will have specific properties; for example, if it will be 
in a given location or state of motion. It is a wave of possibilities. The prop-
erties of the particles are not given. Instead, they are possibilities – elements 
of the wavefunction, which is a statistical law of probability. Their very ex-
istence as a particle is a wave-like probability. In other words, elementary 
particles do not exist as material particles “as such”, but as a “possibility”, as 
an element of a quantum possibility wave. Thus no certainty exists with 
which to predict an atomic or sub-atomic phenomenon (Capra 2012: 67).  
With this new information, the particle, which in classical physics is a 
solid, material, separate entity, can no longer be understood as a static object. 
It has instead become a dynamic structure, a process of energy that can mani-
fest as the mass of a particle (Capra 2012: 77, 80). The atomist material onto-
logical statement that matter is made of tiny, indivisible elementary particles 
can no longer be sustained. Against the background of quantum physics, we 
should instead speak of processes as the ontology of matter. 
As mentioned above, a central feature of these processes is that particles 
never exist as single, separate entities, but are entangled, connected. For 
quantum physics, the relations between particles are more important than 
their individual, particular manifestations. In classical physics, it is not the re-
lations between the entities but rather their individual properties and appear-
ances (atomism) that proves key to the world view. In quantum physics, in 
contrast, the properties of a particle can only be understood as having been 
derived from that particle’s activity and interdependencies. 
With the mounting evidence in favor of processes of quantum mechanics, 
classical models of atomism such as the model of the atom as a planetary sys-
tem cannot be sustained. There are thus no solid particles moving around the 
nucleus, but rather waves of probabilities (Capra 2012: 69). Quantum physi-
cists therefore suggest that, in order to better understand the universe, we 
view it as a dynamic web of inseparable energy structures, an integrated 
whole (Capra 2012: 80-81). Quantum physics points to a fundamental unity 
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and a dynamic character of matter. Particles are thus not isolated entities but 
integrated parts of a whole (Capra 2012: 80). This unity takes us back to the 
old ontological view held in Greek antiquity that “physical/mechanical forc-
es” and “matter” are distinct (Capra 2012: 81). In quantum mechanics, matter 
is a web of interrelations between the parts of a whole (Capra 2012: 68). 
These interrelations include the observer, as the properties of an atomic ob-
ject can only be understood in terms of the interdependency between the ob-
ject and the observer/the measurement process. The classical view of an ob-
jective description of nature being possible no longer holds true for quantum 
mechanical systems; the Cartesian distinction between observer and observed 
cannot be maintained in the subatomic world. Observer and observed are in-
stead part of a single system. Furthermore, there is no independent observa-
tion and hence no objective knowledge. 
Admittedly, these new models and theories are not easy to bring into line 
with the way “objects” are observed on the macro-level of everyday life. As 
quantum physicists admit, the predictions of quantum laws are actually coun-
ter-intuitive. However, exactly this paradox has been proved by quantum 
physics: the ontology of physical objects is contradictory and paradoxical and 
yet, as complementary aspects, those paradoxes themselves are a central fea-
ture of reality. 
At present, a widespread discussion is taking place on whether the findings 
of quantum physics are valid for the macroscopic world of our day-to-day life 
“on earth” or whether they only hold relevance for our view of the microscop-
ic sub-atomic world and for cosmological phenomena relating to the entire 
universe. In fact, the current state of knowledge in physics is now going to be 
based on different, partly incompatible paradigms – classical physics and the 
laws of new physics. We will not find satisfying answers in such discussions, 
last but not least because we have only recently developed an increasing 
awareness of the potential implications of new physics for our perspective of 
the world. We must first study and understand the counterintuitive laws of 
new physics, a complex and difficult task given that we perceive new physics 
through the lenses of our classical, Cartesian-Newtonian world view. In fact, 
analyzing the implications of new physics for our world view requires us to 
see things from a totally different perspective than the classical one in which 
we have all been trained and socialized. In that regard, the discussions about 
the rise of a new scientific world view require rethinking, seeing things with a 
different order of thought. It is exactly this need to rethink previously held 
perspectives and beliefs that makes a discussion of the science-physics-nexus 
so interesting for the social sciences as well. We will come back to this idea in 
the final paragraph of this unit and at the end of the book.  
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Prospects 
Quantum physics fundamentally calls into question the very foundations on 
which the classical, Cartesian-Newtonian world view rests: the atomist-
materialist ontology; dualism in regard to mind and matter; determinism and 
the idea of a law-like nature of the order of the world; the view that research-
er and his/her object of scientific inquiry are separate entities. You can easily 
conclude that, in such a world, reductionism and methodological individual-
ism will not make any sense for the practice of science. In addition, scientific 
knowledge will lose its status as “objective” knowledge. If science’s current 
high-prestige status in our societies depends on its association with “objective 
knowledge”, then the interpretation of new physics will have far-reaching 
consequences for the way we perceive the role and function of science more 
generally. If this is the case, we must confront the question of what will then 
provide a “valid” basis for economic and political action.  
This unit has been written with the intention of raising some thought-
provoking issues with regard to our idea of science and our world view. It al-
so invites you as readers to actively take part in a debate on the implications 
of our scientific world view for how WE (!) – researchers, students, teachers, 
practitioners of international politics – actually do science, use science, “pro-
duce” knowledge and thus actively shape “reality” by what we do.  
I would also like to link our discussion to the current debate about the 
need for a new world view. This debate is extremely broad and goes far be-
yond what has been described above based on the findings of new physics. 
However, I see the current debates on the implications of quantum physics as 
a part of this broader public and societal debate. For us as teachers, students 
and practitioners of international relations, the quantum physics aspect of the 
debate is particularly interesting because of its relevance for science. An in-
creasing number of scientists are convinced that quantum physics has the po-
tential to radically change our classical scientific world view, which is still 
based on Cartesian-Newtonian science (see Dürr 2012, Capra 2012, Bedenig 
2011, Hüther 2012, Knapp 2011). In fact, in recent years physicists have pro-
duced an increasing number of publications in which they “go philosophi-
cal”, pointing to the implications of quantum physics’ recent findings for 
changing our “world view”. You will find a range of such titles in this book’s 
supplementary reading section “New world view”. However, this increase in 
“philosophical” publications holds true for biologists, neuroscientists, neu-
rophilosophers and other scientists too (for biology, see for example the 
overview in Hüther 2012; in biology and immunology see also Han 2010: 5-
16 and Tomasello 2001, 2009).  
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In addition, the broader debate about a new world view demonstrates an 
increasing awareness of the implications of “other” world views, such as 
those based on Chinese, Indian or Arabic philosophies, for the conduct of 
science, politics and economics. These “non-Western approaches” are in-
creasingly being recognized in the natural sciences (for example, Traditional 
Chinese Medicine or Ayurveda in the medical field), philosophy (the new in-
terest in Arab philosophers such as Al Kindi and Ibn Khaldun or in Indian 
and Chinese philosophy), in politics (e.g. a new interest in Indian political 
theory or Chinese IR theory), and business (an awareness of different cultural 
approaches to firms, management and political economy more generally). 
Analogous to the impact classical Greek thought had on European/Western 
culture, science, politics and economics, we can equally assume that the phi-
losophies found at the heart of Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism 
or Arab philosophy shaped world views beyond Europe. Furthermore, these 
world views are equally reflected in the science, politics and economics of 
those areas in the same way European thought is reflected in the Europe-
an/Western understanding of science, politics, economics, etc. (for IR, see for 
example Acharya/Buzan 2010). Learning about these regions thus, requires 
an understanding of positions on international politics that are not European 
in origin.   
Why is this discussion a relevant one? 
This book started with the core argument of international politics’ intrinsic so-
cial and political relevance for societies and the thesis that this relevance has 
historically been a driving force for theoretical reflections about international 
relations. I would like to conclude this learning unit on world views and the 
idea of science by taking up this core argument once again. The common back-
ground that unites the different strands of the current debates on the need of a 
new world view is the devastating condition of our environment, the deep cri-
ses of economics, finances, and legitimation, the tremendous social dislocations 
in our societies, and the deadlocks in almost all areas of international politics 
that require true and genuine cooperative solutions for the sake of humankind. 
This need for cooperation holds true not only for international environmental 
politics, but also for North-South relations and developmental policy, food and 
agricultural policy, and many other areas. There is an increasing awareness that 
social, political, economic action requires rethinking and constructing political 
and economic systems based on something other than the individualist rivalry 
and competition which has such devastating consequences for our natural liv-
ing conditions. For those who promote such a reevaluation and rethinking, no 
less is at stake than the future of the planet and of mankind (see for example the 
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excellent contributions of scientists in the volume of Hüther/Spannbauer 2012). 
In short, this is a debate about the very basics, the fundamental assumptions 
and orders of thought as reflected in our world view. What is the role and posi-
tion of science therein, provided the thesis holds true that a mutual linkage ex-
ists between the way we conduct science and the overarching orders of 
thought? What is the role and position of the academic discipline of Interna-
tional Relations in such a world view? What is the role of our own academic 
work, our own theoretical research? Conceptual and theoretical inquiry is a pre-
requisite for any academic research as well as for the practice of politics. As 
you have learned, all inquiries and all engagement with the “world” begin from 
certain premises. This holds true for science as well. Do we really understand 
the basis of these premises? Are we truly aware of those starting points and 
their implications for the way we do science? 
You are invited to more deeply reflect on the idea of science in IR and on 
the role and status of science in our societies more generally. For advanced 
students of IR who are already familiar with theories of International Rela-
tions, you may engage in this discussion right now by going straight to the 
end of the book, reading the questions and (after having registered) entering 
the discussions in our forum on iversity.  
For all those who are not yet familiar with theories of International Rela-
tions, you are invited to learn about a selected range of IR theories first be-
fore joining the discussion. For this purpose, in the next unit we will compile 
core criteria and questions – derived from the philosophy of science discus-
sions in Units 1, 2 and 3 – that facilitate structured learning about particular 
theories of IR. These criteria and questions will also make it easier to com-
pare these theories with regard to the nature of their theoretical constructs and 
their approach to science and theory. 
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Step 3: 
Self-study and consolidation 
Self-study (3) 
Familiarize yourselves with the findings of quantum physics by consulting 
two or three titles from the “Quantum physics”-section of the supplemen-
tary reading list. In addition, please read Munro 1927 and diZerrega 1991 
from the “Politics/IR and Quantum theory” section. 
Step 4: 
Discussion (optional, for advanced students) 
Enroll in the discussion on IR as a science on the iversity platform. 
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Introduction 
As has been discussed in the learning units 1 and 2, theory building is “in-
formed” by and embedded in meta-theory: there is theory “behind” the par-
ticular theories of IR in that a theory of IR implicitly or explicitly is built on a 
set of assumptions that are derived from a specific understanding of science. 
Moreover, the understanding of science is part of a broader scientific world 
view, a specific historical “order of thought”. Unit 2 was designed in the be-
lief that, for a better understanding of the differences between theoretical ap-
proaches to IR, you need some basic understanding of general problems of 
theory building in the social sciences. In Unit 2 you therefore gained 
knowledge about theory formation as linked to the meta-theoretical level of 
philosophy of science. You are now familiar with the core elements of any 
philosophy of science: ontological claims about what is, what exists, what re-
ality is made of and what the most general features and relations of the things 
and entities are; epistemological claims about the kinds of knowledge possi-
ble and the criteria for legitimate knowledge; and methodological assump-
tions that define how to best come to know and explain. In addition you 
know about how philosophies of science are embedded into broader world 
views. Without these world views, it would be difficult to understand where 
we derive the assumptions and the particular theoretical constructions found 
at the heart of theories. While even the philosophy of science position that 
underlies a theory is only rarely spelled out explicitly, this is even truer for 
the broader (scientific) world view. Both can be understood as a type of “hid-
den” theory that shapes our fundamental perception of (social) reality and of 
what and how we can know about it.   
Now we will take the next step and link our philosophical discussions to 
the study of International Relations. Our purpose will be to define a set of 
questions and criteria for the more qualified study of particular theories of IR. 
Terms such as ontology, epistemology and methodology have very specific 
uses and functions within the philosophy of science. For the purpose of our 
book, they have to be “translated” and applied to International Relations. The 
aim is to define a range of criteria that can be used for a structured process of 
learning about particular theoretical approaches to IR. In other words, the fol-
lowing chapter presents a set of criteria that will be used later to discuss five 
particular theories of International Relations. It is important to emphasize 
once again that the discussions in Part 2 of the book will be based on “learn-
ing by example”: the broader intention is to offer meta-theoretically and phil-
osophically informed guidance for your structured self-study of any IR theory 
– not only those presented in the book. The application of this concept will be 
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demonstrated by way of five sample theories. The method is based on the 
conviction that a structured learning process along the lines of criteria de-
rived from philosophy of science discussions will offer important insights on 
theory construction that, because of a neglect of their embedding in philoso-
phy, would otherwise not be reached.  
As this learning unit is basically about the didactics and method to be ap-
plied in Part 2 of the book, there will be only one self-study instruction and 
two review questions. Key aspects will be given in form of a tabular over-
view of the criteria developed in this unit. 
Criteria for a structured learning process about theories of IR 
1. Core question 
Each learning unit dealing with a particular theoretical approach will start by 
asking: what is the core question or core problem of the approach? Which 
phenomena of international politics does the theory explain? What is the pur-
pose of constructing this particular theory of IR? 
An introduction of different theories of IR with regard to their core ques-
tion will offer a first and important insight on the understanding of the under-
lying theory and science. 
2. Ontological assumptions about actors and structures in 
international relations 
As you have learned in Units 2 and 3, theoretical constructions in the social 
sciences are always built on assumptions: ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological starting points in the process of theory construction.  
For a theory of International Relations these are usually assumptions  
 
(1) about the relevant actors of international relations, the “type” of actors 
considered to be most important and their “properties”; 
(2) about the context of interaction, that is, the structures of international re-
lations;   
(3) about interrelations between the entities; how the actors and structure re-
late to each other. 
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You know that these are ontological assumptions as long as they involve 
claims about existence and being (what is), the entities that exist, and their 
properties and relations. They are epistemological assumptions insofar as 
they concern questions of how to come to know and what counts as valid 
knowledge. They are methodological assumptions when they relate to the 
ways and methods in the practice of gaining knowledge. 
Let me now elaborate on what we are looking for in IR theories when ap-
plying the criterion of “assumptions about actors and structure”. 
2.1. Assumptions about actors 
In order to reflect on the politically relevant interactions, a theory will usually 
ask about actors. Who are the relevant actors in international politics? What 
is the “nature” of the actor and what is the “nature” of interactions taking 
place? 
Remember that the answers to these questions are “starting points”, not sub-
ject to any “proof”, but instead fall under the category of what we call “as-
sumptions”. An example is the general assumption that the “nature” of interna-
tional relations is inter-state politics, that states are the central and most im-
portant actors, and that they act rationally. This is a claim shared by the most 
influential theoretical approaches in IR. However, other theories exist as well, 
starting for example from the assumption that the “nature” of international poli-
tics is a world of interwoven, network-like social relations between diverse 
types of actors within a “global society”. Here, any social actors, state and non-
state, are relevant for the “existence” of international relations. For each exam-
ple, the view of the “being” of international politics – the view of ontology – 
differs. This difference – whether you think of international relations as state 
interactions within a system of states or, alternatively, have a world society in 
mind when talking about “international relations” – affects both the theoretical 
construction and the explanatory model that a particular theory offers.  
The precondition of action and interaction between social actors is usually 
perceived as an intentional state: action is, by its very nature, intentional and 
purposeful (even though, of course, it can have unintentional effects and con-
sequences). Therefore, theories usually make assumptions about the “driving 
forces” of actions/interactions and about how actors reach decisions. These 
are ontological assumptions related to the actor’s motivation, goals, needs, 
cognitions (such as values, beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, and perceptions), in-
terests or preferences; in short, they are ontological assumptions about actors 
and their “properties”. 
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For example, many theories in IR draw on action theory and assume actors 
are “rational actors”. For rational actors, the “source” of action is assumed to 
be “internal” (their “interest”) and to involve utility-maximization, which is 
perceived as being a “property” of the individual actor. With regard to an ac-
tor’s decision-making style, utility-maximization assumes that actors have in-
dividual preferences for various possible outcomes in any situation and, as a re-
sult, can rank the outcomes in terms of their desirability. They then choose 
whatever strategy or course of action makes the better outcomes most likely, 
thereby maximizing the actor’s “utility” (rational choice). You will find such 
assumptions in economics as well as in most other social science theories. 
Those theories that draw on mathematical models of decision–making in a 
formal manner demonstrate individualism and the rational actor-assumption 
most clearly. Examples are decision theory, which focuses on single decision 
makers, and game theory, which focuses on small groups of actors interacting 
strategically (for a good overview of rational choice in IR see Kydd 2008). 
In line with these ontological assumptions, IR theories assuming rational 
actors ultimately explain outcomes in international politics in terms of the in-
dividual actors’ rational actions. Depending on the particular actors assumed 
to be relevant for international relations (these could be individual actors 
from a state’s society as is the case in liberal theory, or unitary states as in 
neorealist theory), different theories of IR operate on the general assumption 
of rational individual actors. Here, philosophy of science discussions become 
particularly relevant. Only a superficial difference arises between theories of 
IR because they assume different actors to be relevant; from a philosophy of 
science perspective, the theories are the same in terms of their underlying in-
dividualist ontology. In the example of neorealist theory, as in many other 
theories of IR, the state is theoretically treated as an “individual”: it assumes 
the state is a unitary actor analogous to an individual, with a rational – state – 
interest and engaged in rational interaction with other states (as individual ac-
tors). You can find such state individualism in many IR theories. 
What these theories express is in fact the ontological position of atom-
ism/individualism you learned about in Units 2 and 3. Treating the state as if 
it were an individual actor reflects an ontological view of international rela-
tions made up of individual “units”. At the level of international relations, 
this atomism can sometimes be difficult to see. As you already know, this 
fundamental ontological position has epistemological and methodological 
implications: when the state is treated as an individual and the basic unit of 
international relations, outcomes of international politics are usually ex-
plained in the final analysis by referring to the individual state’s motivation 
and interest. You know that this approach is called methodological individu-
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alism. In IR, it is sometimes referred to as “methodological nationalism” or 
“methodological statism” because the “individual” in this case is the state. 
Generally, the question of how to treat actors theoretically in international 
politics is difficult. This holds true not only for the state, but for other actors 
as well. For example, how can we account for actors such as international or-
ganizations? How can we conceive theoretically of the UN or the EU as ac-
tors in international politics? Ontological assumptions regarding the “being” 
of collective and individual actors have important consequences for explana-
tions. This point is also closely related to the fundamental ontological ques-
tion of how the “whole” relates to the “parts”: is, for example, the UN as an 
international organization more than the sum of its constituents – the states? 
Is the UN a “collective” actor to be perceived as a collective “global commu-
nity” with a “quality” that goes beyond the sum of the individual actor’s 
(state) interests? Is “society” more that the sum of its components, the indi-
vidual societal actors? The theories presented in Part 2 of the book will be 
discussed with regard to the difficult ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological aspects of theorizing actors and their “properties”.  
2.2. Assumptions about structures 
In addition to actors, theories of the social sciences usually reflect on the 
“context” for social actions: the social environment of actors is often called 
the structural context or “structure”. “Structure” refers to the social order or 
organization within which actors act and interact. For example, “inside” the 
state, individual and collective actors (citizens, interest groups, parties, trade 
unions etc.) act within state structures. Structures are not only material insti-
tutions; they also embody the norms and rules of authority (e.g. laws) that 
govern and regulate the behavior of actors and sanction deviant behavior. 
“Outside” the state in international relations, states and non-state actors are 
usually assumed to act and interact within an international system. We have 
already discussed the fundamental assumption that the “type” of social order 
found in the international system is often perceived as “anarchy” (as opposed 
to hierarchy inside the state). The assumption of an anarchical international 
system is usually an assumption about the structural features of the interna-
tional system. No higher authority exists “to govern” international politics. 
Sovereignty is the basic norm inherent in the structure of the international 
system (when understood as a system of states). 
In short, theories of IR (implicitly or explicitly) build on assumptions 
about the most relevant structures of international relations, the “nature” of 
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those structures and their “effects” on actors in international relations. A very 
basic ontological question is the “nature” of the structural context: to what 
extent can we assume that the structures of the international system consist of 
material conditions? Do they instead consist of ideas such as norms or col-
lective knowledge? Or, alternatively, both? We can easily think of structures 
in terms of how material resources, technology, weapons, economic power, 
etc., are distributed. But we can also think of structures in terms of (immate-
rial) norms and rules inherent in the system or in social institutions found in 
international relations, such as international organizations or international re-
gimes. From what you have learned in Units 2 and 3, you know that assump-
tions of material and/or ideational features of the world belong to the most 
fundamental ontological “starting points” of any reasoning.  
The theories presented in this book will thus not only demonstrate differ-
ent ontological perspectives on actors, but on structures too. We will learn 
about different theories of IR because they have different theoretical ways of 
ontologically taking into account the structural context of actors’ interactions.  
2.3. Assumptions about the interrelation between agency and 
structure 
The relationship between active and self-reflecting agents and the structural 
context in which their activity takes place lies at the core of the agent-
structure-problem in IR. Agency usually refers to the capacity of human ac-
tors to act independently and to make their own free choices. Structure con-
sists of all factors of the social context that constrain (or enable) human ac-
tion. 
The “nature” or “being” of this relation is a question of social ontology, 
an ontological position of the primacy of structure or agency. Is social struc-
ture ontologically “prior” to human behavior or is human agency? This query 
involves further questions about the nature of the entities, in this case that of 
actors and social structures, as we discussed them in the previous section. For 
systematical reasons, the following units will discuss ontological aspects of 
the interrelation between agency and structure together with the epistemolog-
ical and methodological implications of different ontological positions on the 
agent-structure-problem. Please be aware that this problem is, at its core, on-
tological. For that reason, it is discussed in the section “Ontological assump-
tions about actors and structures”. However, in the overview at the end of this 
unit, the agent-structure problem will take a separate position because of its 
epistemological and methodological implications. 
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In short, the question of how agency and structure interrelate is not only 
ontological but also epistemological and methodological. As an epistemolog-
ical question, it seeks an explanation in terms of the interrelation of agency 
and structure: does structure “cause” agency or does agency “cause” struc-
ture? Perceived as a causal relation, this is usually understood as a temporal 
cause-effect-relation in the Humean sense described in Units 2 and 3. How-
ever, as will be shown later, there are theories of IR that assume a different 
“causality” in the interrelation between agency and structure. We learned in 
Unit 2 that there are two basic positions with regard to this question: method-
ological individualism and methodological holism. Both aspects, the ontolog-
ical and the explanatory, relate to each other as follows: 
 
1) Social existence IS a “whole”; it has its own “ontological quality” that is 
more than the sum of the parts (ontological holism, often called ontologi-
cal structuralism). “Structure”/the “whole” is ontologically prior to agen-
cy. Agency can thus mostly be explained by the operation of this structur-
al whole (epistemological and methodological holism). The explanation 
of agency (such as individual behavior or individual identity) always oc-
curs “in terms” of structure. “Structure” is also epistemologically “prior” 
to agency in that the structure is seen as the “cause” for actors’ behavior. 
In other words, agency is explained as a causal effect of structure. 
2) Social existence IS agency; in other words, the “being” of the world is indi-
vidual actors constructing and reconstructing their worlds. The whole (for 
example “society”) is not more than the parts (the individual actors). Onto-
logically there is no social whole with its own quality. There are only indi-
viduals that act according to their (internal) “properties”; that is, their indi-
vidual interests (ontological individualism). Social worlds then can mostly 
be explained by their construction through the agency of individual human 
actors (epistemological/methodological individualism). The “social” is fi-
nally explained “in terms” of the parts (actor’s individual interests). 
 
You can easily see that “individualists” and “holists” agree that agents and 
structures are somehow interdependent. However, they assume this interrela-
tion in different ways. Theorists committed to the notion of epistemological 
and methodological individualism share the ontological view that actors are 
the central elements in social systems. In terms of explanations, social struc-
tures are the result and the consequences of actions and interactions between 
individual actors. The structures can be reduced to the properties and interac-
tions of agents. You are familiar with this concept from what you have 
learned about reductionism. Theorists committed to methodological holism, 
on the other hand, view actors as being embedded in (ontologically prior) so-
114 
cial structures that constrain, enable or generally shape individuals’ disposi-
tions and capacities to act. Structure has irreducible “emergent” properties 
that determine an actor’s course of action. Here social structure should be 
taken as the primary and most significant explanatory factor.  
The agent-structure-problem resembles the more general problem of indi-
vidual/society, or the micro/macro problem. In IR theory, we will find both 
structuralist views that point to the structural effects on an actor’s behavior 
(structuralist theories) and actor-centered views emphasizing the relevance of 
action’s effects on structure (agency-centered theories). However, you will 
learn that there is a third philosophical “solution” to the agent-structure-
problem which ontologically assumes agency and structure are mutually de-
pendent. Here, the “problem” arises when it comes to explanation: if there is 
agency and structure in the social world and neither is ontologically prior, 
how can you then explain their interrelation? How can you give equal ex-
planatory weight to agency and structure? As you will see, this third ontolog-
ical perspective that agency and structure are ontologically interdependent 
poses a serious challenge to our traditional notion of causality as a temporal 
relation of cause and effect, with the cause preceding the effect in time. As an 
explanation, this ontological position of mutual dependency is usually ex-
pressed in the notion of “mutual constitution”. Agency and structure mutually 
constitute each other; each entity explains the other. This type of explanation 
is often called “constitutive”. This idea of “causality”, if taken seriously, is 
very different from the well-known Humean causation. This observation 
leads us to the next criterion for learning about theories of IR: the type or 
model of explanation and the notion of causality.  
Before we discuss this criterion, let us sum up the previous one. The onto-
logical as well as the epistemological and methodological assumptions about 
the interrelation of agency and structure will be an important third criterion 
applied to our structured learning process about theories of IR. Each unit will 
ask if the explanation offered by the theory is structuralist or agency-centered 
or, alternatively, if the theory offers an explanation of a different type.  
At the end you will know about explanation in terms of structural effects, 
explanation in terms of individual action, and explanation in terms of mutual 
constitution of agency and structure. The next question is about a more spe-
cific topic: the nature of explanation itself. What counts as an explanation of 
international politics? What is valid scientific knowledge about international 
relations? 
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3. Epistemology and methodology 
Ontological questions are intimately linked to epistemological problems of 
knowledge and of how we come to gain that knowledge. In most theories, 
these problems basically revolve around explanation and/or understanding, 
what type of knowledge counts as valid knowledge, and how to gain valid 
knowledge. In this book, we will approach such epistemological and method-
ological assumptions by discussing different types of explanations offered by 
different theoretical approaches to IR. How can we best explain international 
politics? What is the nature of the explanation? What reasons can a theory of 
IR give so that an explanation is taken and accepted as “legitimate”, valid 
knowledge about international politics?  
These are examples of guiding questions that help outline each theory’s 
specific answer to the core question/problem (Criterion 1) in the respective 
theoretical approaches. Three aspects will be particularly relevant. First, what 
is the interrelation of agency and structure found at the heart of the explana-
tion? This is primarily an ontological problem and has been introduced in the 
previous section through our discussion of the ontological core and the com-
bined epistemological and methodological implications. For systematic rea-
sons, I am mentioning it here again. Second, what is the “nature” or type of 
the explanation and the notion of causality therein? The third aspect will be 
the approach the theory takes to what is known in the social sciences as the 
level of analysis problem, which is in fact an analytical concept rather than a 
philosophy of science criterion. It will be used here in an indirect manner be-
cause it is a well-known “problem” in IR and most theories of IR refer to it. 
This also holds true for theories that reject the concept because of their dif-
ferent understanding of science: they refer to the level of analysis problem to 
clarify their position on science. Learning how different theories of IR ap-
proach the level of analysis problem will offer important insights into their 
general understanding of theory and science. 
3.1. Type of explanation and causality 
The “type” of explanation is important with regard to a central epistemological 
criterion: how can one come to know something and what counts as valid 
knowledge? It requires taking a closer look at explanation itself – that is, how 
the interrelation between the ontological entities is perceived epistemological-
ly. In fact, when we ask about explanation, we ask about knowledge. What 
counts as valid knowledge of international politics in the discipline of IR? 
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Usually “knowledge” takes the form of a “causal relation” as it has been de-
scribed for the positivist account of science in Unit 2: law-like regularities that 
can be expressed in terms of if-then temporal sequences and that make predic-
tion possible. Take, for example, the theory of inter-democratic peace; based 
on empirical observation proved by statistics, the findings of the Correlates-of-
War project at the University if Michigan have been formulated into a quasi-
law that “democracies do not fight each other”. This finding can be trans-
formed into the following if-then statement: if a state is a democratic state, 
then the risk of war and conflict with other democratic states will be dimin-
ished. The knowledge has been used to legitimize a politics of democratization 
by the West in such areas as human rights and development policy, based on 
the conviction that democratization will contribute to peace and stability.  
However, as you have learned in Units 2 and 3, neither “explanation” nor 
“causality” are fixed scientific terms, but instead depend on the underlying 
understanding of science. A scientific explanation does not necessarily take 
the form of a law-like generalization, nor does “causality” necessarily have to 
be perceived as a sequential relationship of cause and effect with the cause 
temporally preceding the effect. For example, social constructivist theory as 
formulated by Wendt points to a distinction between constitutive and explan-
atory theory. The criterion “type of explanation and notion of causality” will 
therefore be used in the structured learning process to explore different un-
derstandings of “knowledge” that lie at the hearts of different theories of IR.  
3.2. Approach to “levels of analysis” 
As has been mentioned above, “levels of analysis” is not a philosophy of sci-
ence criterion in the strictest sense. Let me briefly explain why I will none-
theless integrate it to the criteria for our structured learning process.  
Usually, this concept is introduced as the level of analysis problem. The 
problem is where (in terms of levels) we should focus our study of Interna-
tional Relations. As an analytical concept, “levels of analysis” originated 
with Waltz (1959) and Singer (1961). In his study on war, Waltz (1959) uses 
the term “images of the world” or “images of international relations”. The 
first image is the individual; analyzing international conflict at the individual 
level means explaining the outcome of international politics as a result of 
human behavior. The second image is the state level, where international 
conflict is explained by the internal structure of states. The third image is an 
explanation of international politics at the system level, where structural fea-
tures of the international system account for international conflict.  
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More generally, the concept operates on the assumption that we can study 
international relations at the level of the international system (systemic level), 
the level of the state (state-level or domestic level) or the individual level.  
System-level analysis explains the outcomes of international politics by 
referring to the systemic level. Explanations of outcomes in international pol-
itics are “systemic”. Domestic or state-level analysis means that states and 
their internal processes (e.g. the “type” of political system, the powerful in-
terest groups within the state that shape its foreign policy) count most when 
explaining outcomes in international politics. Explanations of outcomes in in-
ternational politics are “domestic”. Individual-level analysis focuses on indi-
vidual human actors. This can be done by analyzing complex processes of 
decision-making, explanations such as “human nature” or “organizational 
behavior” of individuals in organizational settings, or the specific world 
views or beliefs of single foreign policy decision-makers. Explanations of 
outcomes in international politics are “individual”. In fact, these three level 
of analysis result in three different types of theory building in IR. 
From what we learned in Units 2 and 3, you will easily be able to con-
clude that the levels of analysis problem reflects the idea of modern positivist 
science that reality can be separated analytically into spheres or levels in or-
der to gain better knowledge about the objects of inquiry. As such, this con-
cept belongs to reductionism. 
However, discussing theories of IR in terms of how they approach the 
positivist concept of “levels of analysis” will result in important insights on 
the idea of science that underlie a particular theory of IR. We will see that 
some IR theories categorically reject the notion of “levels of analysis” be-
cause of their different position on science altogether. We will study the rea-
sons given for their rejection and, in so doing, will learn more deeply about 
each theory’s understanding of science and valid knowledge. 
4. General approach to IR as a science and to the practice 
of international politics 
By way of summarizing, we will make a final statement about the general 
approach to the scientific study of IR and to the practice of international poli-
tics that is inherent in the theoretical approach at the end of each chapter on a 
theory. This statement will be primarily related to three aspects: 
First, we will ask about the philosophy of science at the heart of the theo-
retical construction. Second, we will ask about the normative perspective of 
118 
the theory. By its very nature, any social theory has a normative perspective 
(implicit or explicit): what should the “ideal” international system look like? 
We will try to identify the kind of normative perspective or ethics that the 
different theoretical approaches entail. In addition, we will learn more about 
the theories by asking about each one’s particular view of change in interna-
tional relations. Is there “progress” in the development of the international 
system? How does change in international politics occur?  
These questions are also closely related to the third criterion: we will ask 
about the particular perspective on the study of international relations in 
terms of how the theorist/researcher/scientist relates to the “object” of 
study/research/theorizing. What position does he or she hold as to how theory 
of IR and the practice of international politics are linked to each other? 
 
Self-study 
Below you will find an overview of the criteria introduced in this unit and 
two review questions. Please take some time to reflect on the criteria and 
how they relate to what you have learned in Units 1, 2, and 3. Then try to 
answer the two review questions below. 
Overview of criteria for a structured learning process about 
theories of IR 
• Core question/core problem of the theory 
• Ontological assumptions about actors and structure  
• “Agency and structure”: ontological, epistemological and methodologi-
cal assumptions 
• Type of explanation and notion of causality  
• Approach to „levels of analysis“ 
• Philosophy of science 
• Normative perspective 
• Theory and practice/role of the scientist 
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Review questions 
1. What are some basic ontological questions that the theories of IR attempt 
to answer through assumptions? 
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Introduction 
This unit marks the beginning of Part II, which covers five theories of IR. At 
the core of this unit will be neorealist theory as developed by Kenneth Waltz in 
his Theory of International Politics (1979). By discussing neorealist theory’s 
core assumptions and explanatory model in detail, we will learn about the par-
ticular perspective of international politics that neorealist theory provides. 
When learning about theoretical approaches to International Relations, 
there are several reasons to start with neorealist theory.  
Within the academic discipline of International Relations, neorealist theo-
ry – developed continuously by Kenneth Waltz beginning in the 1950s and 
completely worked out in his book “Theory of International Politics” (1979) 
– is the first “scientific” theoretical approach to IR. It was Waltz’s objective 
to construct a general theory of IR which could explain the way all of interna-
tional politics functions. At the heart of neorealism lies a strong belief that 
general, legal-like knowledge about international politics is possible. Within 
IR, Waltz was the first scholar to build his theoretical argument on the 
grounds of clearly demarked assumptions about actors and structures in in-
ternational politics. 
Neorealist theory is also the most parsimonious, or least complex, theory 
of International Relations. This alone makes it easy to start with. However, 
even more important than being the first “scientific” theoretical approach, the 
position neorealism holds within the academic discipline of IR almost neces-
sitates beginning theoretical studies with neorealism. As you will learn, al-
most all theoretical approaches draw on neorealism as a point of reference 
against which to sharpen their own theoretical arguments. 
In terms of “intellectual traditions”, realism is the oldest “theory” of in-
ternational politics. Please be aware that we are now talking about realism as 
a theoretical strand of IR. It should not be confused with realism as a philos-
ophy of science (as discussed in Part 1 of the book). Realism as realist think-
ing about interstate relations in terms of power politics or balance-of- power 
politics can be traced back in history as far as Thucydides. However, this ar-
gument only holds true if we take into account the core of political thinking 
about power politics that is found in all strands of realist theory. For the pur-
pose of our book, it might therefore be useful to differentiate between realist 
thinking and neorealist theory right from the beginning. This difference is 
important because the type of theoretical construction and nature of theoreti-
cal explanation found in neorealism as a theoretical approach will be the cen-
tral issue for our discussions. However, as one aspect of dealing with our 
theoretical approaches will be questions about the normative perspective, we 
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will come back to realist thinking in terms of realist international politics at 
the end of this unit. 
These points are closely related to a final aspect, the relevance of theory 
for the practice of international politics. Realist thinking and neorealist theory 
clearly belong to the most influential perspectives of International Relations. 
This can be seen through their role as a guide to the political actions of US 
administrations after World War II until the 1970s and again since the 1990s. 
In the US, the study of IR was (and often is) closely tied to a practical politi-
cal purpose: to optimize American foreign policy under “new” conditions of 
international politics, such as of superpower rivalry after World War II, 
world economic turbulences with the oil price shocks in the 1970s, following 
the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, or now against the background of new 
rising powers such as China. In the early years it was Hans Morgenthau’s re-
alism as formulated in his Politics among Nations (1948), together with the 
work of John Herz, Reinhold Niebuhr, subsequent US Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and Arnold Wolfers, which shaped American foreign policy. 
Neo-realism, developed by Waltz as a critique of early realism, along with the 
diverse strands of neorealist theory today, have also mainly been developed and 
modified in the US. The frequently debated move of the US from multilateral-
ism to unilateralism since the 1990s and the hopes that the Obama administra-
tion would bring a new multilateralist approach to US actions cannot be rea-
sonably understood without taking into account the relevance of a (neo)realist 
world perspective. Much of international security politics, not only in America, 
is guided by (neo)realist perspectives. Investigating the neorealist perspective 
thoroughly is thus not only a theoretical endeavor but also helps us to better 
understand the perspectives behind much of contemporary world politics. 
Step 1: 
Background and core question 
The differentiation between realist thinking and neorealist theory in the mod-
ern usage of the terms provides a good starting point for illustrating the back-
ground behind the formation of neorealist theory. Realist thinking, with its 
central categories of “political power” and the “national interest”, formed the 
core of IR after World War II. This tendency increased with the advent of the 
Cold War. However, approaches to International Organizations and conflict 
studies have also constituted a large part of the academic study of IR since 
the 1950s; their role should not be downplayed. The dominance of realism 
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within IR was the answer to politically motivated questions at the core of the 
American discipline until the late fifties and sixties. At this point, there was a 
move towards more basic or fundamental research. Comparative studies – us-
ing systematic comparison as a method to find general explanations for inter-
national relations (since the 1950s) – and theories applying game theory to 
the social sciences/International Relations (especially since the 1960s) were 
attempts to find scientific explanations for international relations. In the US, a 
strong dominance of decision-making approaches to International Relations 
was the result of a transfer of emphasis from politics to foreign policy studies 
(Snyder R.C./Bruck, H.W./Sapin, B. 1962). Foreign policy decisions such as 
the American choice in favor of the Korean War were at the core of these theo-
retical programs. In terms of theory, the controversial point was whether these 
studies should be classified as foreign policy studies or as studies of interna-
tional relations. These are questions closely related to the level-of-analysis 
problem, which was an issue of our discussions in Unit 4 of the book. They re-
flect the fundamental problem of how best to explain international politics in 
terms of “locating” the most relevant explanatory variables. 
Out of the belief that theories of foreign policy do not constitute adequate 
explanations of international politics, Kenneth Waltz claimed that there was 
a lack of a genuine international political theory within the discipline. Expla-
nations of international politics are not to be found at the state or individual 
level of political decision makers, but at the level of the international system. 
His theoretical project is basically the construction of a system level theory of 
IR. He developed early ideas about such a systemic theory of international 
politics in the 1950s with his Ph.D. dissertation on Man, the state and the 
state system in theories of the causes of war at Columbia University in New 
York (1954) and his book Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis 
(1959). Waltz argues that, in order to study international conflict, we have to 
look at the systemic level of international politics. The causes are not to be 
found in human behavior or in the internal structures of the state. 
Subsequently, Waltz developed a comprehensive system-level theory of 
international politics, published in 1979 as Theory of International Politics. 
The core question for the construction of the theory is a theoretical explana-
tion of war and peace in international politics. As we know, questions of war 
and peace have been at the core of the discipline right from the beginning. 
What particularly interested Waltz was the following question: How can we 
explain that history shows phases of war and conflict while other periods 
proved to be stable and peaceful? His observation of these recurrent patterns 
of state behavior and repeated and enduring patterns in the history of interna-
tional politics awakened his interest in finding a theory to explain those re-
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current patterns: the cycles of war and peace in international politics. More 
precisely, it was the recurrent formation of balances of power by the great 
powers in international systems that interested him. 
The objective was to create a general theory of International Politics that 
could aid in discovering law-like regularities within the confined realm of in-
ternational politics. These regularities in turn help to explain the patterns ob-
served.  
In Waltz’s eyes, such a general theory had to be both a system theory and 
a balance-of-power theory. The search for the “right” theory of international 
politics within the discipline of IR therefore forms the academic and intellec-
tual background for the construction of neorealist theory as a system theory. 
Neorealism’s further development as balance-of-power theory allows the sys-
tem-level theory to specify more clearly its implications for the conduct of 
real-world international politics. The bipolar system of the Cold War formed 
the political-historical context at the time the Theory of International Politics 
was written. From Waltz’s point of view, the Cold War proved to be an 
astonishingly stable period – at least in terms of the absence of major wars – 
despite phases of high-risk confrontation between the two superpowers. The 
central issues of neorealist theory are the implications for the prospects of 
peace and stability resulting from two major changes: first, from the previ-
ously multipolar international system to a post-1945 bipolar world with two 
superpowers; and, second, from the bipolar world to a new international sys-
tem with the end of the Cold War. In addition, the theory has to be interpret-
ed against the background of a declining American hegemony vis-à-vis the 
economic rise of Europe and Japan after the 1970s. 
Let us now take a closer look at the theoretical argument. 
Step 2: 
Assumptions about actors and structure 
Neorealist theory is built on a strict distinction between national and interna-
tional politics. International politics is considered to be a confined realm or 
domain separate from national politics. The starting point of neorealist theory 
is the international system. For the purpose of constructing a theory, the in-
ternational system is assumed to consist of two elements: the structure of the 
system and the states as acting and interacting “units” within the system. 
As we have learned in Part 1 of the book, theory in the social sciences is 
always based on assumptions about the most relevant actors, their properties 
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and their behavior. They are assumed, not explained by the theory. Assump-
tions play a central role for the construction of the theoretical argument and 
hence for its explanation. In this way, neorealism is based on the assumption 
that states are the most important, relevant actors in international politics. 
States are unitary actors. In regard to their motivations and interests, or in 
other words, the driving forces of their behavior, neorealist theory assumes 
that states are at a minimum seeking their own survival and preservation and 
at a maximum striving for universal domination within the international sys-
tem. Therefore, states seek to increase their military strength and economic 
capability (inside) and to strengthen and enlarge their alliances (outside). 
Power is assumed to be the most important political means in international 
politics, used to achieve the state’s aims. There is a clear hierarchy of state 
goals with security (high politics) on top.  
Waltz does not deny that there are other actors in international politics in 
addition to states and he agrees on the importance of non-state actors and 
transnational activities (Waltz 1979: 93-94). However, for him, this does not 
mean that a state-centric view of international politics is obsolete. We will 
later see (Step 3), that the neorealist assumptions of states as unitary actors as 
well as the most relevant ones have a central function for the concept of 
structure. This function leads in turn to the “structural realist” explanation of 
international politics at the conclusion of the neorealist line of argument. 
Now recall what you have learned in the fourth unit of Part 1 about the 
social context of actors and their interactions. Social action and interaction 
occur in a structural context.  
For neorealism, the structural context for states is the international sys-
tem. The basic structural feature of the international system is anarchy. Being 
the opposite of hierarchy, anarchy means the absence of any higher authority 
in the international system that sets the rules for state behavior and has the 
power monopoly to punish non-compliance with the rules and norms. For 
states, this poses a serious security dilemma.  
In the words of John Herz in his famous book International Politics in the 
Atomic Age, a security dilemma  
“is a social constellation in which units of power (such as states or nations in in-
ternational relations) find themselves whenever they exist side by side without 
higher authority that might impose standards of behavior upon them and thus pro-
tect them from attacking each other. In such a condition, a feeling of insecurity, 
deriving from mutual suspicion and mutual fear, compels these units to compete 
for ever more power in order to find more security, an effort which proves self-
defeating because complete security remains ultimately unobtainable.” (Herz 
1959: 231, emphasis mine) 
129 
Under conditions of anarchy, states must rely on themselves; they therefore 
coexist, act and interact in a self-help system. Self-help is the principle of ac-
tion within structures for which anarchy is the central feature: “A self-help 
system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less 
effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dan-
gers, will suffer.” (Waltz 1979: 118). 
 
Assumptions of neorealist theory 
• States as unitary actors (“units” of the international system) and the most 
important actors in international politics  
• Power as the most important political means used by actors  
• Hierarchy of actor’s (state) goals: „high politics“ (security) and „low 
politics“ (all other issue areas) 
• Anarchy of the international system 
• Actors (the “units”/states) motivated by self-interest because of the secu-
rity dilemma 
Step 3: 
The neorealist explanation of international politics 
3.1. Level of analysis 
Having discussed the basic assumptions, we will now take a closer look at the 
explanation a neorealist theory offers for the outcomes of international poli-
tics. In the fourth unit of the first part, we defined outcomes of international 
politics as the patterns of interaction such as conflict, war, peace and coop-
eration. These are what have to be explained by a theory of international poli-
tics (the explanandum). The explanans is what explains these outcomes. A 
central question is where the explanans is “located”, i.e. where to focus our 
study in terms of levels of analysis.  
For Waltz, statements about war and the conditions for peace in interna-
tional politics are made according to the level at which the causes are located 
– whether they originate with man, the state or the state system (Waltz 1959). 
He shows a clear preference for explaining international politics at the sys-
temic level. In fact, for Waltz, a theory of international politics is a system-
level theory. He supports his preference for the systemic level by drawing a 
sharp line between reductionist and systemic theories. Please be aware that 
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the term “reductionist” as used by Waltz should not be confused with “reduc-
tionism” as introduced in Part 1 from a philosophy of science perspective. 
Theories that concentrate causes at the individual or state level are reduction-
ist. According to Waltz, we have to distinguish between a theory of interna-
tional politics (systemic) and a theory of foreign policy (reductionist). Reduc-
tionist theories understand international politics in its entirety by knowing the 
attributes and the interactions of its parts (the states), either through explana-
tions of group behavior resulting from the psychological study of the group’s 
members or through efforts to explain international politics by studying state 
bureaucracies (Waltz 1979: 18). Reductionist theories explain international 
outcomes through “elements” or “combinations of elements” located at the na-
tional or subnational level; internal forces produce external outcomes. For 
Waltz, reductionist theories do not provide adequate explanations for outcomes 
in international politics. His “project” is the construction of a non-reductionist, 
system level theory. In this regard, Waltz builds on criticism of the dominating 




Now take some time and read chapters 2 and 4 of Waltz 1979: Theory of 
International Politics carefully. Why do reductionist theories fail as theo-
ries of international politics?  
Reflect on the neorealist view that only a system’s level theory is a “real” 
theory of international politics. 
3.2. The neorealist concept of structure 
The alternative to reductionist theories conceptualized by Waltz is a specific 
type of system theory. It cannot be understood without discussing the concept 
of structure at the heart of this theory first. To think of any political system – 
national or international – in terms of its structure is the starting point of the 
neorealist theoretical program. This is why neorealist theory as formulated by 
Waltz is called “structural realism”. Please note that “structural” is different 
from “structuralism” (holism). “Structural” relates to the re-formulation of 
classical realism by introducing the concept of “structure” as part of the neo-
realist explanation; it is a structural realist explanation and will be discussed 
in detail below. In contrast, “structuralism” (holism, as introduced in Unit 2) 
relates to an ontological and methodological philosophy of science position. 
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For Waltz, structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible 
to think of a political system as a whole. His aim is to independently define 
the “elements” of a political system (national or international), to define 
structure on one hand and units and processes on the other. For him, this is 
necessary to “disentangle” causes of different sorts (that is, not to “mix” lev-
els of analysis) and to make possible a clear specification of structural causes 
and effects (Waltz 1979: 78). Defining structure independently of the “units” 
is necessary to explain the constraints that confine all states. The concept of 
structure serves the purpose of explaining why a certain similarity of behav-
ior is expected under systemic constraints. 
Following the definitional approach, structures have to be defined free of 
the attributes and the interactions of their units. The characteristics of the 
units (the type of political system, the types of political leaders, the social and 
economic institutions, the ideological commitments of states), their behavior 
and their interactions (the cultural, economic and military interactions of 
states) are not included in the definition of structure. They belong to the unit 
(state) level. This is an omission made in order to distinguish between varia-
bles at the unit level and variables at the system level (Waltz 1979: 80). The 
question of how to define a structure thus is simply a question of how units 
are “arranged” or positioned within the system (Waltz 1979: 80). For Waltz, 
the way the units/states are arranged or positioned is not a property of the 
units themselves but a property of the system. Waltz calls it a “positional pic-
ture” (Waltz 1979: 80).  
In short, the structure of a system is defined by the arrangement of its 
parts and by the principle of the arrangement. Each unit’s behavior is differ-
ent and they produce distinct interactional outcomes when differently ar-
ranged or positioned in the system. 
To make the concept easier to grasp and to understand the concept of 
structure as applied to international politics, Waltz illustrates his definition by 
describing domestic political structures. He asks three questions about a po-
litical system in order to define its structure:  
 
Defining political structures 
• Ordering principle: How are the units arranged in the system? 
• Differentiation of units and functions: What functions do the formally 
differentiated units perform?   
• Distribution of capabilities: How is power distributed across the units? 
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Domestic political structures, or a national political system, are hierarchically 
ordered and centralized; hierarchy is the ordering principle. The units (insti-
tutions and agencies within the state) stand in relations of super- and subordi-
nation to each other. Political actors within the state are formally differentiat-
ed by the degree of their authority and the functions they perform (actors re-
sponsible for jurisdiction, legislation, bureaucratic actors, etc.). There is a 
specific distribution of capabilities (power) across the units of a national po-
litical system. Because political structures shape political processes, we can 
expect different political processes according to different structures in a na-
tional political system. For example, with regard to the type of political sys-
tem, structures in autocratic or democratic systems will differ from each oth-
er, as will those in presidential and parliamentary democracies. The behavior 
of the units (the actors in the political system) and the outcomes of their in-
teraction will be different depending on the structural features of the system. 
In international politics, the ordering principle is different. Anarchy, not 
hierarchy, is the ordering principle of the international system. International 
systems are decentralized and anarchic. There are no formal relations of su-
per-or subordination, but rather an absence of agents with system-wide au-
thority. In place of relations of super-and subordination in the international 
system, we can only find coordination of formally equal units. The units of 
the international system, the states, are not differentiated by the functions 
they perform. There is no “division of labor” in the international system. All 
states have to fulfill the same tasks regardless of the type of political system: 
ensuring survival in a self-help-system. Anarchy therefore implies the 
“sameness” of the units in the international system (Waltz 1979: 93). In con-
trast to a national political system, the criterion of functional differentiation is 
not needed to define the structure of the international system. States are “like 
units“, meaning that all states are alike in being an autonomous political unit, 
a sovereign state or sovereign political entity. Only if the organizing principle 
changes (that is, from anarchy to hierarchy) a functional differentiation might 
be possible. 
However, states differ according to their capabilities (power). States have 
greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks. Capabilities/power 
are attributes of units. In contrast, for Waltz, the distribution of capabilities 
is not: In neorealist theory, the distribution of capabilities across units be-
comes a defining criterion for the structure of the system. Here the notion of 
the “positional picture” becomes clearer: states in the system are placed or 
positioned by their power. Depending on how power is distributed in the in-
ternational system, we can think of multipolar, bipolar or unipolar interna-
tional systems. This definition enables a distinction between international po-
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litical systems according to the number of great powers and how they are po-
sitioned.  
The structure of a system changes with variations in the distribution of 
capabilities across the units. Changes in structure alter expectations about 
how the units of the system will behave and about the outcomes their interac-
tions will produce (Waltz 1979: 101). 
 
Political structures: national and international 








Yes No. Like units. States as sov-
ereign political units and 
unitary actors.  
Distribution of 
capabilities across units 
Distribution of power as a 
“structural feature” of the 
political system. 
Distribution of power as a 
“structural feature” of the 
system. Change in the dis-
tribution of power is a 
change in the system. 
3.3. Structures as causes 
For a system theory of international politics, political structures have to be 
defined in a way that enables an identification of their causal effects. “Causal 
effects” of structures means that the structure of the system “acts” as a con-
straining and disposing “force”. Actions of agents and agencies, their interac-
tions and the outcomes of their interactions are all affected by the system’s 
structure. Outcomes in international politics cannot be inferred from the in-
tentions and behaviors of the units (“inside” states), but have to be explained 
in reference to the “external” structures. They can only be explained struc-
turally. Effects vary as structures change.  
For Waltz, a structural realist explanation (that is, through his concept of 
structure) is the only way to answer the core question of neorealist theory: 
why do recurrent patterns of state behavior and repeated and enduring pat-
terns in the history of international politics, cycles of war and peace, and pe-
riods of conflict and stability in the international system occur? An explana-
tion in neorealist theory is to say why patterns of behavior recur, why events 
repeat themselves, why the range of expected outcomes falls within certain 
limits (Waltz 1979: 69). Recurrences and repetitions within a system cannot 
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be explained by reductionist theories. It is a constancy of structure that ex-
plains the recurrent patterns and features of international politics. 
For Waltz, a structural realist theory can explain why war recurs and de-
fine conditions that make war more or less likely, but it will not predict the 
outbreak of particular wars. According to Waltz, structures explain some 
“big, important and enduring patterns” (Waltz 1979: 70). These are the conti-
nuities within a system. Phases of stable international systems and phases of 
conflict and war are the “big and important” patterns. It is not the objective to 
explain single, particular events and short-term outcomes in international pol-
itics. This is the domain of theories at the state level. 
The core question therefore is: What are the causal effects of an anar-
chical structure of the system and of a specific distribution of capabilities? 
Here Waltz draws on an analogy: he uses the theory of the market to explain 
how the structure of the international system shapes the behavior of states in 
the same way that the market forces of a competitive market economy shape 
the behavior of the single firms.  
 
Self-study (2) 
Read chapter 5 of Theory of International Politics. Learn about the analo-
gy used to explain the effects of international structures. Do states behave 
like firms under constraints of market forces?  
3.4. Balance-of-power politics 
How do states behave under structural constraints? What kind of politics do 
they have to choose? 
As we know, in neorealist theory, survival is the motive and reason for 
action in a world where the security of states is not assured (security dilem-
ma). Under conditions of anarchy, security is the highest goal; survival has to 
be assured in a system that has no rules set by a central authority. Mistrust 
and uncertainty about the ambitions of other states are the dominating condi-
tions in such a system. 
According to the neorealist explanation, an anarchical system “encour-
ages” the units to seek security (Waltz 1979: 126). The fate of each state de-
pends on its response to what other states do; this is why we have arms races, 
competition and imitation in the field of military technological innovations. 
Power, the buildup of military, economic and technological strength, is the 
means (not an end) to achieving security. The first concern of states therefore 
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is not to maximize power, but to balance power, and to maintain their posi-
tion in the system (Waltz 1979: 126). An anarchical system that is defined by 
the distribution of power induces states to behave in such a way that they 
seek the balance of power. States balance power by, for example, building up 
military strength or forming and joining alliances.  
However, this assertion applies first and foremost to the great powers in 
the system. It is a defining feature of neorealist theory to focus on great pow-
ers: the “units” of greatest capability count most for the behavior of states. 
“Concern with international politics as a system requires concentration on the 
states that make the most difference. A general theory of international politics 
is necessarily based on the great powers.” (Waltz 1979: 73). “Secondary”, 
less important and not-so-capable states usually join the weaker of two coali-
tions or alliances; states do not wish to maximize power (in this case they 
would join the stronger side), but to balance power. If states wished to max-
imize power, no balances would be formed.  
In terms of politics, the structural constraints of an anarchical system “en-
courage” the states in the system to adopt “Realpolitik” (Waltz 1979: 117). 
The system thus indicates to a certain extent the “methods” by which foreign 
policy is conducted and provides a “rationale” for them. Structural con-
straints explain why the methods are repeatedly used despite differences in 
persons and states: the “structure of the international system” encourages a 
certain type of politics in which a state’s interest is the rationale of actions. 
This is based on a strong belief that the necessities of politics are derived 
from the unregulated competition between states and that calculation based 
on these necessities can lead to the policies that will best serve a state’s inter-
est. “Success”, defined as preserving and strengthening the state, is the ulti-
mate test of policy (Waltz 1979: 117). 
A balance-of-power theory can explain the results that such policies pro-
duce at the system level: results that may not be included in any of the actor’s 
motives or as objectives in the policies of actors. Balance-of power theory 
can be understood as a further development of system theory. It offers predic-
tions in terms of tendencies: states can be expected to behave in ways that re-
sult in balances of power. The dynamics of the system limit the freedom of 
the individual units. This is why their behavior and the outcomes of their be-
havior become predictable. 
In sum: In neorealist theory, international structures are defined in terms 
of the distribution of power between the primary political units of an era. Un-
der the “structural constraints” of international politics, the result is that the 
units behave in a way that tends towards the creation of balances of power. A 
balance of power is the outcome of international politics that results from 
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states’ actions and interactions, shaped by the system’s constraints. A balance 
of power is an outcome that can only be explained by a system level theory. 
Such a theory predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. Bal-
ances will be disrupted and restored again; thus, balances of power form on a 
recurrent basis.  
A theory of international politics claims to explain certain aspects of the 
foreign policy of nations, particularly in regard to the international condi-
tions with which national policies have to cope. 
3.5. Peace and stability in the international system  
The purpose of neorealist theory is explanation and prediction: how can one 
explain recurrent patterns of war/conflict and peace and stability in the inter-
national system? In terms of the theory, the objective is to define the condi-
tions for peace. A commitment to balance-of-power-politics is the outcome of 
the theory in terms of “policy advice”. Peace and stability are defined as the 
absence of major conflict and war, provided by phases of balance of power.  
In the absence of authoritative regulation (anarchy) Waltz favors a “loose 
coupling” and a certain amount of control exercised by large states in order to 
help promote peace and stability. Most important in international politics is 
control (not regulation) and prevention (not coordination) (Waltz 1979: 209). 
For Waltz, the use of force in international politics will be prevented by the 
threat of force. Thus, employing the threat or use of force to influence states’ 
policies is the most important means of control in security politics.  
In an anarchical system, states with superior power are able to “absorb” 
destabilizing changes simply by virtue of their greater power (Waltz 1979: 
210). Neorealist theory therefore can be read as a strong plea for a “construc-
tive management” of international affairs by great powers (Waltz 1979: 210). 
In such a system, the basic condition of anarchy will prevail and will be re-
produced by the actions and interactions of states. The security dilemma can-
not be solved. International politics is “timeless” in that it is an endless cycle 
of war/conflict and peace/stability, governed by the logic of balance-of-
power. 
Now recap what you have learned by carefully reading the key aspects in 
the synopsis below and answering the review questions. 
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Step 4: 
Check your understanding: key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
 Neorealism 
Core question • Explanation of recurrent patterns of state action 
and interaction (war and peace) in international 
politics 
Ontological assumptions about 
actors and structure 
• Anarchy 
• States as unitary actors/”units” of the system and 
the most important actors in international politics 
• Actors are “like units” 
• Rationality assumption 
• Actors differ with regard to their capabili-
ties/power  
• Actors (“units”) motivated by self-help: survival, 
power 
Assumptions about “agency and 
structure” 
• Ontological priority of actors/”units” with inter-
ests and capabilities (ontological individualism) 
• “Structure” is a theoretical concept: it is defined 
in terms of the distribution of actor’s capabilities 
(ontological individualism) 
• “Management of international affairs” by the 
most powerful actors/”units” 
Type of explanation and notion 
of causality 
• Explanation through the concept of structure: 
structural realist explanation 
• Agency-centered and methodological individual-
ist explanation because “structure” is a theoret-
ical concept and is defined as the distribution of 
actors’ capabilities (methodological individualist 
explanation) 
• Causality: structure (as a concept, defined as the 
distribution of actor’s capabilities as the inde-
pendent variable explains actor’s behavior (de-
pendent variable); 
• ”Systemic constraints” (defined in terms of the 
distribution of actor’s capabilities) causally im-
pose balance-of power politics of actors in the 
international system 
Approach to „levels of analysis“ • System level 
Philosophy of science • Positivism  
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 Neorealism 
Normative perspective • Skepticism. 
• Cycles of war/conflict and peace. 
• Anarchy constantly reproduced, security dilem-
ma cannot be resolved.  
• Peace and stability only as the absence of major 
conflict and war. 
Theory and practice/role of the 
scientist  
• Contribution to peace and stability in the inter-
national system by providing objective, law-like 
knowledge about international politics. 
• Policy recommendation based on objective 
knowledge: Realpolitik (balance-of- power poli-
tics) as a contribution to stability. 
Review questions 
1. What is the core question of the neorealist theoretical research program? 
2. What function do assumptions about actors and structure have for the 
construction of neorealist theory? 
3. Outline the neorealist explanation of international politics. 
4. What is balance-of-power theory? 
Step 5: 
Final self-study and consolidation 
 
Self-study (3) 
Now read Waltz 2000 and Wohlforth 2008 from the required reading 
list. 
Self-study (4) 
In addition to the required reading, choose at least three texts out of the 
supplementary reading. Outline briefly a) the basic lines of critical argu-
ments against neorealist theory or b) current developments within the neo-
realist paradigm. Think for a moment about contemporary world politics. 
Do you see problems of real-world international politics for which a neo-




Re-read Unit 2 about positivism as a philosophy of science. Why, from a 
philosophy of science perspective, does the neorealist theory belong to 
positivism?  
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1, 5-41. 
Wohlforth, William C. 2008: Realism, in: Reus-Smit, Christian/Snidal, Duncan (eds.): The 
Oxford Handbook of International Relations, 131-149. 
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Introduction 
This unit will introduce you to the second theoretical approach in Part II: 
neoinstitutionalist theory in International Relations. 
Institutionalist theory is one of the most influential perspectives in the so-
cial sciences, as well as in economics and law. Political scientist Elinor 
Ostrom won the 2009 Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences for academic work 
carried out within an institutionalist framework. Ostrom’s work, above all her 
book Governing the Commons. The evolution of institutions for collective ac-
tion (1990) is an excellent example of institutionalist political science and 
economics. Ostrom’s objective is to understand the fundamental problems 
involved in governing and managing natural resource systems, and to find out 
how and what type of institutions can contribute toward solving the collective 
actions problems inherent in the use and distribution of natural resources. Re-
search based on Ostrom’s institutionalist analysis includes case studies on the 
capabilities and limitations of self-governing institutions for regulating re-
sources such as fisheries, water resources, irrigation or land.  
In a number of disciplines, collective goods, for which a clean and healthy 
environment is a good example, constitute a core field of institutionalist stud-
ies. What unites all strands of “institutionalism” found in sociology, political 
theory, comparative government, economics and law is a strong belief that 
“institutions matter” in social and economic life. In general, institutionalism 
focuses on the influence of the rules, norms or procedures of social institu-
tions on human behavior and individual preferences and actions. This is also 
true for institutionalist theory in the academic discipline of IR, where the fo-
cus lies on the impact social institutions have on the interests and behavior of 
states and other actors in international politics, and on how interstate coop-
eration and an increasing institutionalization of international politics contrib-
ute to solving the fundamental problem of order in an anarchical international 
system. 
Recall for a moment how we learned that the historical development of 
the modern state system goes hand in hand with theoretical reflections on in-
terstate relations. As discussed in Part I of this book, the idea and principle of 
state sovereignty, as well as the idea of viewing international politics as an 
anarchical realm, were both developed parallel to the advent of the modern, 
centralized territorial state of the Westphalian order. These theoretical reflec-
tions not only provide descriptions of the “conditions” in international poli-
tics, but also transfer ideas on political solutions to the problem of anarchy: 
how to create rules and norms for conducting international politics in the ab-
sence of a “world government”, how to prevent or formulate rules for conflict 
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and war among nations, and how to achieve cooperation. We briefly dis-
cussed the important contributions of Hugo Grotius to the development of in-
ternational law and Immanuel Kant’s visions of a foedus pacificum, i.e. inter-
national organization and international law as a means of conducting peaceful 
interstate relations. With regard to establishing such interstate institutions, 
these “solutions” to the problem of anarchy are directly opposed to the early 
ideas of the realist tradition that power and balance-of-power-politics present 
the best means to stabilize interstate relations. We know that different theo-
ries of IR provide different explanations for outcomes in international politics 
and therefore also different solutions for the actual practice of international 
politics.  
Although theoretical reflections on the ways in which institutions affect 
social life and society date back as far as Ancient Greece, it was not until the 
late 19th and first half of the 20th century that the study of institutions gradual-
ly became more systematic and “scientific” in the way we discussed while 
considering the issue of “science” in Unit 2. In the US and Britain, the study 
of political institutions has dominated large areas of the social sciences since 
at least the 1950s. The focus of this early institutionalist analysis (“old” or 
classical institutionalism) was on the formal institutions of government and 
the state, often in comparative perspective. 
In International Relations, the term “old institutionalism” relates to the 
early systematic study of the role and functions of (formal) international or-
ganizations in the 1950s and 1960s, in particular the United Nations and its 
many related organizations and specialized agencies, as well as the European 
Communities. In fact, we can think of a “tradition” of institutionalist theoret-
ical reflection in International Relations. This tradition comprises theories 
such as functionalism (the “classic” being David Mitrany’s A Working Peace 
System, 1943), federalism (the work of C.J. Friedrich in the 1960s) and 
neofunctionalism (the standard works being Ernst Haas’ The Uniting of Eu-
rope (1958) and Beyond the Nation State. Functionalism and International 
Organization (1964) ). However, as theories of regional integration, the fo-
cus was essentially on the role and function of institutions in regional, espe-
cially European, processes of integration. This focus also extended to the ef-
fects of integration and the establishment of institutions on the prospect of 
peace, stability and the future of the nation-state.  
It was not until the mid-1970s that an attempt was made to formulate a 
general theory of International Relations on the basis of an institutionalist 
perspective and with a clear explanatory approach following the dominating 
(positivist) perspective of IR as a “science”. In the academic discipline of In-
ternational Relations, the advent of this new or neoinstitutionalism (the prefix 
144 
“neo” indicating a “revival” or new “wave” of institutionalism in IR) is asso-
ciated with the publication of the works Power and Interdependence. World 
Politics in Transition by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) and 
Keohane’s After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy (1984). In the late 1980s and 1990s, interdependence analysis and 
the neoinstitutionalist regime theory formulated in After Hegemony were sub-
sequently developed into a complex and influential institutionalist research 
program within IR. The concept of interdependence was an important build-
ing block in regime theory, which has been broadened into what is now 
called neoliberal institutionalism. However, it should be noted that the termi-
nology used in connection with the neoinstitutionalist theory can sometimes 
be confusing. For instance, the terms “neoliberal institutionalism” and “ne-
oliberalism” are used in the literature interchangeably. In the theoretical de-
bate on neorealism in the 1990s “neoliberalism” was a common term (Bald-
win 1993). 
The “revival” of the study of institutions in IR since the mid-1970s and 
1980s again reflects the more or less parallel advent of neoinstitutionalism in 
all social and political sciences, as well as in economics. In sociology, for ex-
ample, the advent of neoinstitutionalism is associated with the works of John 
Meyer and Brian Rowan (1977), and of DiMaggio and Powell (1983); in 
economics a similar connection can be made to the work of Douglas North 
(1973, 1990). With the advent of new institutionalism in the social sciences, 
the previous focus on institutions in a formal and often legal and descriptive 
way has now been overcome. Apart from this commonality, institutionalist 
theory is so diverse that it has proved almost impossible to provide a system-
atic introduction to this multi-faceted theoretical strand. In Political Science 
and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996) Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor 
facilitate a better understanding of new institutionalism by differentiating be-
tween rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and his-
torical institutionalism (Hall/Taylor 1996). 
Within the academic discipline of IR, neoinstitutionalist theory as devel-
oped by Robert Keohane belongs to rational choice institutionalism: a “utili-
tarian” or interest-based neoinstitutionalism found at the heart of regime the-
ory and its subsequent development into neoliberal institutionalism. Regime 
theory and neoliberal institutionalism are the results of a critical engagement 
with Waltz’ neorealist theory of international politics. It may come as a sur-
prise to learn that the outcome of this critical engagement is a modified struc-
tural realism. For the purpose of this book, learning more about this “modifi-
cation” will be a promising undertaking, as it will provide an important in-
sight into theory building in the social sciences in general. 
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Therefore, we will devote the first learning step to those elements of neo-
realist theory that challenged neoinstitutionalist criticism in the 1970s and 
1980s. Please note that the term “neoinstitutionalist theory” will be used 
throughout the text to refer to the interest-based neoinstitutionalism devel-
oped by Keohane and Nye. 
Step 1: 
Neoinstitutionalist theory as “modified structural realism” 
1.1. Power, structure and rationality: concepts and assumptions 
There is agreement with neorealism that the fundamental issues of power, in-
terests and rationality are at the core of a theory of international politics, as 
well as agreement that a system level theory must be able to explain outcomes 
in international politics adequately (Keohane 1986b: 182). However, in terms 
of theory construction, a range of critical points exist related to the concepts 
and assumptions at the core of neorealist theory: the concept of power, the 
concept of structure and the rationality assumption. 
As we learned in the previous unit, in neorealist theory, state interests are 
“given” and patterns of outcomes in international politics are determined by 
the overall distribution of power among states. The distribution of power is 
claimed to be a “systemic” feature and the neorealist explanation of interna-
tional politics therefore a structural realist one. In neorealist theory, “power” 
in a very general way refers to resources that can be used to induce other ac-
tors to do what they would not otherwise do (in accordance with the interests 
of the state exercising its power). Each international system has one structure 
and therefore one context of state action, which is defined by the general dis-
tribution of power in the system. 
For Keohane, the neorealist conceptualization of power and structure cre-
ates problems for the explanation of outcomes in international politics, as 
well as for predictions. The neorealist concept of power is overaggregated 
and state interests therefore underspecified (Keohane 1986b: 191). The con-
cept of power has to be modified, especially with regard to the relationship of 
power to the context of action. Keohane suggests a disaggregation of power 
resources by issue-areas (Keohane 1986b: 190). What does this mean for a 
theory of international politics? 
Issue areas in international politics include, for example, security, wel-
fare, freedom and environmental politics. To split international politics into 
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issue areas means to renounce the neorealist concept of international politics 
as one separate domain (dominated by security concerns). In neoinstitutional-
ist theory, different issue areas constitute different contexts of action. In fact, 
modifying the system means thinking of its structure in terms of several 
structures according to different issue areas. It has been suggested that such 
a disaggregation will enhance the ability to explain and to predict with the 
structural realist model of explanation (Keohane 1986b: 190).  
Thus, the concept of structure as developed by Waltz will remain a valua-
ble starting point. The question posed by Keohane is: how much should the 
concept of structure in a system’s level theory include? He is convinced that 
the concept requires greater complexity. The problem can only be solved by 
modifying the concept of structure to include the explanatory factors that are 
not found in Waltz’s concept of structure: further “elements” of the interna-
tional system. Neoinstitutionalist theory highlights the factors that Waltz 
downgrades or ignores: international (economic) interdependence and the 
role of international institutions. For systematic and didactical reasons we 
will return to this key issue at a later stage (Step 2). 
With regard to the concept of power, the emphasis similarly is on power 
resources as an explanation of outcomes in neoinstitutionalist theory. How-
ever, the assumption that power is fungible across different issue areas of 
world politics is rejected. Moreover, Keohane not only introduces a dis-
aggregated power model that differentiates between issues areas, but he also 
calls attention to links between issue areas that need to be understood sys-
tematically (Keohane 1986b: 189). 
Such a modification avoids the direct deduction of national interests from 
the (one) system’s structure simply on the basis of the rationality assumption. 
For Keohane, such a direct prediction of outcomes from assumed interests 
and an overall distribution of power would fail (Keohane 1986b: 190). State 
interests cannot be derived solely on the basis of rational calculation of the 
“external” positions of states. The implication of neoinstitutionalist critique is 
that the neorealist assumption of states seeking (at most) to maximize power 
is wrong: States do not always seek to maximize power. They will not do it, 
for example, when they are not “in danger”. Modifying the neorealist as-
sumption of states seeking to maximize power enables us to consider other, 
competing goals of states in international politics.  
The assumptions of neoinstitutionalist theory as a modified structural re-
alism are therefore: (Overview in Keohane 1986b: 194): 
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Assumptions of neoinstitutionalist theory 
1) States are the principal actors in world politics.  
2) Rationality assumption: world politics can be analyzed as though states 
were unitary rational actors that calculate the costs of alternative cours-
es of action and seek to maximize their expected utility across a set of 
ordered objectives. Like neorealism, neoinstitutionalist theory is based 
on microeconomic theory and seeks to explain an actor’s behavior by 
specifying a priori utility functions for actors. 
3) The neorealist assumption that states seek power and calculate their in-
terests accordingly will be modified. Power and influence are seen to be 
important state interests (as ends and means), but the implication that to 
seek power is always the overriding state interest is rejected: “Under 
different systemic conditions states will define their self-interest differ-
ently.” (Keohane 1986b: 194) 
4) Neoinstitutionalist theory is based on the assumption that the value of 
power resources for influencing state behavior depends on the goals of 
states: “Power resources are differentially effective across issue-areas…” 
(Keohane 1986b: 194). 
For the outcomes of international politics (the explanandum) this implies, 
that different patterns of outcomes in different issue areas can be anticipated 
with hypotheses. The differences have implications for the ability of actors to 
link issue areas and use power resources from one area to affect the results in 
another (Keohane 1986b: 195). We will return to this issue in Step 2, which 
is devoted to the neoinstitutionalist explanation of international politics. 
With regard to the level of analysis and in terms of concepts and assump-
tions, the modifications do not affect the fundamental belief that neoinstitu-
tionalism shares with neorealism, that a theory should be elaborated at the 
systems level. There are two reasons behind this belief: first, the context in 
which a state’s actions take place has to be appreciated before a state’s actual 
actions can be accounted for and second, because a “good structural theory” 
is easier to test than a theory at state level. It would therefore most effectively 
fulfill the requirements for acquiring scientific knowledge as stipulated by 
positivism according to Lakatos (Keohane 1986: 18; 1986b: 193). 
1.2. The objective and core question of neoinstitutionalist theory 
So far, we know that neoinstitutionalist theory aims to develop a systemic 
theory that is built on structural realism, but is also able to deal with the dif-
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ferences between issue areas and the implications these differences have for 
exercising power in order to reach state goals. The modified structural ap-
proach is seen as the basis for further systemic research.   
The following question lies at the core of neoinstitutionalist theory: 
“How can order be created out of anarchy without superordinate power 
(…)?” (Keohane 1986b: 199) Whereas in neorealist theory, order is created 
either by exercising power or by hegemony, neoinstitutionalist theory be-
lieves that the core problems of anarchy can be reduced under conditions of 
interdependence and through the institutionalization of international coop-
eration. What are the conditions for interstate cooperation? Why and how do 
states construct international institutions? Neoinstitutionalist theory there-
fore forms part of the research into questions of order in international poli-
tics. Theoretical work on international regimes is particularly devoted to 
these questions.  
Neoinstitutionalist theory also investigates the effects of international co-
operation and institutions on peace and stability in international politics, i.e. 
through questions relating to peaceful change: “Under what conditions will 
adaptations to shifts of power, e.g. in current technologies or in fundamental 
economic relationships, take place without severe economic disruption or 
warfare?” (Keohane 1986b: 198, 199)  
The outcomes of international politics to be explained here differ from 
those put forth in neorealism. Neorealism as a balance-of-power theory ex-
plains large-scale patterns of state action over long periods of time. It is an 
important approach to the study of conflict, bargaining and war (Keohane 
1986b: 188-170). In contrast, neoinstitutionalist theory seeks to explain out-
comes of international politics such as international cooperation and changes 
to the rules and institutions that regulate relations among governments in 
world politics. 
1.3. Normative perspective and significance of IR as policy analysis 
The issues of change and peaceful change are crucial for assessing the nor-
mative perspective at the heart of neoinstitutionalist theory. For Keohane, neo-
realist theory is unable to explain change and provides a pessimistic view of 
international politics (Keohane 1986: 18). Neoinstitutionalist theory strongly 
rejected the “pessimistic” neorealist view right from the start. “Reasons of 
humanity” define the need to find a way “out of the trap” of anarchy and pro-
vide hope for a stable world order: “If we are to promote peaceful change, we 
have to focus not only on the basic long-term forces that determine the shape 
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of world politics independently of the actions of particular decision-makers, 
but also on variables that can, to a certain extent, be manipulated by human 
action.” (Keohane 1986b: 199; my italics). These “variables” are internation-
al institutions and cooperation. They involve the calculation of state interests 
and can be influenced by political action. International institutions therefore 
have to be subjected to an investigation by the academic discipline IR. At the 
same time, they also form an issue of policy: “International relations must be 
a policy science as well as a theoretical activity” (Keohane 1986b: 198). 
Theory must be linked to practice in order to bring the insights of modified 
structural theory into the practice of international politics and solve contem-
porary world political problems.  
In short, neoinstituionalist theory sees itself as contributing toward a bet-
ter understanding of how to achieve cooperation and build international in-
stitutions. Dealing with international institutions will provide insights into 
processes of change. A strong normative belief exists that international co-
operation and institutions can reduce the effects of anarchy and bestow or-
der, peace and stability on the international system. In terms of the practice 
of international politics, this belief implies discontent with neorealist Real-
politik. The practical political implications of neoinstitutionalism indicate a 
need to devise new international institutions or regimes (beyond the nation 
state), and move towards changes in the principle of sovereignty (Keohane 
1986a: 25). 
1.4.  Summary 
The new elements of a modified structural realism are (1) the splitting of in-
ternational politics into issue areas, (2) the focus on international institutions 
and (3) the issue of peaceful change. 
Any given international system can consist of several structures that differ 
with respect to issue areas and according to the resources that can be used by 
states to affect outcomes. Here, military force is no longer assumed to be at 
the top of a hierarchy of power resources. In neorealist theory, states must 
enhance their power – this is the result of an anarchical international system, 
in which security is not guaranteed (self-help system). 
The starting points of neoinstitutionalist theory are different structural 
conditions for international politics: insecurity is reduced in a system in 
which interdependence is an additional structural feature. States can, but do 
not have to, strive for power. They are free to pursue other goals. States do 
not have to focus on security as the only or most important issue area but can 
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also define goals and objectives in other issue areas. This perspective of 
world politics results from the different assumptions and conceptualizations 
of the structural conditions of state action and state power in neoinstitutional-
ist theory. The modified structural research program offers a structural expla-
nation of the emergence of international rules and procedures, as well as of 
state compliance to those rules. The theoretical explanation of international 
politics is issue-area-specific. Different outcomes of international politics can 
thus be expected in different issue areas.  
Step 2: 
The neoinstitutionalist explanation of international politics 
Having established the neoinstitutionalist critique, its core question, basic con-
cepts, assumptions and normative perspective, we will now look at the neoinsti-
tutionalist explanation in more detail. This explanation cannot be understood 
without discussing the concept of interdependence from the first step.  
2.1. The concept of interdependence 
The neoinstitutionalist explanation starts by conceptualizing the rising levels 
of international interdependence in world politics in the 20th century. Interde-
pendence is a theory with a systemic, structural approach. The concept, de-
veloped in Power and Interdependence by Keohane and Nye in 1977, is pre-
sented as a systemic or structural feature of the international system that 
modifies the structural realist argument. Interdependence points to variations 
in systemic characteristics, such as mutual economic dependencies and dif-
ferent levels and quality of information in the international system.  
The theoretical modification discussed in Step 1.1. is easier to understand 
if Power and Interdependence in the real-world international politics of the 
1970s is “contextualized”. According to Keohane (1986b), the declared ob-
jective of neoinstitutionalist theory was to modify structural realism to “fit 
contemporary reality better” (193). “Contemporary reality” of the 1970s was 
dominated by two oil price shocks that caused a severe economic crisis in the 
Western industrialized world. These price shocks demonstrated the high lev-
els of interdependence among globally integrated national economies at that 
time and caused serious conflicts about the question of what was the “right” 
economic policy to manage the crises. Learning that unilateral, i.e. national, 
crisis management was powerless under conditions of interdependence was a 
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bitter political experience. It was during this time that global economic fo-
rums for the coordination of economic policy such as the G7 were born. 
Keohane and Nye had an explicit policy-oriented purpose for writing 
Power and Interdependence. Their intention was to optimize American for-
eign policy under the “new conditions” of interdependence (hence the subtitle 
World Politics in Transition). Against the backdrop of recognition that an 
“autonomy illusion” exists under conditions of economic interdependence, 
the realist perspective was criticized as inadequate for coping with the new 
realities. Keohane and Nye came to the conclusion that “(u)nilateral leader-
ship under the conditions of complex interdependence is (…) unlikely to be 
effective” (1977: 232). The objective was to formulate an alternative scien-
tific perspective for policy advice (Keohane/Nye 1975: 359, 1977: vii-viii, 
242). 
What is interdependence? In the words of Keohane and Nye (1977), “in-
terdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence” (Keo-
hane/Nye 1977: 8). In turn, interdependence has to be distinguished from “in-
terconnectedness”, which “…refers to the volume or frequency of communi-
cation, interaction, or exchange between two sociocultural systems. Intercon-
nectedness is most often expressed in the exchange of goods and services, i.e. 
in trade (…).” (Inkeles 1975: 469-470).  
The concept of interdependence emphasizes the political significance of 
these interactions: Interdependence is politically significant because it creates 
costs (Keohane/Nye 1977: 9). It is costly because it constrains autonomous 
state action: National political objectives (security, welfare) depend on the 
politics of all actors being part of the interdependent relationship. Interde-
pendence becomes particularly costly as soon as states in interdependent rela-
tionships become vulnerable: “Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s lia-
bility to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been 
altered.” (Keohane/Nye 1977: 13) Keohane and Nye (1977) posit that the 
vulnerability dimension of interdependence proves important and “particular-
ly relevant for the analysis of the structure of relations” (Keohane/Nye 1977: 
370, emphasis in the original). This argument will be taken up and developed 
further when looking at the politics of interdependence in more detail (Step 
2.2.). 
To sum up, interdependence is conceptualized as a structural feature of 
the international system. Interdependence is issue area-specific (remember 
the several- structures -argument). At the same time, mutual dependencies 
are central features of interrelations between particular (state) actors. The 
questions for Keohane/Nye are: What is the scope of state action under such 
conditions of interdependence? What should a successful “politics of interde-
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pendence” look like? The answer can be found through a critical engagement 
with neorealist theory. 
Self-study (1) 
Read chapters 1,2 and 3 of Power and Interdependence. World Politics in 
Transition written by Keohane/Nye (1977). Learn about the function the 
concept of “complex interdependence” as an “ideal type” has for theory 
building. 
2.2. Power and interdependence 
The core question of the book is an issue that relates to (American) foreign 
policy, i.e. how to exercise power under conditions of interdependence 
(hence the title). The question is relevant because conventional power cannot 
be used under conditions of interdependence: military force proves ineffec-
tive in such situations. In order to understand the answer given to this ques-
tion by Keohane and Nye, we have to understand the position of interdepend-
ence in the theoretical explanation. Interdependence as a systemic, structural 
feature is introduced as an intervening variable. It “works” between power 
(as the independent variable) and the outcomes of international politics (as 
the dependent variable). This “condition” changes the context and the struc-
ture of international bargaining processes. 
As we have seen already, neoinstitutionalist and neorealist theories are 
based on the assumption that states are rational actors and make rational 
choices in accordance with cost-benefit calculations. The neoinstitutionalist 
argument is that interdependence constrains the autonomy of states as actors. 
Due to the effects of interdependence as an intervening variable, it becomes 
impossible to “directly translate” power resources and political power into 
political outcomes. In terms of the distribution of power under conditions of 
interdependence, different issue areas of international politics have distinct 
structures. Mutual dependencies in issue areas are not necessarily symmet-
rical. Asymmetrical interdependence therefore constitutes an important 
source of power and enhances the state’s scope for less dependent action. 
States may be tempted to manipulate the international system in their own in-
terests. The problem exists on two levels: 
 
1) “From the foreign-policy standpoint, the problem facing individual gov-
ernments is how to benefit from international exchange while maintaining 
as much autonomy as possible.” 
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2) “From the perspective of the international system, the problem is how to 
generate and maintain a mutually beneficial pattern of cooperation in the 
face of competing efforts by governments (and non-governmental actors) 
to manipulate the system for their own benefit.” (Keohane/Nye 1987: 
730, my italics). 
 
Because unilateral action cannot be successful under conditions of interde-
pendence and against the background of declining American hegemony, 
Keohane and Nye suggest multilateral politics as a strategy of policy coordi-
nation and international leadership (Keohane/Nye 1977: 239). According to 
the two scholars, “multilateralism is based on action to induce other states to 
help stabilize an international regime”. (Keohane/Nye 1977: 231) 
In the politics of interdependence as suggested by Keohane and Nye, the 
US plays a leading role in establishing international policy coordination. This 
is based on the conviction that international cooperation and international in-
stitutions are the best means of achieving policy goals under conditions of in-
ternational interdependence. Keohane develops this argument further in After 
Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in International Politics (1984), in 
which he formulates regime theory. 
2.3. International cooperation, international institutions and the 
“civilization” of world politics  
Interdependence has two effects: first, under conditions of interdependence, 
military power becomes meaningless; and second, interdependence enhances 
the need for international cooperation. Under conditions of interdependence, 
states as rational actors have a strong interest in international cooperation and 
peaceful international politics. They seek not to enhance their power, but to 
achieve absolute gains. International cooperation is a win-win solution to col-
lective action problems in international politics. By cooperating, all parties in 
the interdependent relationship that is causing a collective action problem 
will be better off. 
Robert Axelrod has done some important work on cooperation among 
egoists under conditions of interdependence, which was modeled on the 
game of prisoner’s dilemma and published in his book The Evolution of Co-
operation (1984). In the book, Axelrod demonstrated that expectations about 
the future significantly influence the results of cooperation (“shadow of the 
future”) and that they will lead to stable patterns of cooperation. However, 
levels of uncertainty can inhibit the evolution of cooperation; information 
that reduces uncertainty thus constitutes an important factor in world politics. 
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International institutions can reduce uncertainty by providing information, 
therefore affecting international political behavior (Keohane 1986b: 195, 
196). Finally, stable cooperation will foster and increase interdependence 
again, as well as enhancing institutionalization in international politics. In the 
long term, institutionalization can be understood as an evolutionary process 
in the construction of a peaceful world order that will lead to a “transfor-
mation” of anarchy. Anarchy will continue to persist as a structural feature of 
international politics but, in the long run, this will develop into “regulated an-
archy” and world politics will become “civilized”.  
Self-study (2) 
Expand what you have learned about the role of cooperation and institu-
tions in international politics. First, please read chapters 4, 5 and 6 of Keo-
hane 1984: After Hegemony. Then return to the text and read the key as-
pects and review questions below.  
Step 3: 
Check your understanding: key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
 Neoinstitutionalist theory 
Core question • Chances of cooperation in an anarchical internation-
al system, peaceful change 
Assumptions about actors 
and structure 
• States as unitary actors and the most important ac-
tors in international politics (interest-based institu-
tionalism) 
• Rationality assumption 
• Anarchy 
• No hierarchy of actor’s/state goals 
“Agency and structure” • Actors ontologically prior to structure (ontological 
individualism) 
• Actors (states) construct international institutions 
• Institutions (such as regimes and international or-
ganizations) as structural features of the internation-
al system 
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 Neoinstitutionalist theory 
Type of explanation and 
notion of causality 
• Agency-centered explanation: causal explanation of 
cooperative outcomes in international politics in 
terms of actors’ rational actions (methodological in-
dividualism)  
• Structure of international system, defined as distribu-
tion of actor’s capabilities (independent variable) ex-
plains state behavior (dependent variable): but dif-
ferent outcomes across issue areas because of inter-
dependence (intervening variable) 
• Interdependence as a “structural constraint” of state 
action (intervening variable): Interdependence de-
fined in terms of political significance (costs) for indi-
vidual actors/states (methodological individualism) 
Approach to 
„levels of analysis“ 
• System level 
Philosophy of science • Positivism  
Normative perspective • Cooperation and institution-building desirable be-
cause of collectively useful political outcomes (win-
win solutions in security, welfare, environment etc.) 
• Optimism and belief in progress. Civilization of in-
ternational politics through institutionalization. 
• Transformation of anarchy: anarchy becomes “regu-
lated anarchy”. 
Theory and practice/role of 
the scientist  
• Social scientists provide objective knowledge about 
international politics.  
• Objective knowledge used for policy recommenda-
tion: politics of interdependence, multilateralism and 
international cooperation. 
Review questions 
1. Compare the assumptions made in neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theo-
ry. Reflect on reasons for commonalities and differences.  
2. What is the core question of the neoinstitutionalist research program? 
Compare it to that of neorealist theory. 
3. Explain “interdependence” a) as a real-world phenomenon of internation-
al politics and b) as an analytical concept. What function does interde-
pendence as an analytical concept have in the neoinstitutionalist model of 
explanation? 
4. Outline the neoinstitutionalist explanation of international politics. 
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Step 4: 
Final self-study and consolidation 
 
Self-study (3)  
Try to explain the increasing number and scope of international organiza-
tions in the 20th and 21st century from a neoinstitutionalist point of view. 
Self-study (4) 
What kind of policy advice for the practice of international politics would 
be given from a neoinstitutionalist perspective? Discuss against the back-
ground of the positivist claim to provide “objective knowledge”. 
Required readings 
Keohane, Robert O./Nye, Joseph 2001 (1977): Power and Interdependence. World Politics 
in Transition. 3rd. ed. New York: Longman, chapters 1,2,3. 
Keohane, Robert O. (1984): After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Polit-
ical Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapters 4,5,6. 
Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 1997: Theories of international regimes. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, chapters 4 and 5. 
Hall, Peter/Taylor, Rosemary 1996: Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms, 
in: Political Studies 44: 5, 936-957. 
Supplementary readings 
Axelrod, Robert 1984: The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Baldwin, David (ed.) 1993: Neorealism and Neoliberalism. The contemporary debate. New 
York: Columbia University Press 
Keohane, Robert O. 1986a: Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics, in: Keo-
hane, Robert O. (ed.): Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1-26. 
Keohane, Robert O. 1986b: Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in: 
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 158-203. 
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.) 1986: Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia Universi-
ty Press 
Koremos, Barbara/Lipson, Charles/Snidal, Duncan 2001: The Rational Design of Interna-
tional Institutions. 
Spindler, Manuela 2013: Interdependence, in Schieder, Siegfried/Spindler, Manuela (eds.): 
Theories of International Relations. London and New York: Routledge (forthcoming). 
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Introduction 
Following our criteria for a structured learning process for theoretical ap-
proaches to IR, this unit will introduce you to the third approach presented in 
Part II: new liberal theory in International Relations. 
Within the discipline, a great deal of controversy exists concerning the 
term “liberal theory”. You will become aware of a variety of usages when 
you have taken a closer look at the textbooks, where you will find such dif-
fering “labels” for liberal theory as, “domestic theories of international poli-
tics” (Putnam 1988), “theories of state-society relations” (Moravcsik 1993), 
“pluralism” (Viotti/Kauppi 2005), “second image approach” (Waltz 1959) or 
“reductionist theories” (Waltz 1979).  
From our discussions in unit 5 (neorealist theory), you are already famil-
iar with the basic criticism of “reductionist” approaches as expressed by 
Waltz as well as with core neorealist arguments on why a theory of interna-
tional politics should be a system-level theory. From the conceptual tool 
“levels of analysis” introduced in unit 4, we know that “reductionist” theories 
provide explanations for outcomes in international politics at the level of the 
state. They do so by drawing attention to explanatory factors at the unit level, 
i.e. to all the “attributes”, which Waltz suggested we omit in order to con-
struct a system-level theory. Taking the neorealist perspective as the starting 
point, liberal approaches would fall into this group of “reductionist” theories. 
Liberal thinking has a long intellectual tradition. The term “liberal” points 
to the roots of liberal theory in the European Enlightenment, as well as to the 
liberal theory of politics/political liberalism. Immanuel Kant (The perpetual 
peace, 1795), already known to us as an intellectual precursor of institution-
alist thinking in International Relations, also belongs to the “liberal tradi-
tion”. Kant believed that a “republican constitution” of states is the first and 
most important requirement for stable and peaceful inter-state relations. We 
will come back to his arguments when discussing the (liberal) theory of inter-
democratic peace. The core argument here is one of a causal link between a 
liberal type of political order within the state and that state’s foreign policy 
and international politics. Peace and international cooperation as outcomes of 
international politics are more likely to exist among states with a liberal do-
mestic order. Other well-known contributors to liberal theory in international 
economics and international politics are Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and 
Woodrow Wilson. In their philosophical, economic and political thinking, 
these “liberals” drew important conclusions about the relationship between 
internal (domestic) factors and foreign policy behavior. What the intellectual 
precursors of liberal theory had in common was a normative perspective that 
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a “civilization of international politics” was desirable and societal progress 
possible. For this reason, they have often either been acclaimed as “idealists” 
or have had their approaches labeled as “utopian”, in particular by the realist 
“camp”. Owing to these intellectuals’ strong normative commitments, which 
sometimes come close to political ideology, social science has not really clas-
sified their work as “theories”. 
However, liberal theory in the 20th and 21st century has been built explic-
itly on these early ideas. Attempts have been made to develop coherent theo-
retical programs in accordance with the dominant positivist ideal in social 
science. The label “liberal”, in the most basic understanding, encompasses 
those theories that explain outcomes of international politics by referring to 
domestic actors, structures and processes. It goes back to neofunctionalism 
as a theory of regional integration (Ernst Haas), the work of Graham T. Al-
lison on bureaucratic politics (Allison 1971), the transnationalist theory of 
Keohane/Nye and the early works of James Rosenau. Bruce Russett, Michael 
Doyle, Robert Putnam, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Andrew Moravcsik also 
made important contributions to liberal theory in contemporary International 
Relations. In the German-speaking world, the works of Ernst Otto Czempiel 
(1979, 1981) and Thomas Risse are associated with a liberal perspective on 
international politics. What these works have in common is a pluralist, liberal 
conception of state and society.  
However, liberal theory in IR is diverse and different strands of contem-
porary liberal theory can be distinguished by the particular factors that are 
expected to shape foreign policy behavior. Zacher/Matthew (1995: 120-137), 
for example, distinguish republican liberalism, commercial liberalism, mili-
tary liberalism and sociological liberalism, just to mention the most im-
portant strands. To briefly illustrate the differences: whereas republican liber-
alism makes a statement about democratic states being more peaceful and 
more cooperative in their foreign policy than non-democratic states, sociolog-
ical liberalism points to the impact of communication flows and cultural pat-
terns on state’s ability to cooperate. The latter was pioneered by Karl Deutsch 
(1953, 1957). Others point to the impact of transnational relations on the co-
operative behavior of states and analyze how transnational relationships pres-
sure governments into seeking cooperative solutions to problems in interna-
tional politics (for example, Keohane/Nye 1970). We will come back to these 
different strands in Step 2. 
Whereas, for a long period of time, neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theory 
dominated IR and liberal thinking was marginalized, there has been a “renais-
sance” of liberal theory since the 1990s. The real-world background to this 
“renaissance” of liberal approaches is the end of the Cold War and the “implo-
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sion” of communist regimes in Middle and Eastern Europe. No “event” in in-
ternational politics has revealed the importance of societal actors (inside the 
state) for the conduct of international politics more strongly (Risse-Kappen 
1994). The failure of neorealism and neoinstitutionalism to predict the break-
down of the Eastern bloc resulted in the empowerment of those approaches that 
attempt to explain international politics by looking “inside the state”. 
Credit for bringing liberal theory back into the center of IR theory belongs, 
in particular, to Andrew Moravcsik. His theoretical project is the reformulation 
of liberal theory in a non-ideological and non-utopian way, making it a system-
atic theory of international politics (1993, 1997). His intention was to put liber-
al theory as an empirical social science on a par with neorealist and neoinstitu-
tionalist theory within IR (1997: 513). For the purpose of our book, Moravc-
sik’s “new liberalism” (Moravcsik 2008; Schieder 2013) is of particular interest 
as it represents the most advanced attempt to formulate a “scientific” liberal 
theory of IR (please recall our discussions in Units 2 and 3 on what counts as 
“scientific” theory in International Relations). Additionally, Moravcsik’s work 
leaves behind the “level-of-analysis problem”, constructing a liberal theory that 
– while starting with the domestic level in the “classic” liberal way – also pro-
vides a systemic explanation of international politics. This liberal theory thus 
draws level with neorealist and neoinstitutionalists explanations of international 
politics (Moravcsik 2008). With this reformulation, liberal theory enters the 
stage of general, scientific theoretical approaches to International Relations. 
New liberalism thus becomes a fascinating “candidate” within the group of 
theoretical approaches that form the center of our book. 
The terms “new liberalism” or “new liberal theory” will be used through-
out the chapter. They refer to new liberalism as a general, scientific theoreti-
cal approach, as developed by Andrew Moravcsik.  
Step 1: 
New liberalism as a “positive” IR theory: assumptions about 
actors and structures 
New liberalism has been reformulated in line with the idea of IR as a positive 
social science (Moravcsik 1997: 514). The basis of Moravcsik’s theory is the 
clear distinction between liberal philosophers or classical liberal publicists, 
and liberal social scientists (Moravcsik 2008: 236). It begins with the basic 
liberal insight already mentioned in the introduction: the liberal claim of the 
centrality of state-society relations to world politics (Moravcsik 1997: 515). 
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State-society relations are the relationships of states to the domestic and 
transnational social context in which they are embedded. The domestic and 
transnational social context is assumed to have an impact on the behavior of a 
state in international politics: state preferences are derived from domestic and 
transnational social pressure and demands (Moravcsik 2008: 236). Those 
demands in turn influence the “social purposes” that underlie state prefer-
ences (Moravcsik 1997: 516). 
In attempting to reformulate liberal theory as a social scientific theory, 
this basic liberal insight is first “translated” into premises in order to ground 
liberal theory in a set of social scientific assumptions. There are three “posi-
tive” assumptions which concern the nature of social actors, the state, and 
the international system. These assumptions give rise to the arguments, ex-
planations and predictions of a new liberal theory (Moravcsik 1997: 514).  
Before exploring these arguments and explanations in detail in Step 2, let 
us first begin with the assumptions underlying new liberal theory. 
1.1. Assumptions about social actors 
The first assumption of new liberal theory is the primacy of societal actors: 
individuals and groups of individuals are assumed to be the most important 
actors in international politics (Moravcsik 1997: 516-517; 2008: 236-237). 
This ontological individualist assumption is based on the pluralist conception 
that society is characterized by competing interests, conflicting values and 
variations in influence, i.e. a plurality of public actors, private actors and civil 
society. Society is understood as a collection of individuals and groups who 
act rationally in their pursuit of material and ideal welfare. Individuals define 
their interests independently of politics and then try to force their interests on 
the political agenda. Consequently, in the analysis, the differing interests and 
demands of individuals and societal groups are treated as though they come 
before politics. In this way, new liberalism gives a bottom-up-view of inter-
national politics: a “pluralist” view of individuals and groups that define ma-
terial and ideational goals and attempt to realize them at the political level 
(AFTER having defined their material and ideational interests).  
But where do the material and ideational goals of social actors arise? The 
“source” of the social interests relevant to the study of international politics is 
globalization. Globalization – defined economically, socially and culturally – 
has an impact on the interests and preferences of social actors. Individuals and 
groups have demands with regard to international affairs. Such demands could 
be a different arrangement of the economic, cultural, social and political “or-
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der”, an order that is in the social actor’s best interests. In liberal theory, the 
demands of social actors are treated as variables, which can change owing to 
the fact that globalization produces “winners” and “losers”. Globalization has 
consequences in terms of distributional effects on societies. Competing or con-
flicting societal demands on a state’s “management of globalization” can there-
fore be assumed. Thus domestic actors (individuals and groups) aim to influ-
ence the foreign policy of their states und so shape outcomes in international 
politics in a way that best matches their interests and goals. These actors have 
different goals and the power to force their goals onto the political agenda. 
For the liberal explanation, this means that domestic actors are the most 
important factors in explaining foreign policy and the behavior of states in in-
ternational politics. Which actors prevail and are instrumental in determining 
foreign policy and with which goals, are dependent on a state’s internal 
structures (sub-systemic or “domestic” structures). 
1.2. Assumptions about domestic structures: assumptions about 
the state 
It may come as a surprise that the first point raised under the headline “as-
sumptions about structures” is an assumption about the nature of the state it-
self. In our units on neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theory, assumptions 
about structures have been assumptions about the actual international system. 
Assumptions about the state, on the other hand, have been assumptions about 
actors in international politics.  
This pattern differs in new liberal theory; here, states are assumed to be 
representative institutions, not actors (Moravcsik 1997: 518-520; 2008: 237-
239). The state as a representative institution represents the parts of domestic 
society whose interests shape the definition of state preferences (see Step 1.1, 
Assumptions about actors). The state as representative institution forms a 
“transmission belt” that “translates” the preferences of individuals and groups 
into foreign policy. The sub-systemic, intra-state structures have selective ef-
fects which influence the choice of actors that will be successful in shaping 
the political agenda. In this manner, sub-systemic structures impact foreign 
policy through their selective effects.  
Different sub-systemic structures can be formed either as a result of the 
type of socio-economic organization (modern or traditional societies) or the 
type of political order (liberal democratic states or non-democratic, autocratic 
or authoritarian states). The different ways in which internal decision-making 
processes and interest intermediation are organized (for example, pluralist or 
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corporatist structures) also result in varied structures. These differences in 
sub-systemic structures have implications for power relations, i.e. power dis-
tribution between state and society. The power of the state in state-society re-
lations is crucial; there can be a “strong” state with a highly centralized state 
apparatus or a “weak”, fragmented state with federalized or decentralized 
state functions. In new liberal theory, differences in the type of democracy 
(such as consensus democracy or majoritarian democracy, according to a 
well-known differentiation drawn by Lijphart, 1999) could be relevant for the 
final explanation of outcomes in international politics.  
In terms of structures, this means that in liberal theory the most relevant 
structures are domestic, sub-systemic structures. These are the structures of 
the state and of society. Anarchy is not the dominating structure in explaining 
either outcomes in international politics (as we have learned in our unit on 
neorealist theory) or interdependence as a systemic structural feature (as in 
neoinstitutionalist theory).  
State preferences are derived from social preferences through the selec-
tive effects of sub-systemic structures. Political action is therefore “embed-
ded” in domestic and transnational civil society. State preferences are en-
dogenized in new liberal theory. This endogenicity contrasts with neoinstitu-
tionalist and neorealist theory, in which state interests are treated as “exoge-
nous” or “given”. In new liberal theory, the state (as a representative institu-
tion) serves to aggregate domestic interests before presenting them to the out-
side. State preferences are FIRST derived from social preferences; only 
THEN does the state present these preferences to the outside. State prefer-
ences are instrumental in managing globalization – the “source” of social in-
terests that is relevant to the study of international politics (1.1). In the words 
of Moravcsik, “states act instrumentally in world politics to achieve particu-
lar goals on behalf of individuals, whose private behavior is unable to 
achieve such ends as efficiently.” (Moravcsik 2008: 237)  
However, this raises another question: what happens once states present 
their preferences to the outside? 
1.3. Assumptions about the nature of the international system 
We now enter into the realm of international politics, where states present 
the preferences they have derived from societal actors – this is the outside. 
AFTER the foreign policy preferences have evolved in the internal decision-
making processes, the governments then interact on the international scene. 
The “outside” is the international system in which states interact, negotiate, 
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cooperate or interfere (the outcomes in international politics are e.g. conflict, 
war, cooperation). The point here is to show how the sub-systemic structures 
and the preferences they brought about relate to each other, i.e. the constella-
tion of structures and preferences. New liberal theory assumes the nature of 
the international system to be a “constellation” of sub-systemic structures 
characterized by a “configuration” of interdependent state preferences (Mo-
ravcsik 1997: 520-524; 2008: 239-240). This “configuration” of interdepend-
ent state preferences shapes international political interaction. This is where 
similarities or differences in sub-systemic structures and state preferences are 
significant for outcomes in international politics. A state’s actual behavior in 
international politics then depends on the constellation of sub-systemic struc-
tures and the foreign policy goals of all interacting states. Whether or not in-
teracting states share preferences defines the scope of the cooperation or con-
flict among those states. For example, transparent internal decision-making 
processes enhance the tendency to cooperate. The relevant internal structures 
here are the role of the public, checks and balances and the rule of law. These 
internal structures all serve to reduce uncertainty and mistrust and their ef-
fects. They thereby build confidence. However, this generalization only ap-
plies when all interacting states have similar internal structures. The resulting 
effect is then mutual trust, which reduces the dilemma in international poli-
tics and contributes towards peace, cooperation and stability. In neo-
institutionalist theory, this effect is due to international institutions. In new 
liberal theory, on the other hand, it is due to the constellation of those sub-
systemic structures that are conducive to peace and international cooperation. 
The crucial link between state preferences and state behavior is the con-
cept of “policy interdependence”. Policy interdependence refers to a particu-
lar configuration of state preferences. Here Moravcsik adopts the classical 
definition of interdependence developed by Keohane and Nye (1977): the 
pursuit of state preferences under conditions of interdependence imposes 
costs upon other states (Moravcsik 2008: 239). In new liberal theory, besides 
the sub-systemic structures of the state, the pattern of interdependent prefer-
ences forms one of the most important significant structures in the new liber-
al explanation. This pattern of interdependent state preferences influences 
state behavior in international politics. Such a structure of policy interde-
pendence is defined by the extent to which basic national goals are compati-
ble. “The lower the net gains and the greater the distributional conflict, 
whereby the realization of interests by a dominant social group in one coun-
try necessarily impose costs on dominant social groups in other countries, the 
greater the potential for interstate tension and conflict” (Moravcsik 2008: 
239, emphasis in the original). In contrast, the incentives for international 
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policy coordination or convergence are greater where policy coordination 
generates mutual gains (with low distributive consequences). 
We can think of different preference constellations, such as harmony, 
conflict and interdependence (Moravcsik 1997: 520f). Harmony offers the 
best chance of cooperation because state preferences are similar. Under con-
ditions of interdependence states have to cooperate in order to realize their 
goals (comparable to the neoinstitutionalist concept of interdependence). 
Whether interdependence, conflict or harmony prevails as a preference con-
stellation depends on societal goals and internal selection processes within 
the state (as a representative institution). 
The concept of policy interdependence is considered to be a distinctive 
conception of inter-state power (Moravcsik 2008: 239). At the heart of this 
concept lies variation in state preferences, not variation in capabilities (neo-
realism). This is why, from the new liberal perspective, the plea for “Taking 
preferences seriously” (the title of Moravcsik’s work 1997) marks the start to 
bringing a reformulated liberal theory back to IR. Particular preferences have 
to be theorized and explained, not assumed (Moravcsik 2008: 250). 
To sum up, whereas in domestic politics the state is a representative insti-
tution (structure) representing coalitions of interests, in international politics 
the state is a purposive actor. 
 
Assumptions of new liberal theory at a glance 
• Social actors (individuals and groups of individuals) are the most im-
portant actors in international politics. 
• Political outcomes in international politics can only be explained by 
looking “inside” the state: domestic actors, structures and processes 
(state-society relations). 
• States are not unitary actors: states act as “representative institutions”. 
State preferences are derived from sub-systemic structures and social in-
terests. 
• State actions present the preferences of the most powerful social actors 
capable of shaping the political agenda to the outside. 
• Policy interdependence in the international system: outcomes in interna-




New liberalism as a general theoretical approach to IR 
2.1. The new liberal explanation and prediction of international 
politics 
At the core of new liberal theory lies the issue of finding general explanations 
for international cooperation, conflict and war as systemic phenomena in in-
ternational politics. Moravcsik aims to formulate a general theory of IR that 
applies equally to liberal and non-liberal states, economic and security poli-
tics, conflict and non-conflictual situations, as well as to the behavior of indi-
vidual states (foreign policy) and “aggregations” of states (international rela-
tions). New liberalism therefore competes with neoinstitutionalist and neore-
alist explanations as a general theory of IR (Moravcsik 1997: 515-516). 
Based on the assumed primacy of societal actors, new liberal theory is inter-
ested in the conditions under which the behavior of self-interested social ac-
tors will bring about cooperation or conflict in international politics. Accord-
ing to the new liberal explanation, the cause of these outcomes in interna-
tional politics is variation in state preferences (independent variable). The 
dependent variable is the outcome in international politics: i.e. conflict or co-
operation? New liberal theory therefore provides a unicausal explanation 
based on variation in state preferences. Accordingly, peace and international 
cooperation thus depend on the constellation of state preferences. These con-
stellations are brought about by interacting states whose internal structures 
produce cooperative foreign policy. Such states comply with agreed-upon 
rules without requiring control or sanctions by an international institution 
(neoinstitutionalism) or a hegemon (neorealism). 
What matters in the new liberal explanation is the variation in the substan-
tive content of foreign policy across issues, regions or international orders 
(Moravcsik 2008: 246). The “substantive content” could be economic inter-
ests, environmental protection, human rights or different goals and institution-
al designs of international regimes and organizations. By focusing on the 
“content” of foreign policy, it is even possible to account for “altruistic” goals 
in international politics. This contrasts with neoinstitutionalist theory, which 
does not specify actors’ exact goals but simply assumes that rational actors 
have an interest in absolute gains. New liberal theory, however, is not only in-
terested in the fact THAT states cooperate by constructing international re-
gimes to cope with climate change, but also in HOW states purse a policy of 
climate change, for example, through state prohibitions or tradable emission 
permits. It is here that the interests of social actors matter; the answer to the 
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“how”-question depends on the dominant internal policy preferences (eco-
nomic actors, environmental NGOs, etc.). Such an approach can explain why 
OECD countries have protectionist agricultural trade policy, but also an 
“open” industrial trade policy (Moravcsik 2008: 246). According to Moravc-
sik, “[T]he stronger the aggregate benefit from social interactions across bor-
ders, the greater the demand to engage in such interactions” (Moravcsik 2008: 
236). For this reason, corporations lobby for (or against) trade liberalization – 
depending on how much they can gain (or lose) by opening an economy to the 
outside. Helen Milner (1988) has contributed some important work on these 
and similar political-economic issues in international trade. 
In short, from the new liberal perspective, the fundamental problems of 
international anarchy must be addressed by focusing an analysis on factors 
inside the state. It is not anarchy, as a structural condition in the international 
system, that produces the problems of international politics, but rather the 
states and societies that constitute this anarchical system and which must in-
teract in international politics. New liberal theory attempts to explain even 
long-term historical change in world politics by creating a causal link be-
tween long-term economic, political and social transformations and state be-
havior (Moravcsik 2008: 247). New liberal analysis should be able to predict 
war and peace, as well as such political-economic outcomes as trade liberali-
zation and trade protection.  
 




Government: Foreign Policy 
State 




(individual actors/interest groups/civil society etc.) 
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Self-study (1)  
Now read Moravcsik 1997 and Matthew/Zacher 1995. Their texts give an 
overview of different strands of liberal theory. What distinguishes the dif-
ferent variants of new liberal theory? Draw the line of causality for each 
variant of new liberal explanation: show the dependent variable, the inde-
pendent variable and the causal relationship between the two.  
2.2. Levels-of analysis in new liberalism: The logic of two-level-
games 
New liberal theory goes beyond “traditional” liberal theory in that it extends 
analysis beyond the sub-systemic state level towards the systemic level of the 
international system. Whereas “traditional” liberalism is a sub-systemic theory, 
new liberalism provides a step-by-step explanation in that it refers first to the 
state and then to the system level. The explanation is systemic (second step) in 
the sense of Waltz’s neorealist theory because the constellation, or “distribu-
tion”, of state preferences – comparable to the distribution of capabilities in ne-
orealism – is perceived as an “attribute” of the international system (Moravcsik 
2008: 248; as discussed in Step 1.3). This “distribution” cannot be controlled 
by the state. Constraints are imposed on a state’s behavior by the preferences of 
other states (via “policy interdependence”). Similar to neorealist theory, the 
theory employs a “configuration” to explain state behavior, i.e. how states stand 
in relation to each other (Moravcsik 2008: 248). However, state preferences 
have their sources in domestic society. According to Moravcsik, the “manage-
ment of globalization” (Moravcsik 2008: 249) lies at the core of foreign policy 
and international politics. “Managing globalization” means managing the re-
sults of interactions between societies. Moravcsik views this management as 
being a “systemic quality” (Moravcsik 2008: 249). 
Therefore, in new liberalism, the concept of “levels of analysis” does not 
make sense in the study of international politics (Moravcsik 2008: 249). In 
fact, as there is no boundary between domestic and systemic levels of analy-
sis in new liberal theory, international negotiations take place under both sub-
systemic and systemic constraints. They must therefore be analyzed as “two-
level games” (Putnam 1988): governments must bargain with each other 




Now read Putnam 1988. What is the “logic” of two-level games? 
2.3. New liberalism as a contribution to multi-causal explanations  
For Moravcsik, new liberal theory demonstrates that there is no “superiority” 
of systemic theories in IR. He criticizes the fact that over a long period of 
time the “image” of domestic theories was that they could only be used to 
explain those “anomalies” in international politics that could not be explained 
by a systemic theory. Moravcsik regards this as being inconsistent with the 
rationality assumption and empirically biased (Moravcsik 2008: 251). In-
stead, he holds that the converse is true: new liberal theory is “analytically 
prior” to neorealism and institutionalism because liberal theory defines the 
conditions upon which the assumptions of neorealism and neoinstitutionalism 
are based (Moravcsik 1997: 515-516). State behavior must be modeled in a 
multi-causal manner, as a “multi-stage process of constrained social choice” 
(Moravcsik 2008: 250). This kind of stage-model gives precedence to the 
variation in state preferences. States first define the state preferences and only 
then do they become engaged in bargaining processes and negotiations. This 
can be explained by liberal theories of state-society relations. Preferences 
therefore take analytical priority over strategic action and only after this do 
states reach agreement on institutional solutions, which can be explained by 
realists, institutionalists, and new liberal theories of strategic interaction (Mo-
ravcsik 2008: 250). This order means that the role of strategic factors, such as 
power and information, comes last. Moravcsik is convinced that new liberal-
ism can be synthesized with other theories to form a multi-causal explanation 
that is consistent with social theory (Moravcsik 1997: 515-516; 2008: 235).  
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Step 3: 
Check your understanding: key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
 New liberal theory 
Core question • Explanations of outcomes in international politics: 
cooperation and peace, conflict and war.  
Ontological assumptions 
about actors and structure 
• Social actors (individuals and groups of individuals) 
are the most important actors in international poli-
tics (ontological individualism). 
• Rationality assumption 
• States as “representative institutions”/structure 
“Agency and structure” • Individuals and groups with interests ontologically 
and epistemologically prior to politics: demands of a 
“management of globalization” through the state 
• Structures and processes in international politics as 
the result of social action (individuals, social groups, 
etc.): ontological individualism and methodological 
individualist, agency-centered explanation. 
Nature of explanation and 
causality 
• Political outcomes in international politics (coopera-
tion, peace) can only be explained by looking “in-
side” the state, to individual societal actor’s inter-
ests: outcomes causally explained in terms of the in-
terests of domestic social actors (methodological in-
dividualism, agency-centered explanation) 
Level of analysis • State (sub-systemic) level and system level 
Philosophy of science • Positivism   
Normative perspective Self-Study (3a) 




1. What is “new” in new liberal theory compared to “traditional” liberal ap-
proaches? 
2. What are the assumptions of new liberalism in regard to the relevant ac-
tors and the state? Compare to neorealist and neoinstitutionalist theory. 
3. Discuss the relevance of the “level-of-analysis problem” for new liberal 
theory. 
4. Outline causality according to the new liberal explanation. 
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Step 4: 
Final self-study and consolidation 
Self-Study (3)  
Reflect on what you have learned in this unit and fill in the missing blanks 
in the key aspects. 
Self-study (4) 
Re-read Unit 2 of Part 1 and then return to this unit: Why, from a philoso-
phy of science perspective, can neorealist, neoinstitutionalist and new lib-
eral theory all claim to be based on ontological individualist and methodo-
logical individualist assumptions? Why can all three theories of IR claim 
to offer methodological individualist, agency-centered explanations of in-
ternational politics? 
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Introduction 
After our learning units on neorealist, neoinstitutionalist and new liberal the-
ory in IR, you are now familiar with three examples of theoretical approaches 
based on a positivist philosophy of (social) science. With regards to philoso-
phy of science criteria, these theories share an individualist ontology, meth-
odological individualism, and a strong commitment to causal explanation. 
However, as could be demonstrated, variances in the underlying (ontological-
ly positivist) assumptions have implications for how outcomes in internation-
al politics are explained and for the policy advice that would be given based 
on each perspective.  
Having discussed these three theories, Unit 8 and Unit 9 will introduce 
two approaches that differ with regard to their major ontological as well as 
epistemological and methodological assumptions: world-systems analysis 
and social constructivist theory. In accordance with our criteria for the struc-
tured learning of theoretical approaches to IR, you will now learn about the 
specifics of world-systems analysis as a holistic and structuralist approach to 
the social reality of international politics. 
Before we start please re-read Unit 2, Step 2 (Positivism as an example 
for a philosophy of science) and Unit 4, Step 2.3. (Assumptions about agency 
and structure). Review the features that define positivism as a philosophy of 
science, i.e. its ontological, epistemological and methodological claims, and 
the different solutions to the agent-structure problem in the social sciences. 
World-systems analysis is a theoretical perspective of international rela-
tions that began in the early 1970s. It developed from a critique of the posi-
tivist accounts of social sciences found at the heart of IR. You will notice that 
representatives of the approach carefully avoid the term “theory”. World-
systems analysis claims not to be a theory about the social world but is in-
stead understood to be “a protest against the ways in which social scientific 
inquiry was structured for all of us at its inception in the middle of the nine-
teenth century” (Wallerstein 2000: 129). As such, it is based on a fundamen-
tal critique of the a priori assumptions of positivist social science. The argu-
ment is that a positivist social science leads to the exclusion of the most im-
portant questions of social reality. Recall our discussion from the second unit 
in Part I on the implications that different philosophies of science have for 
the study of international politics. By learning about world-systems analysis, 
a particular non-positivist approach to IR that basically refers to the work of 
Immanuel Wallerstein, we can now investigate such questions in more detail. 
The intellectual roots of this perspective are found in the works of Frantz 
Fanon, Fernand Braudel, Ilya Prigogine, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Joseph 
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Schumpeter, and Karl Polanyi. However, world-systems analysis is a school 
of thought that encompasses further scholars and world-systems analysts, 
such as Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter J. 
Taylor (you will find a list of their works in the bibliographical guide in the 
section headed “consolidation”). 
The intellectual context for the development of world-systems analysis is 
Wallerstein’s engagement with four debates in the social sciences (Waller-
stein 2004: 11-22):  
The first of these relates to the discussions on underdevelopment as a 
consequence of capitalist development. The concept of core-periphery, as 
developed in the 1960s by Raúl Prebisch, the first executive secretary of the 
UN Commission for Latin America (ECLA), and the dependency theory (as 
formulated by Andre Gunder Frank) both had major impacts on Wallerstein’s 
thought. In contrast to the dominant liberal economic theory, which claimed 
that comparative advantages – and therefore international trade – enhanced 
welfare for all, the concept of core-periphery views international trade as be-
ing an “unequal exchange” with surplus value flowing in one direction only, 
i.e. from the periphery (the Third world) to the core (the developed world). 
For the dependency theory, the free trade promoted by the core states and 
their multinational corporations renders the periphery ever more dependent 
and results in a “development of underdevelopment”.  
The second debate that influenced Wallerstein’s thinking was the debate 
on Marx’s concept of an “Asian mode of production”. His observation of the 
particular mode of production found in the large empires in China and India 
was not consistent with the idea of the linear progression of capitalist devel-
opment. The debate questioned the idea of inevitable stages of development 
and therefore developmentalism as an analytical framework and form of poli-
cy advice.  
The third source for Wallerstein’s work was the controversy among West 
European historians regarding the transition from feudalism to capitalism. At 
its core was the question of the origins of modern capitalism and how to 
study them: can the transition from feudalism to capitalism be explained by 
studying countries or larger units? 
Finally, Wallerstein’s work is strongly influenced by the so-called An-
nales School of historiography, which emerged in the 1920s in France and 
became influential after 1945. Scholars of the Annales School shared the per-
spective of a “total” historiography, i.e. viewing historical developments in 
terms of an “integrated picture” with a strong emphasis on the economic and 
social underpinnings of historical development. For Annales scholars, long-
term generalizations of historical phenomena are both possible and desirable.  
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For Wallerstein, the synthesis of these four separate debates is a funda-
mental critique of the existing structures of knowledge. This view was im-
posed in the 1970s by the 1968 revolutions and the epistemological discus-
sions of the social sciences (Wallerstein 2004: 16-17). The intention behind 
the formulation of world-systems analysis was to address questions on the 
unit of analysis for social science and social “temporality” and to remove the 
barriers between the different social science disciplines. 
However, Wallerstein still denounces the dialogue with positivist ac-
counts of social sciences as a “dialogue of the deaf” (Wallerstein 2004: 19). 
Indeed, world-systems analysis is noticeably missing in most books on IR 
theory. This is a regrettable neglect of a complex and insightful theoretical 
approach to international politics that is well worthy of discussion. 
Step 1: 
World-systems analysis: ontological, epistemological and 
methodological claims 
In Part 1, it was noted that those who reject positivist IR theory do not neces-
sarily oppose systematic inquiry. The understanding of the term “science” 
distinguishes these views. Few theories of IR are “anti-science” or actually 
reject the idea that scientific knowledge is possible. Indeed, most different 
approaches to IR are united in an understanding of science as a systematic 
process of inquiry that employs methods.  
This understanding also holds true for world-systems analysis. Waller-
stein demonstrates a clear commitment to science, but not to positivist sci-
ence. “(I)t is on the basis of scientific claims, that is, on the basis of claims 
related to the possibilities of systematic knowledge about social reality, that 
world-systems analysis challenges the prevailing mode of inquiry” (Waller-
stein 1987/2000: 129).  
For Wallerstein, a “real world” exists and is the object of scholarly obser-
vation (Wallerstein 2000: xx). However, this social reality is socially con-
structed. A construction that is social is by implication therefore collective 
(not individual). 
He also criticizes the “prevailing mode of inquiry”, i.e. theories of IR 
based on a positivist philosophy of science, for several reasons (Wallerstein 
1987/2000: 130-148): 
Firstly, Wallerstein is fundamentally critical of the division of social sci-
ence into a number of different “disciplines” such as sociology, political sci-
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ence, economics and history. He sees the split as originating in the 19th centu-
ry when the then-dominant liberal ideology defined “modernity” by differen-
tiating three separate social spheres with different logics: the market, the state 
and civil society. These spheres were then studied in different fields: eco-
nomics for the market, politics for the state, and sociology for civil society 
(Wallerstein 2004: 6). For Wallerstein, our contemporary departmental/dis-
ciplinary university structures still reflect this division, which has become a 
defining feature of an expanded world university system. In contrast, Waller-
stein sees the individual disciplines in the social sciences as one single disci-
pline because the “spheres” of collective human action (the economic, the po-
litical and the social/sociocultural) are not separate domains of social action. 
As these spheres have no separate logics, “no useful research model can iso-
late ‘factors’ according to the categories of economic, political, and social 
and treat only one kind of variable, implicitly holding the others constant” 
(Wallerstein 1987/2000: 134). Overcoming the “divorce” of the social sci-
ence disciplines means, for world-systems analysis, that “(a)ll the presumed 
criteria – level of analysis, subject-matter, methods, theoretical assumptions – 
either are no longer true in practice or, if sustained, are barriers to further 
knowledge rather than stimuli to its creation.” (Wallerstein 2000: 133). Be-
cause it does not recognize the legitimacy of the separate disciplines, world-
system analysis is therefore unidisciplinary and not multidisciplinary (Wal-
lerstein 2004: 19). 
Through Wallerstein we become aware that the categories used to under-
stand history and our accounts of social reality are themselves historically 
formed, and must therefore be examined critically (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 
145). 
Second, Wallerstein challenges the common distinction between idio-
graphic (as in historical disciplines that describe the unique and the particu-
lar) and nomothetic (the theoretical search for universal laws governing so-
cial reality) modes of analysis, which also originated in the 19th century. The 
dominant view of the social sciences was that “objective” knowledge of the 
world is possible and must be formulated by law-like generalizations based 
on empirical analysis and inductive reasoning (Wallerstein 2004: 6). Waller-
stein also questions the superiority of science over philosophy, i.e. the split 
between the “search for the good” and the search for “knowledge” (Waller-
stein 1997/2000: 195). He views social science as being the basis for a “reu-
nited world of knowledge” (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 203). 
Third, Wallerstein denies that the sovereign state is the basic social entity 
(and hence “unit of analysis”). He sees neither the state nor the inter-state 
system of sovereign states as being the appropriate unit of analysis. He intro-
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duces the “historical system” as a new perspective of social reality and, there-
fore, unit of analysis (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 139). 
Fourth, Wallerstein introduces another perspective to contrast with a 
nomothetic social science that emulates the natural sciences. In his view, the 
method of going from the particular to the universal, from the concrete to the 
abstract, should be inverted (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 148). A historical social 
science must start with the abstract and progress to the concrete. The ap-
proach is not to reduce complexity to simpler variables, but to contextualize 
the simpler variables and make them more complex and able to explain real 
social situations (Wallerstein 2004: 19). This contextualization of variables 
will result in a coherent interpretation of the processes of particular histori-
cal systems. An interpretation is necessary to provide a plausible account of 
how the processes of particular historical systems followed a particular his-
torical path (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 148). Epistemologically, this means to 
search for substantive interpretative patterns (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 198). 
In short, world-systems analysis attempts to “make sense” of the complexity 
of social reality, to “interpret” it usefully and plausibly (Wallerstein 1997/ 
2000: 202). The core task of social science is to offer plausible explanations 
of historical reality. This requires long-term, large-scale social change to be 
placed at the center of analysis. This describes the core of world-systems 
analysis as analysis. The topic will be discussed in the next chapter in more 
detail. 
Fifth, world-systems analysis is theory and praxis: analyses must be “so-
cially useful”. In the words of Wallerstein: “Those scholarly analyses that are 
more correct are more socially useful in that they aid the world to construct a 
substantively more rational reality” (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 200). 
In sum, world-systems analysis is a call for a holistic historical social sci-
ence (Wallerstein 2004: xi). It is based not on the antinomies common for 
most social science approaches: macro and micro, global/local or struc-
ture/agency – but on their unity (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 185). In fact, this 
unity actually “permits us to see that micro and macro, global and local, and 
above all structure and agency are not unsurpassable antinomies but rather 
yin and yang.” (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 196). 
On the basis of these perspectives of the philosophy of science, we will 





2.1. The “historical social system” as the unit of analysis 
The social reality to be analyzed by world-systems analysis is not that of the 
states themselves or even that of the states system but “something larger”: a 
world-system or historical system (Wallerstein 2004: x). The term world-
system comes from the work of Fernand Braudel. 
“Historical systems” as a unit of analysis was first introduced in Volume 
1 of The Modern World-System (Wallerstein 1974). In this perspective, the 
state and the inter-state structure (usually the core subject matter of IR) is just 
one institutional structure among others, and therefore only part of an inte-
grated framework of the modern world-system. A world-system (or historical 
system) is “a spatial/temporal zone which cuts across many political and cul-
tural units, one that represents an integrated zone of activity and institutions 
which obey certain systemic rules” (Wallerstein 2004: 17). There are three var-
iants of historical systems. Wallerstein first distinguishes between mini-systems 
and world-systems, then defines two types of world-systems: world-economies 
and world-empires. Please note that the hyphens in “world-system”, “world-
economies” and “world-empires” are important, as it is “not about systems, 
economies, empires of the world, but about systems, economies, empires that 
are a world” (Wallerstein 2004: 17, emphasis added). The systems do not nec-
essarily encompass the entire globe.  
The criterion used to distinguish between the varieties/forms of world-
systems is the specific mode of division of labor, the “logic” of a particular 
system. The mode of division of labor determines how the systems are repro-
duced (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 139). This idea goes back to the economic 
historian Karl Polanyi (Polanyi 1944: The Great Transformation). Polanyi 
distinguished three forms of organizing an economy: by reciprocity, by redis-
tribution and by the market. The historical systems defined by Wallerstein are 
related to these three forms of economic organization; reciprocity of ex-
changes is a defining feature of the mini-systems (about six generations, with 
highly homogenous structures). The extraction and redistribution of tributes 
from local, self-administered, direct producers by a central organ is character-
istic of world-empires with vast political structures and diverse cultural pat-
terns. In addition to multiple political structures, integrated production struc-
tures and market exchange provide the organizational logic of reproduction in 
world-economies (Wallerstein 2004: 17; 1987/2000: 139-140).  
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In short, there is a link between the “logic” and “form” of historical sys-
tems (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 139). A world-system is a “historical system 
governed by a singular logic and a set of rules within which persons and 
groups struggle with each other in pursuit of their interests and in accord with 
their values” (Wallerstein 1996: 87).  
The choice of the “historical system” as the unit of analysis reflects Wal-
lerstein’s view of a unity of historical social science: the “unit” or “entity”, 
i.e. the specific historical system, is simultaneously systemic and historical 
(Wallerstein 1987/2000: 139).   
The system is socially created; it has a history, is driven by mechanisms 
and goes through crises. The social processes of a historical system are un-
derstood as integrated, complex wholes. The introduction of the historical 
system as a unit of analysis is therefore the introduction of a different vision 
of social reality compared to positivist approaches to IR. The core object of 
the scientific approach of world-systems analysis is to define and explain the 
units of analysis – historical systems. 
2.2. Social times: structural time or the longue durée 
Having discussed the systemic quality of the unit of analysis, we will now in-
vestigate its historical character in more detail. The systemic quality points to 
long-lasting structures. 
For Wallerstein, historical systems are both systemic and historical: “They 
remain the same over time yet are never the same from one minute to the next. 
This is a paradox, but not a contradiction.” (Wallerstein 2004: 22). The catego-
ries of time and space (referred to by Wallerstein as “TimeSpace”; Wallerstein 
2004: 22) are important for an understanding of the systemic-historical argu-
ment. “TimeSpaces” are constantly evolving, socially constructed realities. 
Their construction is part of the social reality to be analyzed. The specific ap-
proach to time in Wallerstein’s work is inspired by the concept of “social 
times” developed by Fernand Braudel (the Annales School), which originated 
both as a critique of the “event-dominated” or “episodic” history writing (the 
idiographic approach), and the positivist search for “timeless truths” (nomothet-
ic social science). In his works, Braudel identified a multiplicity of social times 
such as “structural times”, or what he called the “longue durée”. The concept of 
structural time (the longue durée) has since been integrated into world-systems 
analysis and is the concept of grasping the duration of a particular historical 
system. The longue durée has a crucial function within world-systems analysis 
in that it reflects the self-evidence that world-systems analysis does not have to 
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search for “timeless truths” and is also a critique of the concept of timeless 
structures. For Wallerstein, time-bound structures do exist (Wallerstein 2004: 
21): a world-system has a lifespan, i.e. a beginning, a period of development 
and an end/a final transition (Wallerstein 2004: 18). “Structural time”, or the 
longue durée, relates to the long-lasting fundamental structures underlying his-
torical systems and to the cyclical processes within those structures. These will 
be discussed in more detail in Step 3. 
In sum, by Wallerstein’s standards, social science must be historical and 
the focus of social scientific study must be on the core phenomena of long 
periods and large spaces.  
2.3. Conclusion 
The particular mode of analysis provided by world-systems analysis is the 
simultaneous historical and systemic description and explanation of the so-
cial phenomena of the real world. 
World-systems analysis overcomes the traditional boundaries in social 
sciences; it is the analysis of “total social systems over the longue durée” 
(Wallerstein 2004: 19). The world-systems analysis scholar is an historical 
social scientist: s/he analyzes both the general laws of particular historical 
systems and the particular processes the systems have gone through (Waller-
stein 1987/2000: 127). It thus becomes possible to distinguish between long-
lasting structures and momentary expressions of reality. Epistemologically, 
world-systems analysis claims to explain two things: that the world has en-
during structures and that it is constantly changing.  
The first task of analysis is to locate the structures that govern the longue 
durée, i.e. the regularities, and therefore the relevant structures that constrain 
individual and collective action. The analysis describes the concept and se-
quence of the system’s cyclical rhythms, as well as the patterns of internal 
transformation (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 136).  
“(I)t is only when we have mastered the structures, yes have invented ‘master nar-
ratives’ that are plausible, relevant, and provisionally valid, that we can begin to 
exercise the kind of judgement that is implied by the concept of agency. Other-
wise, our so-called agency is blind, and if blind it is manipulated…” (Wallerstein 
1997/2000: 202).  
Please note the particular approach to structure/agency taken here. We will 
come back to it in our discussions at the end of the unit. 




The modern world-system  
3.1. The modern world-system: a capitalist world-economy 
Most of Wallerstein’s work is devoted to the study of our contemporary 
world-system: the modern world-system. According to the definitions dis-
cussed in Step 2, our contemporary historical system is a world-system. This 
world-system is a capitalist (logic) world-economy (form). According to Wal-
lerstein, the present system is not the first world-economy, but the first one 
that has lasted for any length of time. It originated in the 16th century, when it 
covered only part of the globe (Europe and the Americas), and then expanded 
throughout the entire world. The modern world-system is the result of the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism. The “zone” or unit considered to be 
capitalist is not “the state”, but a larger unit: a world-economy (hence the unit 
of analysis).  
According to Wallerstein, a world-economy is “a large geographic zone 
within which there is a division of labor and hence significant internal ex-
change of basic or essential goods as well as flows of capital and labor” 
(Wallerstein 2004: 23). The defining feature and core principle of a capitalist 
world-economy is the priority of the endless accumulation of capital: the 
capitalist logic of accumulated and unequally distributed surplus. For this 
reason, only the modern world-system was a capitalist system (Wallerstein 
2004: 24). For his definition of capitalism, Wallerstein draws on 19th century 
liberal and Marxist thought. 
Historically, all three forms of historical systems have coexisted. Whereas 
mini-systems were predominant in the pre-agricultural era, between 8000 BC 
and 1500 there were multiple historical systems of all three types. However, 
the world-empire was the predominant form, and this destroyed and absorbed 
the contemporary mini-systems and world-economies. For this reason, the 
history of that period is typically a history of world-empires. Wallerstein’s 
historical argument is therefore that, sometime around the year 1500, one 
world-economy “survived” and became what he calls the “modern world-
system”. On the basis of its inner capitalist logic (absorbing mini-systems and 
world-empires), this modern world-system was able to develop fully and ex-
pand to cover the entire globe. Wallerstein posits that, during this longue du-
rée from the 16th century on, a number of crucial events led to the modern 
world-economy becoming a long-lasting one. He points to the industrial 
revolution in England and the French Revolution, over the course of which 
state interference in the economy was reduced and the pre-capitalist ancien 
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régime transformed into a capitalist state (Wallerstein 1987/2000: 144). Dur-
ing another important time period at the end of the 18th and the beginning of 
19th centuries, capitalists achieved state-societal power in key states (Waller-
stein 1987/2000: 141). By the late 19th century, for the first time, only one 
global historical system was in existence: the modern world-system as a capi-
talist world-economy (Wallerstein 2004: 8). 
The defining features of the modern world-system as a capitalist world-
economy are a single division of labor, multiple state structures within an in-
terstate system – and therefore the lack of a unifying political structure -, and 
multiple cultures within a “geo-culture” (Wallerstein 2004: 58). A capitalist 
world-economy is an “interconnected web of structures” (Wallerstein 1996: 
103): a system of interrelated institutions and processes. The basic institu-
tions of the world-system are markets, productive firms that compete in the 
markets, multiple states within an interstate system, households, classes, and 
identity-/status-groups. They are all created and re-created within the frame-
work of the capitalist world-economy. These institutions form a “matrix” that 
permits the system to operate. At the same time, the “matrix” stimulates con-
flicts and contradictions (Wallerstein 2004: 24).  
The defining features of the modern world-system in terms of structures 
and processes will now be discussed in more detail. 
3.2. Structures and processes of the capitalist world-economy 
3.2.1. Core-periphery and cyclical rhythms 
The capitalist world-economy is a historical system that is based on an inte-
grated axial division of labor. Drawing on Raul Prebisch, Wallerstein de-
scribes this axial division of labor with the concept of core-periphery as a re-
lational concept: a capitalist world-economy has a division of labor between 
core-like production processes and peripheral production processes: 
“A core-periphery relation is the relation between the more monopolized sectors 
of production on the one hand and the more competitive on the other, and there-
fore the relation between high-profit (and generally high-wage) and low-profit 
(low wage) production activities” (Wallerstein 1996: 88).  
The result is an unequal exchange that benefits the core. There is a constant 
flow of surplus value from the producers of peripheral products to the pro-
ducers of core-like products. The capitalist world-economy therefore pos-
sesses both a core and a peripheral “zone”. The geographical consequence of 
core-periphery relationships is the concentration of core-like processes in a 
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few states and peripheral processes in many states. Over time, core-like pro-
cesses become peripheral processes by downgrading products and shifting 
production to semi-peripheral zones (with strong exports to peripheral coun-
tries, but imports of more advanced products from the core, such as South 
Korea, Brazil and India today), and then to peripheral zones. It is important to 
note that it is the production processes that are core-like and peripheral, NOT 
the states.  
For world-systems analysts, all historical systems function cyclically. The 
key cyclical rhythm of the modern world production system is the Kon-
dratieff-cycle of expansion and contraction in the world-economy: an up and 
down curve of A-phases (expansion) and B-phases (stagnation) (Wallerstein 
2004: 30-31). A Kondratieff-cycle is about 50-60 years in length. Any 
measures taken to leave the B-phase and enter a new A-phase will change the 
parameters of the world-system (Wallerstein 2004: 31). 
 
Self-study (1)  
In order to deepen your knowledge, please now read chapter 2 of Waller-
stein 2004 (The modern world system as a capitalist world-economy: pro-
duction, surplus-value, and polarization). 
3.2.2. Political structures and processes: states, the inter-state system 
and hegemonic cycles 
A defining feature of a world-economy is that it is not bounded by a unitary 
political structure (in contrast to a world-empire). There are many political 
units within a world-economy.  
The political units of the modern world-system are the states. These polit-
ical units combine to form the inter-state system. The state of the modern 
world-system is the sovereign (nation) state within an inter-state system of 
sovereign states. In 1648, the inter-state system was institutionalized as a sys-
tem of sovereign states in the Peace of Westphalia. Wallerstein emphasizes 
that “sovereignty” as a concept is a development of the modern world-
system. The steady increase in state power is considered to be a secular trend 
of the modern world-system: from its beginning in the 16th century through 
the 1970s (Wallerstein 2004: 43). 
The state and the inter-state system as political structures of the modern 
world-system have specific functions. According to the capitalist logic of the 
system, the “market” guides decision-making, but it is never fully and freely 
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functional. In fact, the totally free market only functions in an ideological 
sense. For the world-economy as a whole, a totally free market would make 
the endless accumulation of capital impossible. A partially free market is the 
prerequisite for the capitalist system and only the political structures guaran-
tee a partially free market. It is by the authority of the sovereign state that 
property rights are protected, rules for cross-border transactions of goods, 
capital, and labor are defined, employment is regulated, taxation set and state 
subsidies given. States provide transportation infrastructures such as bridges, 
railway networks and airports. Powerful states put pressure on weak states to 
maintain open boundaries for the flow of production factors that are of use to 
their firms.  
In short, not only does capitalism require a large market, it also requires 
political structures, i.e. the states and the states system. In fact, the relation-
ship between states and productive firms is central for understanding how the 
capitalist world-economy functions (Wallerstein 2004: 46).  
Looking at the system as a whole, at first glance inter-state relations ap-
pear paradoxical, as states are rivals in the competitive system of the world-
economy, yet have a common interest in stabilizing and preserving the inter-
state system and maintaining the world-economy as a whole (Wallerstein 
2004: 56). Wallerstein holds that this seeming paradox explains a state’s sim-
ultaneous interest in both an anarchical interstate system AND an order of 
the interstate system (Wallerstein 2004: 56). This tension gives rise to “struc-
tures that are normally in between the two types” (Wallerstein 2004: 56). 
The political structure of the modern world-system as a multiplicity of 
states within an inter-state system corresponds with the needs of a capitalist 
system. This would not be true for a world-empire: Capitalism (logic) and 
world-empire (form) are not compatible. A world-empire gives priority to po-
litical structures and not to the endless accumulation of capital. 
Please bear in mind that the defining feature of a world-empire is a struc-
ture with a single political authority for the whole world-system. According 
to Wallerstein, all attempts by dominant states to transform the modern 
world-economy into a world-empire in the modern world-system have failed 
(Charles V in the 16th century, Napoleon, Hitler) (Wallerstein 2004: 57).  
This also holds true for all attempts to attain long-lasting hegemony, but 
for a different reason: the rise and fall of hegemons plays a special role in 
the functioning of the system. The inter-state structure of the modern 
world-system is governed by key cyclical processes known as hegemonic 
cycles. A hegemonic cycle is the rise and fall of a hegemonic power in the 
modern world-system. Hegemony means that the world-system as a whole 
has only one power at a particular time. Hegemonic cycles are longer than 
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the 50-60-year Kondratieff-cycle and are important for capital accumula-
tion processes.  
From the historical perspective, hegemonies have existed at different times 
in the modern world-system: the Netherlands in the mid-17th century, the Unit-
ed Kingdom in the mid-19th century and the United States in the mid-20th cen-
tury. Hegemonies are based on the superiority of productive efficiency. The 
hegemonic status is the result of market transactions and state power that are 
used to secure advantages for the hegemonic power in the world-economy. He-
gemony is a structurally privileged position (Wallerstein 1996: 99). Hegemonic 
states dominate the world economy by exerting powerful economic and politi-
cal influence with minimum military force, as well as with a hegemonic “cul-
tural language”. However, hegemons only define the rules of the interstate sys-
tem for a certain period of time (Wallerstein 2004: 58). Hegemony can only be 
maintained as long as the hegemonic power is able to impose constraints on the 
free world market (such as forcing other markets to open to the products of the 
hegemonic power, protectionism of own producers, the imposition of a curren-
cy for world transactions, being involved in all decisions in the world-system) 
and maintain a military force strong enough to be used as a threat. The actual 
policies of the hegemonic power are in fact the eventual cause of their decline: 
power in hegemonies is self-destructive owing to the cost of its political and 
military role. Other states gain sufficient economic strength to challenge the 
hegemonic power. At this point, the hegemonic power uses military force (the 
source of further decline), thereby further undermining its power both econom-
ically and politically (Wallerstein 2004: 59). The productive efficiency of the 
hegemon declines and rival states with superior productive efficiency gain 
strength (Wallerstein 1996: 101). This decline goes hand in hand with attempts 
by other states to replace the hegemonic power (which takes a long time). Ac-
cording to Wallerstein, the final phase in the struggle for hegemony is usually a 
“thirty years war” involving all the major military powers and resulting in mas-
sive physical destruction, including the destruction of production facilities 
(Wallerstein mentions the Thirty Years War of 1618-1648, the Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic wars between 1792-1815, the first/second World Wars be-
tween 1914-45). For Wallerstein, the result is quite clear. In all “thirty years 
wars”, the winner has always been the power committed to maintaining the 
structure of the capitalist world-economy while the power aiming to transform 
the system into a world-empire has been defeated (Wallerstein 1996: 99-100). 
The end of each “thirty years war” has always constituted a break in the con-
struction of the interstate system: the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the Concert 
of Europe (1815), and the founding of the United Nations (1945) (Wallerstein 
1996: 100). 
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Hegemony therefore occurs following a breakdown of world order. It cre-
ates the period of stability needed by capitalist firms, especially in leading 
states (Wallerstein 20054 58). Hegemony is therefore a systemic condition. 
As a result, “…hegemony is crucial, repeated, and always relatively brief. 
The capitalist world-economy needs the states, needs the interstate system, 
and needs the periodic appearances of hegemonic powers.” (Wallerstein 
2004: 59). In other words, capitalism and the modern states-system are not 
separate “historical inventions” (or conceptions), but rather developed simul-
taneously as parts of a whole. 
In sum: the functioning of the modern world-system depends on a world 
production system with Kondratieff cycles and a stable inter-state system 
with hegemonic cycles.  
 
Self-study (2)  
The modern world-system is stabilized by a geo-culture. Read Wallerstein 
2004, Chapter 4 (The creation of geoculture) and other relevant texts of 
your choice from the supplementary reading material. Reflect on „geo-
culture“ as part of the explanation offered by world-systems analysis. 
3.3. Crises and transition: towards a new world-system  
As you learned in Step 2, a world-system has a lifespan. Therefore, all histor-
ical systems come to an end and are succeeded by another system. For Wal-
lerstein, the modern world-system is in a crisis, which has been brought about 
by secular trends (Wallerstein 1996: 103-105): capitalist development is un-
derstood to be a polarizing process and the gap between “winners” and “los-
ers” is expected to widen. South-North migration, in particular, will have a 
huge impact on the functioning of the world-system. In addition, the steady 
rise of marginalized populations will cause multiple conflicts. States’ fiscal 
crises and the decline of the welfare state will foster the state’s political cri-
sis. Wallerstein is also concerned about the ecological crisis and its massive 
destructive potential for the modern world-system. In addition, he feels there 
will be a strong ideological turn against the liberal geo-culture. Finally, Wal-
lerstein also observes the loss of faith in science. He predicts that the crisis 
will continue for the next 20-50 years and bring about a new alternative inter-
state system. He admits, however, that this process will be difficult to predict 
(Wallerstein 1987/2000: 147). 
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The crucial phase is the period of transition from one historical system to 
the next, which brings us back to the debate on structure/agency. In Waller-
stein’s view, the debate is one of determinism versus free will. From what we 
have learned so far, it is apparent that Wallerstein’s analysis is strongly de-
terministic: the process inherent in historical systems, i.e. the logic of the sys-
tem, is “translated” into self-reinforcing institutional structures that determine 
the long-term trajectory of the system. Agency, such as all forms of social 
struggle for change, can only be understood within the world-system as a 
whole. In world-systems analysis, actors and structures are the “products” of 
the inner logic of the system. They are not ontologically prior to but rather 
“part of a systemic mix out of which they emerged and upon which they act” 
(Wallerstein 2004: 21). For Wallerstein, “free will” occurs mainly during the 
process of “transition” to a new system. Historical choices and historical al-
ternatives only arise because the system’s structures break down in times of 
crisis. Here the strong normative commitment of world-systems analysis as a 
contribution to the transformation of the world becomes apparent: world-
systems analysis is both theory and praxis. The task of social sciences is “to 
present rationally the real historical alternatives that lie before us” (Waller-
stein 2000: 129). The aim is to provide plausible interpretations of social re-
ality, which are more useful for making political and moral decisions (Wal-
lerstein 2000: xviii): 
“But if reality is a constructed reality, the constructors are the actors in the real 
world, and not the scholars. The role of the scholars is not to construct reality but 
to figure out how it has been constructed, and to test the multiple social construc-
tions of reality against each other.” (Wallerstein 1997/2000: 200).  
Wallerstein therefore attempts to formulate “temporarily useful structures/ 
categories that bear within them the processes by which they are transformed 
into other structures/categories.” (Wallerstein 2000: xxi). 
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Step 4: 
Check your understanding: key aspects and review questions 
Key aspects 
 World-systems analysis 
Core question • What does historical social science as a form of analy-
sis contribute to the transformation of social reality? 
Ontological assumptions 
about actors and structure 
• The “historical social system” as the basic unit of the 
social world  
• The whole (system) is ontologically prior to its parts 
(ontological holism) 
• The social whole is not reducible to its constituent 
elements (ontological and methodological holism) 
• Unity of the spheres of social life (politics, econom-
ics, society) 
“Agency and structure” • Ontological priority of structure (ontological holism) 
• Social structures are ontologically independent of 
the actions 
• Agents (persons, identity groups, states, and class 
agents) act according to the single logic of the sys-
tem, they are determined by structure. Agency is ex-
plained in terms of the “whole” (methodological ho-
lism) 
• Agency only in the transition phase from one histori-
cal system to another: historical choices. Here, hu-
man actions are crucial for the transformation of 
structures 
Nature of explanation and 
causality 
• Explanation is structuralist/holistic, constitutive form 
of causality  
• Structuralist/holistic explanation: structures (the 
whole) are generative (explanation NOT in terms of 
the properties of individuals or their relations). Struc-
tures constitute or generate actors (e.g. the state, 
classes, identity groups) 
• Actors/actions are explained in relation to the world-
system as a whole (methodological holism) 
Approach to “levels of 
analysis” 
• No “level of analysis” (concept is not applicable be-
cause positivism is rejected) 
Philosophy of science • Holistic historical social science. 
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 World-systems analysis 
Normative perspective  • Social reality is not governed either by states or the 
states system, but by time-bound structures of “his-
torical systems”.  
• Progress not linear and inevitable. Progress as possi-
bility.  
• Alternative historical choices in the transition phase 
from one historical system to another. 
•  Analysis of these structures helps formulate the his-
torical choices for transforming the systems. 
Theory and practice/role of 
the scientist 
• World-systems analysis as both theory and praxis. 
• Social science contributes to the transformation of 
the social world in that it formulates alternative his-
torical choices. 
Review questions 
1. What are the core assumptions of a “holistic historical social science”?  
2. What is a “historical social system” or “world-system”? 
3. Outline world-systems analysis as a model for explaining international 
politics. 
4. Discuss the theory and praxis of world-systems analysis. 
Step 5: 
Final self-study and consolidation 
Self-study (3) 
To deepen your knowledge of different types of explanation from a phi-
losophy of science perspective, compare the individualist explanation of 
new liberal theory with the holistic/structuralist explanation of world-
systems analysis.  
Required reading 
Wallerstein, Immanuel 2004: World-Systems Analysis. An Introduction. Durham and Lon-
don: Duke University Press, Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5. 
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Introduction 
In the previous unit you learned about world-systems analysis as a non-
positivist approach based on a holistic ontology, methodological holism, and 
an interpretivist epistemology (“understanding”). At the core of the current 
unit will be social constructivist theory as formulated by Alexander Wendt. 
In addition to the works of Immanuel Wallerstein, social constructivist theory 
provides another particularly interesting case when seen in the context of this 
book’s philosophy of science orientation. There are several reasons to choose 
Wendt’s works as a reference theory for this learning unit:  
First, Alexander Wendt’s declared objective is to find “a via media be-
tween positivism and interpretivism by combining the epistemology of the 
one with the ontology of the other” (Wendt 2006: 182, my italics). He there-
fore attempts to synthesize what appear to be opposed positions: the episte-
mology of positivism and what he perceives to be the ontology of “interpre-
tivism”. As will be shown later in more detail, the term “interpretivism” as 
used by Wendt refers to ontological holistic/structuralist and social construc-
tivist philosophical assumptions. 
Second, with the so-called “positivism versus post-positivism debate” (or 
“Third Debate”) in the 1980s and 1990s, social constructivism in IR came up 
as one of the main challengers of positivist IR theorizing (see Ashley 1984 
for an early critique of neorealism; Kratochwil/Ruggie 1986 on regime theo-
ry; Wendt 1987 and Dessler 1989 on agency and structure). The work of Al-
exander Wendt, especially his meta-theoretical perspective of agency and 
structure as mutually constituted entities (Wendt 1987) and the theoretical 
argument of a social construction of “anarchy” (Wendt 1992) have been as-
sociated with social constructivism in IR. It was above all his seminal Social 
Theory of International Politics (1999) for which Wendt has been recognized 
as one of the major representatives of social constructivism in IR.  
Third, Wendt’s work belongs at the center of this learning unit because he 
is one of the meta-theoretically most informed IR theorists. His writings illus-
trate his philosophy of science positions in an exceptionally precise and sys-
tematic way, making them ideal for this book concept.  
Fourth, following the intellectual development Wendt undertakes regard-
ing his philosophy of science positions between 1987 (“The agent-structure 
problem in international relations theory”) and his recent writings (2006: 
“Social Theory as Cartesian Science” and 2010: “Flatland: Quantum Mind 
and the International Hologram”, and his forthcoming 2014 Limits of Interna-
tional Relations) may well be key to being well-prepared for upcoming meta-
theoretical debates in IR. Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics re-
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flects an ontological turn towards the philosophical positions of scientific re-
alism – a turn that can be found in almost all social sciences, including eco-
nomics. This makes this turn a particularly interesting case for broader meta-
theoretical discussions in IR. Moreover, the ontological and epistemological 
re-orientation towards philosophical interpretations of quantum physics in 
Wendt’s more recent work presents the first attempt to transfer quantum the-
ory to International Relations. In doing so, Wendt recently completely re-
vised the philosophy of science basis of his constructivist Social Theory of 
International Politics. For this reason, the end of this text unit will be devot-
ed to the new lines of thinking in Wendt’s work, even though they leave be-
hind the social constructivist approach of Wendt’s Social Theory. 
Before we start to learn more about the social constructivist perspective of 
Alexander Wendt, we have to keep in mind that “social constructivism” in gen-
eral does not qualify as a coherent theoretical perspective in IR. There are many 
different social constructivist theories in IR that are based on quite different on-
tological and epistemological assumptions. Hence “social constructivism” is a 
term that subsumes many different approaches. In fact, constructivism can be 
considered a philosophy of science itself (see also Jørgensen 2010: 160-164). A 
theory is “constructivist” when it shares basic assumptions of constructivism as 
a philosophy of science. Consequently, the term can be applied to many theo-
ries of IR which share constructivist features (such as world-systems theory, a 
range of postmodern theories, Neogramscian approaches etc.) However, no co-
herent social constructivist theory of IR exists. There are theories of IR that to 
varying degrees share constructivist assumptions. In fact, this is ontologically 
true for almost all post-positivist approaches. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that all disciplines in the social sciences 
had a “constructivist turn” (and not only in the social sciences) that produced 
a variety of social constructivist-informed theories in those disciplines. For 
example, there is social constructivism in disciplines such as sociology (Ber-
ger/Luckmann 1966) and political geography (Reuber et al. 2003) In linguis-
tics, a constructivism exists that draws on the so- called linguistic turn (Lud-
wig Wittgenstein, John R. Searle 1995), hence pointing to the ontological po-
sition of acts of language and speech in social reality.  
What social constructivist IR theories have in common is that they chal-
lenge the ontology of positivist IR theory by pointing to the importance of “so-
cial factors” such as ideas, norms, shared meanings, collective knowledge, cul-
ture, language and texts for the explanation of outcomes in international poli-
tics. According to these theories, reality is (to varying degrees and due to dif-
ferent social factors) socially constructed. “Social factors” are usually factors 
ascribed to “collectives”, not individuals. Different theories do this in different 
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ways and based on a range of other, often varying epistemological assump-
tions, hence the existence of a number of diverse social constructivist theories 
of IR (for a good overview see Ruggie 1998 and Jørgensen 2010: Chapter 7). 
To strengthen the argument of the previous paragraph about social con-
structivism as a philosophy of science, it might be helpful to recap what you 
have learned in our previous units about the distinction between philosophy 
of science positions (often called meta-theory) and IR theories. Wendt (1999: 
4-6) calls it “first- and second-order theorizing”: “Second order” relates to 
philosophy of science positions, that is, assumptions about the nature of hu-
man agency, its relation to structure, the role of ideas and material factors etc. 
You are already familiar with “second order theorizing” from the first part of 
the book. It encompasses the ontological, epistemological and methodologi-
cal assumptions (in short: philosophy of science) that any theory building 
rests on. Wendt calls it “social theory”. In contrast, “first order” relates to 
“substantial”, domain-specific theories. In IR, a “substantial theory” would 
be for example neorealist, new liberal or neoinstitutionalist theory etc. Theo-
ries are “domain-specific” in that they refer to particular social systems such 
as the international system, a particular institution such as sovereignty, and 
the specific relevant actors acting within these specific structures, such as 
states or non-state actors (Wendt 1999: 6). In contrast, “second order theory” 
or “social theory” refers to the abstract categories of “actor”, “structure”, 
“system”, etc., and how these categories are interrelated. 
Understanding the difference between “social theory” and “International 
Relations theory” is crucial when it comes to the core question of Wendt’s 
theoretical work. Wendt is interested in the implications of second-order the-
orizing (philosophy of science) for first-order theorizing, i.e. for the substan-
tive theory of IR. He calls this approach “applied philosophy” (Wendt 1999: 
6). Using his terminology of “social theory” for second order theorizing (phi-
losophy of science), the title of his seminal book (1999) perfectly reflects the 
approach he takes: Social Theory of International Politics (my italics).  
Following the logic of the previous paragraphs, it then becomes clear that 
a substantial theory of IR (first order theory) would qualify as “social con-
structivist” when it shares assumptions of constructivism (second order, the 
philosophy of science or social theory). IR theories informed by social con-
structivism challenge the ontology of positivist IR theory. Ontologically so-
cial constructivist theorizing is different to positivist IR theorizing because of 
its focus on shared meaning and norms; ideas matter in social reality, while 
reality is perceived as a social construction.  
Following along those lines, Wendt’s work is claimed to be ontologically 
“social constructivist” because of his theoretical position on the ideational na-
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ture of the deep unobservable structure of the international system that con-
stitutes the agents and rules of interaction in international politics.  
These social constructivist positions are post-positivist positions in that 
they challenge the positivist ontology. 
In the next step, let me briefly reflect on the term “post-positivism” as 
used in this unit. What has been said above about social constructivist-
informed IR theorizing is true more generally for “post-positivist” IR theory: 
it can relate to a diversity of different ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological claims. What unites these approaches is no more than the fact that 
none are positivist. In terms of their underlying philosophy of science per-
spectives, however, they are quite diverse; what is referred to as “post-
positivism” artificially unifies a variety of approaches with competing per-
spectives. It reflects the broader search for different, alternative meta-
theoretical foundations for the formulation of theories of IR after or “post”-
positivism. The label “post-positivism” thus unites theories that are as diverse 
as post-structuralism (genealogical, discourse-analytical and deconstructive 
studies drawing on the works of French philosophers Michel Foucault, 
Jaques Derrida or Francois Lyotard), critical theory based on the work of the 
Frankfurt School, normative IR theory, (different types of) feminist IR theo-
ry, Neo-Gramscian and Neo-Marxist approaches as well as social construc-
tivist IR theories.  
However, to place all these theories into a “positivist/post-positivist” di-
chotomy obscures the nature of the challenge. A philosophy of science perspec-
tive will reveal the diversity of the so-called “post-positivist” approaches. At 
the same time, it will highlight the commonalities of positivist approaches. In 
contrast, most traditional textbook presentations depict the differences between 
IR theories within a positivist philosophy of science approach.  
To return to our focus on Wendt, this argument retains its relevance there 
as well: Wendt’s work is basically post-positivist in that it challenges the pos-
itivist ontology. More specifically, his post-positivist approach is ontological-
ly social constructivist; however, he aims at keeping a positivist epistemolog-
ical position. For Wendt, the so-called “Third Debate” in IR is about two dif-
ferent things: ontology (what the world is made of) and epistemology (what 
questions we should ask) (Wendt 1998: 103). For him, the meta-theoretical 
Third Debate should be focused on the former, not the latter (Wendt 1999: 
90, also Wight 2006). Wendt claims that a shift to the “nature” of the prob-
lems in international politics is required in IR theory because the “content” of 
substantive IR theory (i.e. ontology) is distorted (Wendt 1999: 48).  
When we apply philosophy (that is, philosophy of science) as described 
above, the central question for Wendt in his Social theory of International 
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Politics (1999) emerges as: “…given a similar substantive concern as Waltz, 
i.e., states systemic theory and explanation, but a different ontology, what is 
the resulting theory of international politics?” (Wendt 1999: 6).  
In other words, what he has in mind is a new type of systems theory for 
international politics. 
In Step 1, we will examine the ontological assumptions of this new type 
of systems theory. Before you continue reading, please take some time to re-
cap what you have learned about the implications of different philosophy of 
science positions for the study, explanation and hence practice of interna-
tional politics. In this unit, we return to this issue in more detail. As you will 
have recognized while reading this introduction, this unit may well be the 
most theoretically complex and difficult one in the book. As a result, you will 
probably need to allocate more time for your work than has been the case for 
other units in the book.  
Step 1: 
The ontological status of “structure” as an unobservable 
and “object” of scientific inquiry 
Social Theory of International Politics as formulated by Alexander Wendt 
(1999) is based on a systems-theoretic standpoint (Wendt 2006: 217, my ital-
ics). It is Wendt’s objective to formulate a new approach to structural theo-
rizing about international relations (Wendt 1987: 336, my emphasis). 
Wendt’s approach to structural theorizing is novel because it employs a new 
ontological status of “structure” as an unobservable. Compared to the ontol-
ogy of other forms of “structural” theorizing (Wendt mentions neorealism 
and world-systems theory), the concept of “structure” of the international 
system has been ontologically re-thought.  
Wendt’s new ontological approach to “structure” is best understood by 
starting with a reflection of his critique and a comparison of what he per-
ceives to be two different types of “structural theory” in IR: neorealism and 
world-systems theory. You will find the basic arguments in his famous article 
“The agent-structure problem in International Relations” (1987). The article, 
together with that of Dessler (1989), marked the beginning of the so-called 
“constructivist turn” in IR in the second half of the 1980s. They are part of 
the post-positivist challenge to positivist theorizing mentioned in the intro-
duction. In the follow-up to these publications, the attention of the IR com-
munity has been heavily directed towards meta-theoretical questions related 
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to the interrelation of “actors” and “structures” in international politics (see 
also Wight 2006 for an excellent overview).  
In addition to the article mentioned above, the comparison and critique of 
neorealism and world-systems theory is formulated in Chapter 1 of Wendt’s 
Social Theory of International Politics (1999: 1-44). The core of his argu-
ment is that different ontologies lie at the heart of both attempts to formulate 
a structural theory of international politics; neorealist theory is based on an 
individualist ontology, world-systems theory on a holistic ontology (Wendt 
1987: 336). For Wendt, both perspectives are reductionist: either the actors 
are assumed to be ontological prior to structure and hence “given” (ontologi-
cal individualism/neorealism) or structure is assumed to be ontological prior 
to actors and hence given (ontological structuralism/world-systems theory). 
 
Self-study (1) 
Recap what you have learned about neorealist theorizing and about world-
systems theory. Then read Wendt 1987: The agent-structure-problem in 
International Relations, 335-349. Learn about the ontological and meth-
odological individualist status of “structure” in neorealism and the onto-
logical and methodological holistic status of “structure” in world-systems 
theory. Complement and deepen your knowledge about the philosophy of 
science positions at the heart of neorealism and world-systems theory. For 
didactical reasons, the recommendation is not to read the full text, but 
simply to focus on pages 335-349 and then return to the unit text.  
 
Wendt’s attempt to formulate a new structural theory has its philosophical 
foundation in scientific realism (basically drawing on the work of Roy 
Bhaskar) and applies structuration theory from sociology (Giddens 1979, 
1984) to International Relations. Wendt requires the use of both scientific re-
alism and structuration theory in order to base IR theory on a new ontology. 
They are the “meta-physical foundations” of his new approach to theorizing 
international politics (Wendt 2006: 182). Adopting them thus has implica-
tions for the “substantial” IR theory he has in mind. 
Step by step, we will now learn about the ontological position on which 
Wendt’s new approach to structural theorizing is based. The starting point is 
the status of “unobservable” phenomena in scientific inquiry: in Wendt’s 
words, “we cannot see the structure of the international system, whether con-
ceptualized in material or social terms” (Wendt 1999: 49). This problem rais-
es questions and doubts as to whether unobservables such as the structure of 
the international system are legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. How can 
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we know about things we cannot observe? Wendt’s answer is to ground IR 
theory in a scientific realist understanding of science. Please note that “scien-
tific realism” refers to a philosophy of science and thus is on equal terms with 
positivism as a philosophy of science. It should not be confused with “real-
ism” as a (substantive) theory of International Relations. 
In order to learn about the “new ontology” in more detail, the next section 
will start with scientific realist assumptions about “structure”. We will then 
discuss the relevance scientific realism has for the scientific study of interna-
tional politics. 
It should be emphasized that Wendt’s decision to draw on scientific real-
ism reflects a broader movement of re-orientation in the social sciences to-
wards realist ontology. Using Wendt’s work therefore serves a double pur-
pose: it demonstrates and reflects a broader ontological reorientation (philos-
ophy of science aspect) while at the same time demonstrating its application 
to IR theory (as shown in Wendt’s formulation of a specific theory of IR). 
The question of ontology is a highly relevant question as it relates to the na-
ture, the “being” or “reality” of the subject of our studies, such as the state 
and the international system of states. 
1.1. “Structure” is real and object to scientific inquiry 
Wendt, drawing on scientific realism as formulated by Roy Bhaskar (1979: The 
possibility of naturalism), contends that any “structure” as an unobservable en-
tity is real and knowable (Wendt 1999: 47-48). For him, this is true for the 
world of natural sciences (here examples of unobservable “structures” include 
the atom or the double helix of DNA) as well as for the social sciences (the 
structures of any social system). The ontological position of scientific realism is 
that structures are unobservable; however, it is contended that they are real and 
knowable. For the study of the international system, the assumption of struc-
tures as unobservables but real and knowables implies that the state system and 
the state are assumed to be “real structures” (ontology) (Wendt 1999: 47-48). 
The reality of structures is assumed to be independent of human thought. As re-
al structures, independent of human thought, they are also knowable, legitimate 
objects of science (epistemology). More concretely, because they are real and 
independent of the human mind, they can be approached and examined by sci-
ence despite being unobservable. The purpose of scientific theories is to refer to 
this world of observables as well as “unobservables”. Theory is thus under-
stood as a reflection of reality: “ontology before epistemology”, a position that 
is in contrast to positivism (“epistemology before ontology”). 
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To clarify these statements even further, we can compare them to the em-
piricist position of positivism. While in empiricism theoretical concepts such 
as “the international states system” or “structure of the international system” 
are only instruments, devices for the purpose of organizing our experience 
(that is, concepts that do NOT refer to the real world), in scientific realism 
the concepts of states system or structure refer to real structures (Wendt 
1999: 49). In short: In positivism, theories about unobservables are treated 
instrumentally, not realistically. As we know from the second unit in Part 1 
of the book, observation has a privileged epistemic status in positivism com-
pared to theory: “What we can claim to exist depends on what we can know, 
and we can only know what we can see” (Wendt 1999: 60). Hence, in empir-
icism, only observable reality is real and can be known through science.  
Regarding the concept of “structure” in neorealism, this explanation con-
sequently means that structure has “no being”. It is not an ontological entity, 
as “structure” is a concept; a device to organize our observation. Hence in a 
positivist approach, structure is operationalized by “translation” into observ-
ables: the distribution of power, with a concept of power as the capability of 
the state (measurable). 
However, despite these differences in the treatment of theoretical terms, 
scientific realism and positivism do share an important feature: “Scientific 
realism assumes that reality exists independent of human beings – that sub-
ject and object are distinct – and can be discovered through science” (Wendt 
1999: 49). However, for scientific realism and in contrast to positivism, this 
holds true for unobservables as well. A scientific realist interpretation of sci-
ence depends on a distinction between subject and object (Wendt 1999: 50). 
At the core of Wendt’s work is an interest in the scientific inquiry into the 
unobservable “deep structure” of the international system (Wendt 1999: 49). 
He takes this approach with the intention of building an argument against the 
claim from positivist IR that structural analysis of unobservables is unscien-
tific. 
However, Wendt faces a fundamental problem: social structures are dif-
ferent to material structures. This is because of the ideational nature of social 
structures. This nature calls into question the argument of an independence of 
social (ideational) structures from the human mind and raises doubts that sub-
ject and object are distinct – the precondition for being knowable through 
both positivist and realist science. A scientific realist position about natural 
science seems to be unproblematic because it is based on a materialist ontol-
ogy where an object-subject distinction is possible. But what about scientific 
realist social science? Here the core question is: How can social kinds remain 
“objective” despite their basis in shared ideas? (Wendt 1999: 72). How can 
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they be claimed to be legitimate objects of science the same way that natural 
kinds are?  
In Wendt’s words the central question is: “How is it possible to adopt an 
idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or pos-
itivism broadly understood?” (Wendt 1999: 47). Is the ontology of the social 
world consistent with scientific realism? Wendt is convinced that it is. Let us 
therefore continue on to the line of argument for this affirmative position. 
1.2. Social structures are also real and legitimate “objects” of 
scientific inquiry 
We have learned that Wendt’s aim is to formulate a scientific realist perspec-
tive about the structure of social systems. In his writings he uses the term 
“social kinds”, a term derived from John Searl (1995: The Construction of 
Social Reality). It refers to the “things in the social world”, such as “society”, 
the “state”, “money”, the “family”, the “school” etc.: It is the nature of “so-
cial kinds” that they are “made of ideas” (Wendt 1998: 103). We will read 
and learn about the social (that is, inherently ideational) nature of “social 
kinds” in more detail later (Step 2). For didactical reasons, we will first start 
with the arguments to establish the status of social structures as legitimate 
objects of science, i.e. as objects of scientific inquiry for which a fundamental 
subject/object distinction is claimed to be possible (in line with scientific re-
alism). To recall the “problem of social kinds”: If social kinds are made of 
ideas, then we can hardly claim an independent existence from human beings 
and their minds, language etc. At a more general as well as abstract and phil-
osophical level, this problem is known as the mind/body or mind/matter 
problem: are the material/nature and the ideational distinct entities or not? 
Philosophical materialism/physicalism  
Wendt’s solution to this problem is to claim a final, ultimate fundamental basis 
of the social world in nature (materialism). He holds that society is not reduci-
ble to nature, but nature is perceived as the material foundation of society 
(Wendt 1999: 51, my italics). In other words, Wendt’s position is rooted in the 
belief that the world is ultimately made of material things: at the most basic 
level, sub-atomic particles (matter/material nature to be studied by physics). 
This position is called philosophical materialism or physicalism. In a nutshell, 
Wendt commits to a social science that is not distinct from the natural sciences 
(Wendt 1999: 52). The underlying assumption is that the world ultimately con-
tains “natural kinds”, or material entities with “causal power” due to intrinsic 
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thought-independent structures. The material entities hence have the effect of 
“reality constraints”. In other words, social science theories should conform to 
the findings of natural science regarding natural kinds (matter) (Wendt 1999: 
58). In the second unit of Part 1, this positivist position has also been called 
“naturalism” (a materialist or physicalist position). 
So how can “social kinds” remain “objective” despite their basis in shared 
ideas? The answer is a metaphysical argument that points to an ultimate ma-
terial base of society and/or the social world in physical, material properties. 
Human beings are thus perceived as “natural kinds” with “intrinsic material 
properties” such as brains or genetic predispositions (Wendt 1999: 72). The 
mind (ideas/theories/the social etc.) ultimately rests in the material world 
(body/matter/ material, physical world): “In the last analysis a theory of so-
cial kinds must refer to natural kinds, including human bodies and their phys-
ical behavior, which are amenable to a causal theory of reference” (Wendt 
1999: 72). For Wendt, there is a need for a theory that takes account of the 
contribution of mind and language “yet is anchored to external reality.” 
(Wendt 1999: 57, my italics). Wendt sums up his materialist position with the 
words “Constructivism without nature goes too far!” (Wendt 1999: 72, em-
phasis mine). 
Epistemological individualism 
A naturalist position or “constructivism with nature” allows one to think 
about “social kinds” as “objective” and hence able to be known by human 
subjects. However, there is a second step in Wendt’s argument that makes the 
thesis of an object-subject-distinction for social kinds too strong: “Even 
though social kinds are not mind/discourse-independent of the collectivity 
that constitutes them, they are usually independent of the minds and dis-
course of the individuals who want to explain them” (Wendt 1999: 75, italics 
in the original). It is the nature of social kinds that they are collectively con-
stituted. This is an ontologically idealist position (to be elaborated in more 
detail in Step 2) that is attached to an epistemological position of “objectiv-
ism”. This attachment allows one to think of the social world as “confronting 
the individual as objective social facts”. Wendt calls it epistemological indi-
vidualism (Wendt 1999: 75, my italics), in which “(t)he international system 
confronts the IR theorist as an objective social fact that is independent of his 
or her beliefs (…)” (Wendt 1999: 75). For Wendt, the same is true for the po-
litical decision-makers: “As lay scientists, foreign policy decision-makers 
experience a similar dualism of subject and object in their daily efforts to ne-
gotiate the world” (Wendt 1999: 75). 
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In sum, “social kinds” such as a “state” or the “states system” confront 
the researcher as natural facts, as objects. To be objects, they have to be “rei-
fied” (Wendt 1999: 76). As the result of reification, the “states system” is as-
sumed to exist independently of social scientists. It therefore becomes a legit-
imate object of scientific inquiry or for political decision-making by (foreign) 
policy-makers. The interaction with the reality of the states system regulates 
the theorizing about it (Wendt 1999: 63): ontology is before epistemology.  
Moments of reflexivity: Blurring the object/subject distinction 
In contrast to the natural world, however, Wendt maintains that the subject-
object distinction varies when it comes to the social world (Wendt 1999: 73, 
my italics) because the extent to which material forces determine social kinds 
varies. The influence of material forces is treated as a variable and, as a vari-
able, can be examined empirically. Nevertheless, due to the fundamental nat-
uralist position there ultimately is a subject-object-distinction. 
Exceptions to the “rule” of an object-subject distinction occur “when col-
lectives become aware of the social kinds they are constituting and move to 
change them, in what might be called a moment of ‘reflexivity’ (Wendt 1999: 
76, emphasis original). This potential of reflexivity is unique to the social 
world as compared to the natural world. “In effect, if a social kind can ‘know 
itself’, then it may be able to recall its human authorship, transcend the sub-
ject-object distinction, and create new social kinds (Wendt 1999: 76). In such 
“moments of reflexivity”, social scientific theories can become part of their 
world. Only then is reality caused by theory and the distinction between sub-
ject and object becomes blurred. However, for Wendt, this happens only as 
an exception and is very rare. A different position would make a scientific re-
alist approach to the social world impossible; as Wendt argues, “[i]f societies 
were constantly doing this – in a sort of ‘permanent conceptual revolution’ – 
we could not be realists about society.” (Wendt 1999: 76). 
Truth of theory 
Against the background of the position “ontology before epistemology” (i.e. 
reality/ontology conditions theory/epistemology; theory as a reflection of re-
ality), the “ultimate argument for realism” is that science has been a success 
in helping to manipulate the world (Wendt 1999: 59-64). By formulating sci-
entific theories we are getting closer to the (unobservable) structures of reali-
ty and hence gradually gaining a better understanding of the world. In line 
with scientific realism, Wendt argues that a theory is “true” to the extent that 
it reflects the causal structure of the world (also called “correspondence theo-
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ry of truth”). In essence, theories are always being tested against other theo-
ries, not against pre-theoretical foundations (realism is anti-foundationalist). 
We thus cannot know for certain that a claim of reference is true, as there is 
only “approximate truth”. For this reason, scientists have to rely on “mature 
theories” that have proven successful in the world (Wendt 1999: 59).  
Summary 
For Wendt, the ideational structure of the social world does not prevent a sci-
entific realist approach to the study of this world. This is because of his con-
viction that a) there is an ultimate material base for social kinds (although to 
varying degrees) and b) social kinds have intrinsic powers and dispositions 
that exist independently of the mind/discourse of those who wish to know 
them. These two core arguments establish the ontological status of unobserv-
able social structures as “real” and as legitimate objects of scientific inquiry, 
independent of the subject of inquiry itself. 
Let us now take the next step in learning about the new ontology on 
which Wendt’s social theory is based. As a social constructivist, Wendt is in-
terested in the difference that ideas make. In contrast to Waltz, Wendt feels 
that not only material factors count when it comes to the structure of the in-
ternational system. For him, immaterial, ideational factors are also essential. 
More than this, for Wendt “(…) the role of the material base in international 
politics is relatively small, even if it remains essential for preserving a causal 
theory of reference” (Wendt 1999: 73; emphasis mine). 
This discussion now brings us back to the ideational nature/ontology of 
social structures in more detail. 
Step 2: 
The ontological status of “structure” as “made of ideas”: 
Common and collective knowledge (culture) 
Wendt’s interest in the effects of ideational/social structures has led to that 
theoretical approach being called “social constructivist”. Reality is socially 
constructed, based on collective ideas (idealism of social constructivism). 
The position points to the intersubjective quality of the social world, the role 
of ideas, constitutive rules and norms, and the endogenous forming of inter-
ests and ideas. When compared to ontologically positivist theorizing, these 
aspects demonstrate different statements and assumptions about the “sub-
stance” of international politics and lead to different theoretical results about 
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such central issues of international politics as “anarchy” or “sovereignty”. 
This focus on the ideational nature of structure caused Wendt to become as-
sociated with social constructivism in the first place: in his words, “Anarchy 
is what states make of it” (Wendt 1987), a social construction that varies de-
pending on the collective ideas that constitute the structure. Both the structure 
of “anarchy” and the institution of “sovereignty” are theoretically rethought 
as “social kinds”; they are constructed by the way actors act and depending 
on which collective ideas they share.  
In this section, we will learn about the idealist ontology of social con-
structivism in more detail. 
For Wendt, the structure of any social system consists of three “ele-
ments”: a material structure, a structure of interests, and an ideational struc-
ture (Wendt 1999: 139). It is only for analytical purposes that he treats them 
as separate structures. According to Wendt, “[t]he task of structural theoriz-
ing ultimately must be to show how the elements of a system fit together into 
some kind of whole” (Wendt 1999: 139). 
Particularly relevant for Wendt is the ideational aspect of social structure; 
he defines the ideational structure of any social system as the “distribution of 
knowledge” (Wendt 1999: 140). Knowledge is the ideational “substance” of 
structure and can be private or shared. Private or “common” knowledge are 
the ideas and beliefs that individual actors hold. They are not shared by other 
actors. Shared knowledge, on the other hand, is collective knowledge; it is so-
cially shared knowledge, or “culture” (Wendt 1999: 141). In regard to collec-
tive knowledge, Wendt’s work owes an intellectual debt to Emile Durkheim 
(Durkheim 1898: Individual and collective representations, see also Ruggie 
1998 for the intellectual roots of Wendt’s thought on collective ideas). 
Through interaction, private beliefs also emerge as a social structure of 
knowledge. In other words, private beliefs when aggregated become an 
emergent, systemic phenomenon. Collective knowledge, or “culture” as the 
ideational structure, cannot be reduced to the individual knowledge held by 
individual actors (ontological and methodological holistic perspective). Cul-
ture takes many forms, including norms, rules, institutions, ideologies, organ-
izations, etc. Please note that “culture” here refers to the collective ideational 
quality of any social structure, not to a sphere of society distinct from the 
economy or polity. 
Wendt’s idealist, holistic ontology therefore points to a cultural structure 




In order to learn more about the ideational or cultural structure of the in-
ternational system please now read Wendt 1999: chapter 6 (Three cultures 
of anarchy), 246-312, before returning to the text of the learning unit. 
 
The core of Wendt’s work is the description of structure as “made of ideas”. 
However, going beyond that description is the question of which effects the 
ideational structures of a social system have (Wendt 1999: 139). He is inter-
ested in the difference ideational structures make. This question is ultimately 
one of explanation; however, in order to better understand the theoretical po-
sitions that answer that question, we have to take another step in learning 
about the new ontology. We will do so next by outlining the meta-theoretical 
perspective on agency and structure at the heart of Wendt’s theory. 
Step 3: 
Agency and social structure: Ontological interdependence as 
“mutual constitution”  
Remember what you already know from the fourth unit of Part 1 about the 
ontological as well as epistemological aspects of the so-called “agent-
structure-problem”. For Wendt’s attempt to formulate a “social theory” of in-
ternational politics based on a new ontology, it is the ontological aspect that 
is central. Together with his position on scientific realism, the specific solu-
tion to the ontological aspect of the agent-structure problem is the key to un-
derstanding the new ontology of Wendt’s project of formulating a new type 
of structural theorizing in IR. 
You have already learned in Unit 4 of this book that individualists and ho-
lists both agree that agents and structures are somehow interdependent. For 
ontological individualism (such as neorealist theory, neoinstitutionalism and 
new liberal theory), actors are assumed to be ontologically prior to structure. 
In an ontological manner, structure can be reduced to the properties and in-
teractions of individual agents. For ontological holists/structuralists (such as 
world-systems theory), structure is assumed to be ontologically prior to ac-
tors. Ontologically, structure has irreducible emergent, systemic properties. 
Wendt goes beyond the two positions by choosing a third variant of think-
ing about agency and structure that draws on structuration theory from sociol-
ogy (Giddens 1979: Central Problems in Social Theory; and 1984: The Consti-
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tution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration). Structuration theory 
puts forward an ontological perspective of a mutual constitution of agency and 
structure. It is presented as an alternative social ontology to individualist and 
structuralist approaches to the agent-structure problem. The basic theoretical 
statements of agents and structures as being mutually constituted, or co-
determined, entities can be summarized as follows (see Wendt 1987: 355-356): 
 
1) Agents and structures are assumed as mutually constitutive, but ontological-
ly distinct entities. There is no ontological priority of either agency or struc-
ture, but a mutual dependency/co-determination (or what Wendt calls “dia-
lectical synthesis”). Structure and agents are each an effect of the other. 
2) Structures are constitutive for actors and their interests. At the same time, 
actors constantly produce and reproduce structure. Structures of social 
systems are thus both a medium and an outcome of the practices that con-
stitute such social systems. Social structures are results of intended and 
unintended consequences of human action. On the other hand, those ac-
tions presuppose and are mediated by structural context. This is also 
called duality of structure (a term from Giddens). 
3) The constitutive rules and norms inherent in structure allow structure to 
constrain and enable action. 
4) Social structures are bound to spatial and temporal structures: they are 
space-time-specific. Specifically, time and space have to be integrated in-
to theoretical research. Social theories are not trans-historical. 
 
In other words, at the heart of structuration theory is the position of an onto-
logical interdependence of agents and structure. Agents and structure are as-
sumed to be ontologically distinct entities, but ontologically assumed to be 
dependent upon each other. The ontological interdependence is conceptual-
ized as “mutual constitution” or co-determination. 
Please keep in mind that structuration theory is a meta-theory, NOT a 
substantive theory. It belongs to “second order theorizing” (social theory), 
which, according to Wendt, can be used for or applied to first-order theoriz-
ing (substantive IR theory). Hence structuration theory is not about “sub-
stance” of the social world, i.e. not about particular, concrete social systems, 
agents, and structures (Wendt 1987: 355). Instead, it frames our thinking 
about it in a meta-theoretical way. 
So what are the benefits of structuration theory being applied to formulate 
a new structural theory of IR? For Wendt, structuration theory aids in going 
beyond reductionist structural theorizing because the perspective preserves 
the “generative and relational aspect” of structuralism while at the same time 
conceptually and methodologically NOT drawing on a separation of genera-
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tive structures from the self-realizations and practices of human agents (du-
ality of structure, no “reification” of structure) (Wendt 1987: 355). The rea-
sons for this lie in the different ontological perspective of the agent-structure 
problem as described above. 
The generative and relational aspect of structure can be described as fol-
lows: structure is defined as a “set of internally related elements” (Wendt 1987: 
357) such as agents, practices, technologies, territories, etc. These “elements” 
have a position within the social organization of the system. They are internally 
related; that is, they cannot be defined or conceived independently of their po-
sition in the social structure (we know this position from world-systems theo-
ry). The perspective of structuration theory when applied to IR holds that states 
(agency) are generated or constituted by the system’s internal relations. Thus, 
states can be defined or conceived as “states” only by their position in a global 
(systems) structure. Structures generate agents and their behavior; they consti-
tute the conditions of existence for states and state action and make the con-
cepts “state”, “state power”, or “foreign policy” possible. The properties of the 
elements of a relation are internal to the relation itself; they do not exist apart 
from it (Wendt 1998: 114). This position is in contrast to neorealism, in which 
structures are externally related to preexisting state agents. An example for a 
structural relation is “sovereignty” as an organizing principle of the interstate 
system; sovereignty generates and constitutes states as states.  
From what has been written so far and from your self-study (all of which 
are related to the “substantive” theory of IR as the result of “applied philoso-
phy”), it becomes clear that Wendt sees “agency” as the “state”. The core 
question is thus how states (agency) are constituted by the generative and re-
lational aspect of structure. 
However, social structures do not exist independently of the activities and 
practices of agents. The deep structures of the state system exist only through 
the practices of states. This is in contrast to the structuralism of world-
systems theory with its position of an ontological priority of structure that de-
termines or prescribes the actors’ actions.  
For Wendt, there are two relevant types of structure: social kinds are con-
stituted by internal (organizational) structures and by external social struc-
tures. Both form a “constituting social structure”, a set of relationships that 
define a social kind as such (Wendt 1998: 113).  
With an emphasis on structuration theory and a holistic ideational per-
spective on structure, agents are mainly perceived as being constituted by ex-
ternal social structures. Internal organizational structures (Wendt calls them 
“anatomy”) explain intrinsic causal powers and interests of agents. “Internal 
structure” refers to the “structure of a thing as such” (Wendt 1998: 112). Ex-
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amples for this include water being constituted by an atomic structure, human 
beings constituted by genetic structure and brain, or states constituted inter-
nally by organizational structures. Because of their internal structure (“anat-
omy”), actors are able to reflect on their activities. Reasonable action, reflec-
tion and adoption of behavior, and the ability to make decisions are all there-
fore possible (Wendt 1987: 359): Wendt applies the idea of internal structure 
to states and treats them as agents/persons – a position that has been heavily 
criticized but revised in his later work (for a critique and auto-critique of the 
treatment of the state as an agent/person see the contributions in Guzzi-
ni/Leander 2006 and Wendt 2006: 182). 
The distinction of internal organizational structures and external social 
structures is demonstrated by using the example of state sovereignty: here, 
“internal structure” refers to exclusive political control and territorial monop-
oly and the legitimate use of violence. For example, “internal sovereignty”, is 
treated as the intrinsic properties and causal powers of agents/states. “Exter-
nal sovereignty” exists because of states’ mutual recognition of each other’s 
sovereignty, a relational, generative aspect. Sovereignty is an institution (so-
cial structure) between states that is decisive for their rights. Sovereignty (as 
the external social relation) does not exist independently of or prior to these 
internal rights. On the other hand, internal rights do not exist when they have 
not been constructed by the external social relations of mutual recognition 
(see in more detail Wendt 1998: 114). 
The ontological and conceptual interdependence of agents and structures 
as mutually constitutive agencies (as derived from structuration theory) thus 
has implications for explanation. We will learn about the specific approach to 
explanation in the next step. For this purpose, please keep in mind that Wendt 
is interested in the effects of (unobservable) ideational structures. 
Step 4: 
Explanation 
4.1. A question-driven approach 
Just as structuralist (holistic) and agent-based (individualist) approaches are 
distinct in their underlying ontology, structural and individualist approaches 
are distinct in their explanation of social action. An explanation that takes 
“structure” as the starting point (such as in the structuralist approach of 
world-systems theory) epistemologically usually draws on “understanding” 
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(or interpretation). Recall what you have learned about interpretation in our 
learning unit on world-systems theory. An explanation that takes actors as the 
starting point (actor-centered approach, such as in neoinstitutionalism or new 
liberal theory) usually involves “explanation” (recall “explanation” in neoin-
stitutionalist and new liberal theory). For Wendt, such a distinction between 
an “insider approach to knowledge” (understanding) and an “outsider ap-
proach to knowledge” (explaining) is not helpful (Wendt 1998: 102-104). 
What he is criticizing is the “second-class status” for “understanding” in the 
social sciences (Wendt 1998: 104; for explaining and understanding see Hol-
lis/Smith 1990: Explaining and Understanding International Relations). Tra-
ditionally, only “explaining” is associated with “science”. This comprises an 
epistemological perspective that equates positivism with science – a position 
that has already been discussed in the Part 1 of this book. 
Wendt takes a position against the view that there is a distinction between 
explanation and understanding as science and non-science. For him, explana-
tion and understanding are not mutually exclusive (Wendt 1998: 103). Ex-
planation and understanding should not be distinguished by drawing a line 
between “science” versus “non-science”, but by the type of questions that the 
researcher is asking. Hence Wendt epistemologically suggests a “question-
oriented approach” (Wendt 1998: 103). For him, non-causal inquiry (tradi-
tionally associated with understanding) can be explanatory: “The distinction 
between Explanation and Understanding is not one between explanation and 
description, but between explanations that answer different kinds of question, 
causal and constitutive” (Wendt 1998: 104, my italics).  
BOTH are necessary elements of a complete explanation of social action 
(Wendt 1987: 362). This epistemological position will be elaborated in the 
next section in more detail. 
4.2. Causal and constitutive explanation 
In order to understand the question-oriented approach to explanation, it is 
important to keep in mind that scientific realism emphasizes “ontology before 
epistemology”. In other words, as opposed to positivism, it is ontology and 
not epistemology that legitimates scientific practice (Wendt 1999: 91, see al-
so Step 1). For the purposes of explanation, this reversal implies that the form 
of scientific explanation depends on the nature and causal properties of enti-
ties. In short, the type and form of explanation depends on ontology. Expla-
nation in turn depends on the object of the question, on “what is taken to be 
problematic” (Wendt 1987: 362). 
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The position of an ontological and conceptual interdependence of agents 
and structures as “mutually constitutive” (structuration theory) thus has im-
plications for explanation. These implications emerge because, ontologically, 
both (agency and structure) are involved in the production of the social world 
(mutual constitution, co-determination). 
Wendt makes a distinction between two types of questions:  
 
1) “Why (did X happen rather than Y)?”  
2) “How (is action X possible) and what?” (Wendt 1987: 362) 
 
The former is a causal question to be answered by causal theory, the latter a 
constitutive question to be answered by constitutive theory. 
Causal theory: historical explanation 
Causal theory offers answers to Why-questions and requires a type of expla-
nation in the format “X causes Y”. It is the classical form of explanation that 
rests on independent and dependent variables and establishes a causal relation 
between them. That is, X and Y exist independently of each other, X pre-
cedes Y in time, and without X, Y would not have occurred (Wendt 1998: 
105). This type of causal explanation is an explanation of changes in the state 
of some variables. Factors of a change in the dependent variable exist inde-
pendently and temporally prior to the transition. Causality is a relation of log-
ical necessity to initial conditions and laws: if A, then B. It establishes a 
causal relation of temporally sequenced observed events. Explanation is thus 
a generalization about observable, sequenced behavior. Wendt calls it a “his-
torical explanation” (see also Wendt 1998: 105). 
Constitutive theory: structural explanation 
The type of questions answered by constitutive theories is different; at the core 
are how-possible-questions and what-questions. Remember, underneath is the 
ontological position of a mutual constitution of agency and structure. An an-
swer to a how-possible-question thus is to show how the properties of a social 
system are constituted. Constitutive theory offers knowledge about the condi-
tions of possible natural and social kinds (Wendt 1998: 105). How-possible 
questions explain “how the elements of a social kind are composed and orga-
nized so that it has the properties that it does” (Wendt 1998: 112; also called 
“morphological” explanation, a term borrowed from Haugeland 1978).  
In contrast to how-possible-questions, what-questions are requests for 
what it is that “instantiates” a phenomenon (not why). It is also called “ex-
planation by concept”. An example for a what-question is, What kind of po-
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litical system is the EU? (Wendt 1998: 105; Wendt 1999: 110). In the ab-
sence of the structures, the properties of a phenomenon would not exist. This 
is a “conceptual” necessity, NOT a causal one as described above for the case 
of causal theories and explanation. Wendt presents the example of the Cold 
War: the factors constituting the social kind “Cold War” define what a Cold 
War is (but no causal determination) (Wendt 1998: 106). Here the assump-
tions of causal explanation, i.e. dependent and independent variable plus 
temporal sequence (if A, then B), are not applicable. The factors constituting 
the Cold War do not exist apart from a Cold War nor do they ontologically 
precede the “Cold War” in time. Rather, according to Wendt, “when they 
come into being, a Cold War comes into being with them, by definition and at 
the same time” (Wendt 1998: 106; my italics). When the constituting condi-
tions vary, the effects of constitutive structures vary. However, in this case the 
dependency in this variation is conceptual and not causal (Wendt 1998: 106).  
Answers to constitutive questions of the what-type are descriptive but ex-
planatory: They classify observations and “unify” them as parts of a whole 
(Wendt 1998: 110). “Explanations – what explain by subsuming observations 
under a concept – as opposed to a law” (Wendt 1998: 110, emphasis orig.). 
Explanation by concepts is thus about achieving explanatory power by “uni-
fication” (Wendt 1998: 111-112).  
 
Self-study (3) 
Learn more about the type “explanation by concept”, that is, explanation 
by classifying and unifying complex phenomena under a concept, based 
on the example of the EU in the text of Wendt (1998). What is the EU? 
Make use of the concepts of “federation”, “international state”, “postmod-
ern state”, “confederation”, “international regime”, “governance without 
government”, “neo-medievalism”.  
Summary 
In line with scientific realism, a constitutive explanation is usually the identifi-
cation and description of the underlying causal mechanisms of the structure 
that generated the social phenomenon. Underlying causal mechanisms make 
an event naturally necessary (ontology before epistemology). There is a need 
for abductive inference from (observable) phenomena to the existence of un-
derlying naturally necessary relations between cause and effect (unobservable 
structures and their effects). Explanation thus is showing how the unobserva-
ble causal mechanism (which makes observable regularities possible) works 
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(Wendt 1987: 354). Explanation is a process of abduction based on the ques-
tion “what must exist for these events to happen?” It is about abstracting from 
the observable phenomena to the social and internal organizational structures 
which make the phenomena and events possible (Wendt 1987: 363). 
A hint: These statements of explanation are easier to understand if you 
always bring them back to their ontological positions (remember the posi-
tions on agency and structure of structuration theory, and that ontology is be-
fore epistemology). For example, structures do NOT CAUSE the properties 
of social kinds (as being antecedent conditions for a subsequent effect); in-
stead, they constitute these properties, they make those properties possible. 
Social kinds are constituted in a holistic way by the external structures in 
which they are embedded. What these kinds are (what) or how they come in-
to being (how possible) is dependent on the specific social structure (Wendt 
1999: 84). This is exactly the line that a constitutive explanation takes (be-
cause ontology before epistemology: epistemology reflects ontology). 
In sum: Wendt holds that “ideas or social structures have constitutive ef-
fects when they create phenomena – properties, powers, dispositions, mean-
ings, etc. – that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or 
structures, that exist only ‘in virtue of’ them” (Wendt 1999: 88). A constitu-
tive explanation describes causal mechanisms and inference ranging from 
(observable) phenomena to underlying causal mechanisms (unobservable 
structures and their constitutive effects), not subsuming events under laws 
and regularities (Wendt 1999: 82). 
To ask constitutive questions is usually the domain of interpretivists, crit-
ical theorists and postmodernists, and requires interpretive methods (Wendt 
1999: 85). Constitutive theories thus have a large descriptive dimension, but 
there is also an explanatory function for this type of theory. 
In fact, what Wendt offers is epistemologically quite a “relaxed” position: 
“In my view the real lesson of realism in the realm of causal explanation is to 
encourage a pragmatic approach, with the methodological criterion being 
whatever helps us understand how the world works. Methods appropriate to 
answer one question may differ from those for another. Scientific realism 
corrects philosophies of science which say that all explanations must conform 
to a single model, but otherwise leaves science to scientists” (Wendt 1999: 
83; my italics). 
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4.3. Epistemological interdependence: explaining by “structural-
historical analysis” 
For Wendt, there is a need for an explicit epistemological and methodological 
distinction between the two “logics” of the questions: structural (constitutive) 
analysis explains the “possible” (how-possible and what-questions), while 
“historical analysis” explains the “actual” (why-question). However, explain-
ing the “possible” and “what” by constitutive theory is only the first step. If 
the relevant activating conditions are not there, then they will not be actual-
ized by the behavior of actors (Wendt 1998: 111, my emphasis). When dispo-
sitions are actualized, this is the domain of causal theories. In other words, 
causal theories explain actual behavior (historical explanation): Why-questions 
require answers to how-questions (Wendt 1987: 363, my emphasis). 
Finally, Wendt perceives the two forms of explanation as distinct, but 
epistemologically interdependent (Wendt 1987: 363). His work is a plea for 
structural and historical explanations to be integrated into “structural-
historical analysis” (Wendt 1987: 362, my italics; the term “structural-
historical analysis” or “dialectical analysis” is borrowed from dependency 
theorists Cardoso and Faletto).  
“Structural-historical analysis” in IR therefore involves abstract structural 
analysis by constitutive theory to explain the causal powers, practices and in-
terests of states. It also necessitates concrete historical analysis (causal theo-
ry) to reveal the causal sequence of choices and interactions that lead to par-
ticular events (and to the reproduction of structures) (Wendt 1987: 364). 
Structural analysis is thus only one part of a complete explanation; it un-
covers “tendencies” for structures (possibilities) that can be “actualized” in a 
certain way. However, a structural explanation cannot offer generalization or 
prediction. This is instead the domain of historical analysis, the other part of 
a complete explanation. Historical analysis takes the interests and powers of 
agents as given and explains the emergence and persistence of structural con-
ditions. Structural and historical analyses are distinct modes of explanation, 
as each explains the properties of the central objects of the other (Wendt 
1987: 364). In order to provide a complete explanation, they must be inte-
grated (epistemological interdependence). A complete explanation of state 
action therefore explains how the action was possible and why that possibility 
was actualized in a particular form at a given moment (Wendt 1987: 364). 
Thus, for Wendt, structuration theory offers a research agenda for theoriz-
ing both actors (state agents) and system structures. Its core is comprised of 
structural analysis, which serves to theorize the conditions of the existence of 
state agents. The use of historical analysis complements structural analysis by 
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explaining the genesis and reproduction of social structures by concrete ac-
tion. However, Wendt is aware of the methodological difficulty this approach 
involves: the distinct modes of explanation are not simultaneously possible 
and need to take temporally either structures or agents as given in order to 
examine their respective explanatory effects. For a general critique of this 
problem of structuration theory, see Archer 1982, 1995. In fact, as reflected 
in Wendt’s social constructivist “substantive” IR theory, he himself gives 
preference and priority to the structural aspect of explanation. 
4.4. Political relevance 
Wendt claims that a scientific realist approach to IR is “revolutionary” in that 
it gives scientific legitimacy to structural theorizing. At the same time, Wendt 
perceives his work as “critical” science in that it requires looking beyond the 
observable forms and appearances of phenomena and events and uncovering 
underlying unobservable social structures that generate the observable phe-
nomena (Wendt 1987: 363, 370). In short: Phenomena in international poli-
tics are not always what they seem to be. The particular social constructivist 
perspective attached to the scientific realist understanding of science points to 
the ideational nature of social structures and their constitutive effects. In oth-
er words, transformative potentials exist in social structures because of their 
ideational quality of collectively shared ideas that constitute and hence make 
possible the social kinds. Constitutive analysis can then show that social 
kinds like “sovereignty” or the “state” can take different forms. This revela-
tion opens up political possibilities that would otherwise not exist (Wendt 
1999: 87). Wendt presents the example of the Cold War, during which a fail-
ure to account for the role of ideas in generating the conflict politically con-
tributed to the “naturalization”/reification of the conflict itself. As a conse-
quence, social scientists “were not helping to empower policymakers to end 
it, just to manage it.” (Wendt 1998: 109). Only the “new thinking” of Gorba-
chev and hence “reflexivity” contributed to end the reification of the Cold 
War. For Wendt, this example at the same time provides the best evidence for 
the truth of a social constructivist perspective: “If shared ideas do not explain 
the Cold War, then policymakers could not end the Cold War by changing 
their ideas.” (Wendt 1998: 109). Another example for Wendt is state sover-
eignty. In his view, a denaturalizing of sovereignty by uncovering it as “so-
cial” increases the ability of international society to make progressive chang-
es by re-thinking sovereignty and transforming the shared ideas and mean-
ings which underlie this particular social structure. We could thus change the 
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meaning of a sovereignty that constitutes rights that enable states to repress 
their people or to keep out refugees (Wendt 1998: 114-115). 
For Wendt, the lessons learned from a perspective based on a scientific 
realist and constructivist ontology combined with a question-driven approach 
to explanation means being aware of the “politics of questions”. He adds that 
politics is always for someone and for some purpose. The criteria for ade-
quate knowledge always depend on the question asked. This criteria is diffi-
cult to determine, as “(…) it is not individual scientists who naturalize things 
but whole communities of them, who may be organized, often for decades, 
around certain uncontested assumptions” (Wendt 1999: 89). Wendt’s work 
can be read as strong encouragement to ask new questions. Unfortunately, in 
the academic literature, neither these critical aspects nor the political rele-
vance of Wendt’s social theory have usually been at the center of attention 
and debate.  
 
Self-study (4) 
Reflect on the practical political implications a social constructivist per-
spective holds for current problems of international politics.  
Are theories of IR themselves part of the social construction of reality? 
Step 5:  
Check your understanding: Key aspects and review 
questions 
Key aspects 
 Social constructivist theory  
Core question • A new systems theory in IR, based on a “new ontol-
ogy”  
Assumptions about actors 
and structure 
• Unobservable structures are real, independent of the 
human mind and legitimate objects of scientific in-
quiry (scientific realism)  
• Social structures are “made of ideas” (constructivist 
ontology, idealism) 
• Social structures are not reducible to their constitu-
ent elements (ontological holism) 
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 Social constructivist theory  
“Agency and structure” • No ontological priority of either agency or structure 
• Ontological interdependence of agency and struc-
ture: Agents and structures are mutually constitutive, 
but ontologically distinct entities  
• Duality of structure: Social structures are constitutive 
for actors and their interests, at the same time actors 
constantly produce and reproduce structure 
• Actors: Constituted by internal, organizational struc-
tures (“anatomy”) 
• Actors: Constituted by external social structures 
Type of explanation and 
notion of causality 
• Questions-driven approach to explanation: Form of 
explanation depends on the type of questions 
• Constitutive (structural) explanation: How-possible 
and what-questions. Causality as a relation in na-
ture/conceptual necessity  
• Causal (historical) explanation: Why-questions. Cau-
sality as a relation in logic.  
• Epistemological interdependence: Structural and his-
torical explanation to be integrated to “structural-
historical analysis” as a complete form of explanation 
Approach to “levels of 
analysis” 
 
• Micro-level structures: Actors and their interactions 
(domain of causal theory)  
• Macro-level structures/”external” social structures 
(domain of constitutive theory) 
• But: Ontological and epistemological interdepend-
ence (see “nature of explanation” and “agency and 
structure”) 
Philosophy of science • Scientific realist ontology (unobservables are real and 
legitimate objects of scientific inquiry; material-
ism/physicalism) 
• Social constructivist ontology (idealism) 
• Positivist epistemology (for causal, historical analysis 
at the micro-level of actors and interactions) 
Normative perspective • Social constructivist perspective is “critical science”. 
• Transformative potentials in social structures due to 
the ideational quality of collectively shared ideas.  
• Reality is a social construction. Ideas make a differ-
ence: Opens up political possibilities (transformation 
and change). 
• Tendencies/possibilities inherent in structure to be 
actualized by agents in a concrete way. 
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 Social constructivist theory  
Theory and practice/role of 
the scientist  
• For the scientist and policy-maker, social reality is an 
object of scientific inquiry, an objective social fact. 
• Social scientific theories can become part of their 
world only in “moments of reflexivity” 
Review questions 
1. What are the core assumptions of “constructivist” ontology?  
2. Explain the ontological position of a “mutual constitution” of agency and 
structure. 
3. Outline the constitutive in contrast to the causal model for explaining in-
ternational politics. 
Step 6: 
Final self-study and consolidation 
In his more recent writings (Wendt 2006, Wendt 2010) Wendt formulates 
critical positions and presents a fundamental revision of the ontology of his 
Social Theory (1999). In light of the findings and philosophical interpreta-
tions of quantum physics, he revises his ontology in favor of a new position 
of non-duality of subject and object and a naturalism based not on classical 
physics (Cartesian Science) but on quantum physics. In so doing, Alexander 
Wendt intends to bring the discipline back to the very basic questions of phi-
losophy of science: Is there a reality “out there” and what are the ontological 
features? Is reality material or ideational? Is reality independent of our mind? 
As has been introduced in Unit 3, many disciplines, including the natural sci-
ences, philosophy, neurosciences, neurophilosophy, biophilosophy, philoso-
phy of mind and sociobiology, are currently heavily debating these very gen-
eral questions of mind/matter, ideas/material world. There is a rising aware-
ness of the findings of quantum physics and their interpretations. It has been 
argued in Unit 3 that the debates about how to interpret these findings for the 
“macro-world” might set the parameters of meta-theoretical discourses in the 
years to come. Additionally, they might fundamentally call into question dual 
thinking in scientific inquiry and contribute to a major shift in the fundamen-
tal understanding of science in all disciplines. While this has been happening 
increasingly over the past decade, Wendt probably was and is the first to de-
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pict IR theory in light of the findings of quantum physics in recent years 
(2006, 2010).  
 
Self-study (5) 
Now please read Wendt 2006, Social Theory as Cartesian science: An au-
to-critique from a quantum perspective. In this “auto-critique”, Wendt 
claims that the ontology of his Social Theory of International Politics 
(1999) is “probably false” (p.189). Why? 
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Instead of a conclusion: 
Invitation to a discussion 
As introduced in the preface, the book is based on the idea of learning and 
studying as an active process that requires a great deal of self-organization. 
The intention behind the didactical and methodical concept was to offer a 
structured concept for learning about theory and theories of International Re-
lations, the application of which has been demonstrated in the book. The ob-
jective was to enable students to subsequently apply the concept themselves 
when learning about International Relations theory. 
Having finished reading the book and your self-study by now, there are 
several options for proceeding with this process. 
In line with the concept of “learning by example”, the criteria for the 
structured learning process have been applied during the presentation of five 
selected theories of International Relations. You might be interested in learn-
ing and studying more than just those five selected theories of IR, thereby 
broadening your knowledge about the range of particular theoretical ap-
proaches to International Relations. There are a huge number of textbooks on 
theories of IR. You will notice that the range of theories included in the text-
books varies greatly depending on the concept of the book, the author’s un-
derstanding of theory and, of course, the understanding of what IR as a sci-
ence comprises and what not. Just for a start, it might be helpful to have a 
look at the textbooks on theories of IR presented at the end of this section.  
For those students not as interested in particular theories of IR but who 
would instead rather focus on our discussion of theory and IR as a science, I 
recommend going back to our learning Units 2 and 3, re-reading the text and 
reflecting again on the arguments about the relevance of philosophies of sci-
ence and of scientific world views for theoretical thought and the fundamen-
tal understanding of IR as a science. You might be interested in reflecting on 
such questions in courses on IR or related subjects in which you are currently 
enrolled. 
In case you would like to exchange your ideas in a broader forum on iver-
sity, you are invited to actively participate in a discussion on the role of theo-
ry and IR as a science. There you can exchange your ideas, share your 
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knowledge and contribute to a debate about such fundamental questions as 
the role of science and scientific knowledge, not only in our contemporary 
world but, most importantly, for the future. 
For admission to the debate on the platform iversity (iversity.org), please 
send an email with a short statement about your interests to SpindlerIRTheo-
ry-Book@yahoo.de. Depending on students’ interests, there will be different 
working groups on a range of topics derived from our discussions in Units 2 
and 3 of the book. 
I hope you enjoyed reading the book and engaging in the recommended 
self-study activities as well as those that additional ones that go beyond the 
texts. Ideally, these activities should help you find your own means of access-
ing the world of theory of IR and a path worth following to learn more. I look 
forward to meeting you on iversity. I am also happy to receive any comments 
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